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It’s a platitude that we’re generally interested in understanding what other people are doing.  Instances of  sheer curiosity aside,  if we  lacked such an understanding we wouldn’t be able to interact with other people in the right way. If you’re holding an object up in the air, I must be able to tell whether you want to hand it to me, in which case I’ll come closer and extend my hand to receive it, or whether, instead, you want to  throw it  to me and hit me with  it,  in which case  I’d better run away and duck. Now, what does it take to understand what other people are doing? One could  think  that,  in  order  to  understand  it,  all  we  have  to  do  is  observe  other’s actions.  But  is  this  true?  Do  other  people’s  actions,  conceived  as  their  outward bodily movements, suffice to tell what these people are up to? At least in principle, action observation might not suffice. Let us reflect on the following example:  Consider Dr  Jekyll  and Mr Hyde.  The  former  is  a  renowned  surgeon who performs  appendectomies  on  his  anesthetized  patients.  The  latter  is  a dangerous  sadist who  performs  exactly  the  same  hand movements  on  his non‐anesthetized victims. As it turns out, Mr Hyde is Dr Jekyll. (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 23, my emphasis)  In order to understand what the surgeon is really doing, according to Jacob and Jeannerod, observing his bodily movements won’t suffice, as they’re the same both  in  the  case  in  which  the  surgeon  intends  to  harm  the  patient  or  when  he intends  to  help  him.  Thus,  if  a  person were  to  be  brought  in  a  law  court,  and  a witness were to say that she saw this person performing certain bodily movements 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with  a  scalpel,  independently  of  any  information  as  to  whether  this  person intended  to  harm  the  patient,  the  witness’s  report  wouldn’t  help  the  judge  to assess  whether  the  accused  person  is  to  be  blamed  or  praised.  In  a  nutshell,  if Jacob and  Jeannerod are  right,  observing others’  actions might not be  enough  to understand  what  they  are  doing.  What  else  do  we  need?  Here  is  a  plausible answer: we have to understand their intentions. For example, once we’re told that the  surgeon  intended  to  harm  his  patient,  we  are  in  a  position  to  consider  him blameworthy.   But,  in order to understand what a person  is up to,  is  it enough to be told that, besides performing a certain action, this person also had a certain intention? Consider the following example due to Davidson (1973). A climber who wants to get  rid  of  the weight  and danger  of  holding  another man  on  a  rope might  be  so unnerved by these reflections as to end up loosening his hold. So the man intends to loosen his hold, and does perform an action of loosening his hold. But loosening his  hold,  in  this  case,  is  not  brought  about  in  order  to  fulfil  the  corresponding intention. Rather, it just happens to him.   This example brings us the heart of my thesis: in order to understand what a person is doing, we have to understand what action she’s performing. Not only that,  but we  also  have  to  understand what  intention  lies  behind  her  action.  Not only  that,  but  we  must  also  be  assured  that  an  action  is  harnessed  to  the corresponding  intention  in  the  appropriate  way:  the  climber  in  Davidson’s example ends up executing the bodily movements that correspond to his intention, but, even at first blush, you’ll be able to say that he didn’t quite act in accordance with  his  intention—his  intention  and  his  action,  supposing  that  loosening  one’s hold as a consequence of nervousness can be called an action, are not connected in 
  7 
the  appropriate  way.  But  just  what  is  the  appropriate  way?  How  do  we characterize  it?  Answering  these  questions  amounts  to  answering  the  central question of the present work: how are actions connected with intentions? Searle  (1983)  has  done  some  influential  work  towards  clarifying  the appropriate way in which an intention and an action must be connected in order to be able  to  say  that an action has been  intentionally performed by  the subject, by putting forward a theory that features two kinds of intentions: prior intentions and intentions  in  action.  Prior  intentions  are  characterized  as  intentions  that  are formed  before  the  initiation  of  an  action,  whereas  intentions  in  action  are conceived  as  the  causes  of  the  bodily  movements  by  means  of  which  a  certain action  is  executed.  What  makes  the  climber’s  loosening  his  hold  fail  to  be  an intentional action, by Searle’s lights, is that the movements of the climber are not under his guidance in the sense that the climber doesn’t have the relevant intention 
in action. So, in Searle’s theory an intention in action is what connects an intention to an action, and ensures that an executed action is intentional. My answer to the central question of the thesis, namely the question as to how intentions and actions are connected, if only to an extent builds on an insight of  Searle’s  theory.  The  latter  is  certainly  on  the  right  track  insofar  as  it  aims  to pinpoint what ensures  the appropriate  connection between an  intention and  the corresponding  action,  but  it  still  suffers  from  a  fundamental  shortcoming:  the notion of intention in action, as it stands, is no more than a theoretical placeholder for what makes it the case that an action is intentional (see Pacherie, ms.). Another shortcoming  is  the  emphasis  that  Searle’s  theory  puts  on  a  temporal  difference between  intentions  that  are  formed  prior  to  the  execution  of  an  action  and intentions whose lifespan roughly coincides with that of the corresponding action. 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 In this thesis, I’m going to elaborate on the notion of intention in action by trying to make it more than a theoretical placeholder. In order to do this, I’m going to draw on the work of Elisabeth Pacherie, insofar as I take it to constitute the best philosophical attempt to combine the search for a connection between intentions and actions with the relevant results in the cognitive neuroscience of action. In this latter  field,  I’m going  to  explore mainly  the notions of mirror neurons  for  action and of motor representation, in order to answer the question as to how intentions and  actions  are  connected  by means  of  the  introduction  of  the  notion  of motor 
intention.    Mirror neurons for action are neurons in the human brain (first discovered in the macaque monkey brain) that fire both when an individual performs a certain action  and  when  she  observes  someone  else  performing  the  same  action  (Di Pellegrino  et  al.,  1992;  Rizzolatti  et  al.,  1996;  Gallese  et  al.,  1996;  Rizzolatti  & Sinigaglia, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Mukamel et al., 2010). I’m going to be  interested  in  mirror  neurons  for  action  insofar  as  they  enjoy  some  sort  of double  life,  in  the  following  sense.  On  the  one  hand,  their  activation  seems  to correlate with  bodily movements.  On  the  other  hand,  as  a  series  of  experiments that I’m going to report show, their activation significantly abstracts away from the details of the movements in correlation with which these neurons fire. I’m going to show that the characteristics of their activation gives us grounds for hypothesizing that mirror  neuron  firing  correlates with  a  specific  kind  of  intentions.  Given  the specific kind of outcome that is represented by these intentions, which is bodily in nature,  I’m  going  to  term  these motor  intentions  (cf.  Jeannerod,  1994;  Pacherie, 2003,  2006,  2008;  Jacob  &  Jeannerod,  2005),  about  which  I’m  going  to  say something in the following shortly. 
  9 
  A  motor  representation  (see  Jeannerod,  1994,  2006)  consists  in  the representation of an action outcome that depicts the self in action as a generator of forces,  and  thus  determines  the  pattern  of  movements  that  are  going  to  be executed, thereby driving action execution. Insofar as motor representations play a key role  in the production of behaviour, they are obvious candidates for fulfilling the role of intentions in action (something that is suggested by Pacherie, 2000, but see also 2003, 2006, 2008). So I’m going to tackle the question as to whether any motor  representations  are  actually  intentions.  I  argue  for  the  idea  that  those intentions that I term motor intentions can have the same content as some motor representations. Working on this assumption, I develop the idea that the content of motor intentions crucially involves one of a limited set of bodily parts, which has to undergo a specific change—one, for instance, that brings it into a specific relation to  a  certain  object  (examples  are  the  intention  to  grasp,  or  to  tear).  Motor intentions have    (a) a  bodily  content,  which  is  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  an  motor representation, and (b) their content is related to that of an motor representation either by deferral or by identity, depending on the kind of motor representation in question.   On  these  grounds,  I  contend  that  these  intentions  are  the  best  candidates  for explaining the way in which intentions connect with actions. My appeal  to  the notions of motor  representations and mirror neurons gives me the chance to make a methodological remark. In what follows, I’m going to rely on the one hand on strict armchair philosophical reflection, by looking at the work 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that  has  been  done  on  intention  in  analytical  philosophy  (I’m  going  to  make reference  to  such  authors  as  Anscombe,  Davidson,  Goldman,  Searle,  Bratman, Pacherie  and  Velleman).  On  the  other  hand,  I’m  also  going  to  rely  on  recent research  in  the  cognitive  neuroscience  of  action.  I  conceive  of  the  connection between  these  two  research  tools  in  a  twofold  way,  consisting  in  the  following double influence:  1) (From  data  in  the  cognitive  neuroscience  of  action  to  philosophical reflection.)  If  two  competing  theories  T1  and  T2  that  make  different predictions (which affect a given body of experimental data) can equally be made to stand under the theoretical viewpoint, if (say) T1 fits a body of data better than T2, then I’m going to prefer T1 to T2.  2) (From philosophical  reflection  to  the  cognitive neuroscience of  action.)  If, on the other hand, a certain philosophical theory (T1) is found to fare better than  another  (T2)  under  the  strictly  theoretical  viewpoint,  and T1  can  be applied to a given body of experimental results while  forcing a revision of the interpretation that had previously been given of those results, then I’m going to suggest that this revision should indeed be performed.  It  is  to  be  emphasized  that  even  those  who  are  sceptical  about  any  kind  of combination  between  philosophical  reflection  and  experimental  practice  should still  be  able  to  find  this  piece  of work  to  their  liking,  insofar  as  it  does  rely  to  a significant extent on strict armchair reflection.  The present thesis is organized as follows. 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Chapter 1 introduces the notion of mirror neurons for action, namely neurons that fire  both  when  an  individual  performs  a  certain  action  and  when  she  observes someone else performing the same action. I start out by considering a hypothesis according to which mirror neuron activation correlates with mere movements, and I reject it on the basis of a series of experimental results. I then introduce the idea that  mirror  neuron  activity  could  correlate  with  action  outcomes,  conceived  as being  more  abstract  than  mere  movements  insofar  as  action  outcomes  enjoy  a significant degree of independence with respect to movement details. Building on this  idea,  I  further  suggest  that  mirror  neuron  activity  could  correlate  with  a specific  kind  of  intentions,  and  I  try  to  locate  this  proposal  within  the  broader framework  of  action  understanding  based  on  Simulation  Theory.  I  contend  that clarifying  the  correlation  between  mirror  neuron  activity  and  a  certain  kind  of intentions could pave  the way  for a mirroring‐based Simulation Theory of action understanding. I conclude the first chapter by arguing, against Csibra (2007), that the outcomes with which mirror neuron activity correlates are of an intermediate kind,  that  is bound up with movement details while also significantly abstracting away  from  fine  movement  details.  This  kind  of  outcomes,  which  I  term motor 
outcomes, are going to be those represented by motor intentions. 
 
Chapter  2  is  devoted  to  beginning  to  answer  the  central  question  in  the philosophy of intention, namely that as to what, if anything, gives unity to the three guises  in  which  intentions  may  appear:  intentions  for  the  future,  intentional actions, and intentions with which someone acts. This chapter focuses on the link between  intentional  actions  and  intentions  for  the  future.  I  start  out  with  a methodological  clarification:  as much  as  it  is  true  that  the  notion  of  intentional 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action  is  connected  to  that  of  attributions  of  responsibility,  blame  or  praise,  in order  to  clarify  the  notion  of  intentional  action  we’d  better  steer  clear  of  these notions.  Once  that  is  done,  I  consider  and  reject  the  following  hypotheses: intentions may be reduced  to  intentional actions, and  intentions are  just desires. By building up on the notion that intentions are mental states that represent action outcomes, I use Bratman’s planning theory of intention to show that intentions are distinctive propositional attitudes inserted in a specific web of norms, and I review Bratman’s argument to the conclusion that the connection between intentions and intentional  actions  is  given by  the  so‐called  Single Phenomenon View: whenever one  intentionally As,  one has  the  intention  to B,  and  it’s not necessarily  the  case that A  = B.  I  then  raise  the  challenge proposed by Velleman  (2007)  to  this view: what purpose serves an intention once an intentional action is being performed? In response to this challenge, I introduce the idea that an action may be intentional by virtue of being appropriately connected to the relevant intention.  
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of motor representation, and explains why there are  reasons,  on  the  one  hand,  to  maintain  that  motor  representations  are intentions, and, on the other hand, reasons to think that motor representations are the wrong thing to be identified with intentions. In this chapter I’m going to argue for an intermediate, neutral position according to which the content of some motor representations  can  be  a  good  guide  to  the  content  of  some  intentions,  which, following  Jeannerod  (1994)  and  in  a  different  sense  with  respect  to  Pacherie’s (2003, 2006, 2008) use of  the  term,  I’m going  to call motor  intentions. My stance leaves open  the possibility  that  some motor  representations  could be  intentions, but  doesn’t  commit  to  this  idea.  Pacherie  proposes  the  distinction  between  two 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kinds of intention whose function is to initiate, sustain, guide and monitor actions: present‐directed  (or P‐)intentions on  the one hand,  and motor  (or M‐)intentions on the other hand, which are supposed to differ, among other things, insofar as the contents of P‐intentions are accessible  to  introspection, while  the  contents of M‐intentions are  typically not.  I  endorse  the  idea  that  the content of  intentions can encompass  all  the  contents  that  Pacherie  describes  as  pertaining  to  P‐intentions and at least some of the contents that she describes as belonging to M‐intentions, with  the  exclusion  of  contents  concerning  action  adjustments.  Still,  I  reject  the notion  that  two  kinds  of  intentions  should  be  distinguished  on  the  basis  of accessibility to introspection.  
Chapter 4 highlights the existence of a variety of motor intentions, corresponding to  different  levels  of  an  action  hierarchy.  While  the  motor  intentions corresponding to the lower levels of the hierarchy bear a significant resemblance to motor images in terms of content, the content of motor intentions higher up in the hierarchy  is not so straightforwardly  identifiable with  that of a motor  image. This  implies  that  motor  intentions  higher  up  in  the  hierarchy  are  less controversially classified as intentions, insofar as they have a propositional format and  a  conceptual  content.  As  far  as motor  intentions  lower  in  the  hierarchy,  the acknowledgement  that  they  are  propositional  attitudes,  and  of  their  having  a conceptual content relies on the acceptance of the demonstrative strategy and/or of the notion of executable concepts. What brings together all these different kinds of  motor  representation  is  the  fact  that  their  content  involves  reference  to sequences  of  bodily  configurations.  Now  I’m  in  the  position  to  specify  the 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similarity  in  terms  of  content  between  motor  intentions  and  motor representations, which was introduced in chapter 3, as follows: (i) motor  intentions  at  the  lower  levels  of  the  hierarchy  refer  to  action outcomes by deferring their content to that of a motor representation (see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012) whose content is likely to be a motor image; (ii) motor intentions at the higher levels of the hierarchy are likely to have the same  content  as  that  of  corresponding  motor  representations,  which  is likely not to consist in a motor image.  
Chapter 5 tackles the distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action introduced by Searle  (1983)  in  terms of  temporal  characteristics  and of  content. According to the temporal characterization, prior intentions are formed prior to the performance  of  an  action,  whereas  intentions  in  action  are  present  as  an intentional action unfolds.  I show that  the temporal criteria don’t suffice to draw the  distinction.  On  the  basis  of  O’Shaughnessy  (1991),  it  can  be  shown  that  the prior  intention has to  last until  the action  is completed. Hence, after action onset there  is an overlap between prior  intentions and  intentions  in action, and one of the two kinds of intention seems to become redundant. Can differences in content preserve the distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action? On the basis of both Searle (1983) and Pacherie (2006, 2008), I try to make a case for the idea that there has to be a difference in content between the two kinds of intention before  and  after  action  onset.  However,  I  also  provide  the  example  of  a  case  in which the content of the prior intention is as detailed as that of the corresponding intention  in action. So,  in that case,  there  is no difference  in content between the two kinds of intention. In conclusion, prior intentions and intentions in action are 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insufficiently  distinguished  on  the  basis  of  temporal  characteristics,  and  don’t always  differ  in  content  related  features,  so  that  the  distinction,  as  a  whole,  is inadequately motivated. The take‐home message  is  that there doesn’t seem to be any  reason  to  postulate  two  different  kinds  of  intention,  based  on  a  temporal criterion.  So,  in  the  framework  for  intentions proposed  in  the  following  chapter, only one kind of intention is going to feature.  
Chapter  6  finally  puts  me  in  the  position  to  describe  intentions  in  terms  of  a hierarchical structure of which motor intentions occupy the lowest levels, and non‐motor intentions, if any, occupy the levels above. Here I take up again the notion of action hierarchy, so far only hinted at.  I elaborate on Goldman’s (1970) notion of level‐generation among different action descriptions, and I reinterpret it in terms of what I call means‐end‐generation, which comes at least into two kinds (properly called  means‐end‐generation,  and  determinate‐determinable‐generation).  Action descriptions  can  be  ordered  hierarchically  according  to  the  principle  of  means‐end‐generation.  Once  action  descriptions  have  been  ordered  hierarchically  this way,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  second  hierarchical  ordering  of  the  intentions corresponding  to  the action descriptions  that  feature  in  the  first hierarchy. Thus what  I  call  a  vertical  dimension  for  ordering  intentions  appears,  and  motor intentions are shown to occupy the lowest level of this hierarchical ordering. This gives me the chance to draw a distinction between the notion of motor  intention and that of intention fulfilled by a basic action. I also trace a horizontal dimension for  ordering  intentions  on  the  basis  of  temporal  relations  holding  among  the corresponding  actions.  In  the  light  of  this  hierarchy,  it  is  possible  to  account  for two notions of intention‐with‐which that are distinguished at the beginning of the 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Introduction Suppose  I’m  in  the presence of other people who are  carrying out  some  familiar activities—say,  someone’s  bringing  food  to  her  mouth,  while  someone  else  is moving objects  away  from  table. While  I  observe  these  individuals,  I understand what  they  are  doing—that  is,  I  understand  that  the  goals  of  their  actions  are, respectively, eating and tidying up. What does this understanding consist in? Is it the case that I explicitly reason on the details of the action that I observe to then conclude  that  it’s  an  instance  of,  e.g.,  eating?  Do  I  thereby  believe  that  it  is  the subject’s intention to do it? Or does my action understanding consist in a different process altogether? Contemporary cognitive neuroscience may have something to contribute to this matter. Consider that there exist neurons in the human brain (first discovered in the macaque monkey brain) that fire both when an individual performs a certain action and when she observes someone else performing the same action, namely mirror  neurons1  (Di  Pellegrino  et  al.,  1992;  Rizzolatti  et  al.,  1996;  Gallese  et  al., 1996; Rizzolatti &  Sinigaglia,  2008; Rizzolatti &  Sinigaglia,  2010; Mukamel  et  al., 2010). It’s reasonable to suppose that the firing of mirror neurons in the brain of a 
                                                        1  Even  though  mirror  neurons  were  originally  discovered  in  the  domain  of  action,  in recent  years  a  number  of  studies  have  established  the  existence  of mirror  neurons  for emotions and sensations as well (Avenanti et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003). In the present work, however, I’m going to focus  on  mirror  neurons  for  actions  only—and  it’s  only  to  those  that  the  provided characterization in terms of action performance and action observation applies. 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subject  who  performs  a  certain  action  might  serve  the  purpose  of  behaviour production. However, the question arises as to what role, if any, the firing of mirror neurons  plays  in  the  observer’s  brain.  One  might  conjecture  that  this  neural activation  in  each  individual’s  brain  enables  the  individual  to  represent  the intention  to  perform  the  action  that  one  of  the  two  is  executing  (Gallese,  2001), and  that  mirror  neuron  activation  in  the  observer  is  connected  to  action understanding  (Gallese  &  Goldman,  1998).  Some  (Rizzolatti  et  al.,  2001,  p.  661; Gallese et al., 2004, p. 396) have gone as far as saying that mirror neuron activation in the observer while witnessing another’s action constitutes understanding of that action.  Others  (Goldman,  2009,  pp.  236‐ff.)  have  more  cautiously  claimed  that mirror neuron activation plays a causal, but not constitutive, role. Others still have denied  that  mirror  neurons  have  a  “dominant,  specialised  role  in  action understanding”  (Heyes,  2010).  So,  what  role,  if  any,  does  the  firing  of  mirror neurons  play  in  action  understanding?  So  long  as  answers  to  these  questions cluster  around  two  extremes,  consisting  of  theorists  who  are  either  overly enthusiastic  or  overly  pessimistic,  no  progress  will  be  made  in  the  debate.  I contend that a more empirically plausible and theoretically fruitful middle ground for the role of mirror neurons in action understanding should be identified. In  order  to  do  this,  some  theoretical  grounds  have  to  be  cleared.  In particular,  it has  to be  clarified what  exactly mirror neuron activation  correlates with2. Formulating and defending a specific solution to this issue is what my thesis 
                                                        2 The question might be alternatively posed  in  terms of what mirror neurons represent. I’m  going  to  avoid  formulating  the  question  in  this  way,  insofar  as  there  are  deep  and difficult  questions  as  to whether  it  can  be  said  that mirror  neurons  represent  anything, and,  even  if  it  can  be  said  so,  it’s  unclear  what  would  constitute  the  relevant  unit  of representation (a population of neurons vs. a pattern of activation involving a number of neurons, etc.). On questions about representation, see Dretske (1981). For an application of that question to the present issue, see Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2012). 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shall be concerned with,  in  the attempt  to answer a more general question as  to how  the  connection  between  intentions  and  actions  is  ensured.  Since  this  is  the main question that I mean to address, the following methodological remark has to be made. Notice that the defining property of mirror neurons is that they fire both during  action  production  and  during  action  observation.  In  the  present  work, however, I’m mainly going to focus on their role in action production. Still, in order to explore provisional answers to the question as to what mirror neuron activation correlates  with,  in  what  follows  I’m  going  to  review  a  series  of  experimental results  concerning  mirror  neurons  that  investigate  what  happens  in  action observation as much as in action production. Depending on the experimental study under consideration, at times I’ll also consider the results obtained as far as action observation  is  concerned,  working  on  the  assumption  that,  on  the  basis  of  the defining property of mirror neurons, these results are going to carry over to what mirror neuron activation correlates with in action production.  
1. Do mirror neurons tell us about mere movements? In a single‐cell recording study, Rizzolatti et al. (1988) recorded the activations of neurons  in  the ventral premotor  cortex  (area F5) of  the macaque monkey brain, while  the  monkey  was  performing  the  following  action:  reaching  for  a  piece  of food, grasping the piece of  food and bringing the piece of  food to the mouth. The action was  repeatedly  performed,  and  it  involved  different  effectors  at  different times: sometimes grasping was executed with the right hand, sometimes with the left  hand,  sometimes  with  mouth.  The  results  were  as  follows.  Some  neurons (Grasping­with­the­hand­neurons)  fired during  the  act  of  grasping with  the hand, regardless of whether this act was performed with the right or the left hand, and 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regardless  of  the  spatial  position  of  the  stimulus.  Other  neurons  (Grasping­with­
the­hand­and­with­the­mouth­neurons) fired during the act of grasping, regardless of whether this act was performed with the hand or with the mouth.  It  was  then  discovered  (Di  Pellegrino  et  al.,  1992)  that  a  subset  of  F5 neurons  has  visual  properties  too.  More  specifically,  a  series  of  studies  (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996) established the existence of a class of F5 neurons with  the  following visual properties:  these neurons are not  triggered by the observation of objects or mere bodily movements, but only by the observation of  actions  in  which  an  individual’s  hand  or  mouth  interacts  with  an  object. Depending on the kind of interaction between effector and object, they were thus classified  as  follows:  grasping  neurons  (responding  to  the  sight  of  a  hand approaching and grasping an object); placing neurons (responding to the sight of a hand moving an object on a support); holding neurons (responding to the sight of an individual keeping an object in her hand), and so forth. The striking discovery is that  these  neurons  fire  in  correlation with  the  same  kind  of  action  both  during execution  and  during  observation.  In  a  nutshell,  their  visual  properties  mirror their  motor  properties—hence,  the  name  bestowed  on  these  sensorimotor neurons: mirror neurons. So  far,  I’ve  described mirror  neurons  recorded  in  the  area  F5,  but mirror neurons  are  also  present  in  the  inferior  parietal  lobule  (IPL)  of  the  macaque monkey brain  (Fogassi  et  al.,  2005). An  action‐related mirror  system  is  found  in the human brain too (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), and is formed mainly by two regions: the  inferior section of  the precentral gyrus plus  the posterior part of  the  inferior frontal gyrus, and the inferior parietal lobule (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Grafton et al., 1996). Note that in the case of the human brain one does not usually talk of mirror 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neurons,  but  rather  of  a  mirror  system,  because  single‐cell  recording  is  not normally used with humans. However, since there is at least one study (Mukamel et al., 2010) in which single‐cell recording has been applied to human beings, we can safely talk of mirror neurons also as far as humans are concerned.  This gives me the chance to make another methodological remark. In what follows,  I’m  going  to  rely  on  the  idea  that  significant  similarities  exist  between macaque  monkey  brain  and  human  brain3  (Rizzolatti,  Fogassi,  &  Gallese,  2002; Gallese  &  Lakoff,  2005),  so  that,  even  though  in  the  present work  I’ll mainly  be concerned with human beings, I’m going to extensively report experiments carried out on monkeys working on the assumption that their conclusions may be applied to the human brain. Having said this, we should be aware of a series of differences that  have  already  been  observed  between  macaque  monkey  brain  and  human brain also as far as the properties of mirror neurons are concerned. For instance, mirror  neurons  in  the macaque monkey  brain  fire  in  correlation with  transitive actions only,  in which  an  individual  interacts with  an object. By  contrast, mirror neurons  in  the  human  brain  fire  in  correlation  with  a  wider  range  of  actions, including intransitive actions—not directed to a target objects, such as speaking—too (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Buccino et al., 2004). Having said this, it’s safe enough to assume that results found in the macaque monkey brain can be carried over to the human brain. 
                                                        3 We will use the results on monkeys as applying to humans for the simple reason that there is enough evidence to support the notion of an analogy—when not a homology—between the monkey and human brain regions we will be discussing (see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002). (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, p. 458) 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For all  that has been said so  far, you might be  led  to  think  that  the visuo‐motor  congruence of mirror neurons comes down  to  the  fact  that  these neurons fire  in  response  to  the  same  kind  of  movements,  regardless  of  whether  these movements  are  executed  or  just  observed.  That  is,  you  might  think  that  these neurons  fire  in correlation with a certain kind of  trajectory and speed of a given effector,  such  as  the  hand  or  the mouth.  But  if  this was  all  that mirror  neurons were sensitive to, it shouldn’t matter for the sake of the activation of, e.g., grasping mirror neurons whether an object is actually being grasped or not, so long as the arm and the hand display the right kinematics and dynamics. However, this turns out not to be the case.  Umiltà and colleagues (2001) carried out a single‐cell recording study in the area  F5  of  two  macaque  monkey  brains.  In  this  experiment,  the  following  four conditions  were  compared.  All  of  the  conditions  featured  an  experimenter standing  in  front  of  the  monkey,  with  a  metallic  frame  interposed  between  the experimenter and the monkey, allowing the latter to see the experimenter’s upper body and arms. In the first (full vision) condition, the monkey was shown an action directed to an object: the experimenter’s hand started from a given fixed position, moved towards the object, grasped it and held it for about one second. The action just described was thoroughly visible  from beginning to end,  i.e. since movement onset up until the object had actually been grasped. The second (hidden) condition was analogous to the  first condition, except  for the  following detail: an occluding screen was placed so as to occupy the rightmost half of the space enclosed by the metallic  frame,  in  such  a  way  that  the  second  half  of  the  action,  in  which  the experimenter’s hand  interacted with the object, was hidden  from the view of  the monkey. Crucially, at the beginning of each trial, before action onset, the occluding 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screen was briefly lifted so as to let the monkey see the object placed behind it. The third  (miming  in  full  vision)  and  fourth  (hidden miming)  conditions mirrored  the first and second one respectively, but with the following variation: no object was present, so in both conditions the experimenter mimed the grasping of an object. In the miming in full vision condition, the miming was visible to the monkey from beginning to end, whereas in the hidden miming condition part of the miming took place behind the screen. The results show the existence of mirror neurons  that respond selectively to grasping actions, even when the second part of the action—the one in which the object  is  grasped,  which  is  crucial  for  the  picking  out  the  action  as  one  of grasping—is  hidden  from  view.  The  same  neurons  show  no  response  in  the miming in full vision as well as in the hidden miming condition. For our purposes, the  reported  study matters  for  the  following  reasons.  If  you  thought  that mirror neurons  were  sensitive  to  a  certain  kind  of  bodily  movements,  i.e.  to  a  certain trajectory and speed of the arm and hand of the experimenter, this study offers an example  of  a  case  in  which  the  same movements  performed with  vs.  without  a target object elicit or fail to elicit (respectively) a certain response from a number of mirror  neurons.  Now,  at  this  point  you may want  to  question  that, when  the target  object  is  absent,  the  experimenter’s  movements  are  exactly  the  same  as those in which the target object is actually grasped. To rule out the possibility that differences  in bodily movements  across  conditions  could  account  for  the  results, hand  movements  were  analyzed.  No  systematic  differences  connected  with  the presence  or  absence  of  the  object  were  found.  In  particular,  for  some  of  the recorded neurons, hand movements were extremely similar across conditions. For some  other  recorded  neurons,  subtle  differences  could  be  found  in  hand 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movements  between  conditions,  but  no  systematic  connection  existed  between differences  in  hand  movements  and  different  responses  (Umiltà  et  al.,  2001,  p. 160). Note that the considerations I’ve made so far do not rely on the two hidden conditions4. The significance of the latter is going to be discussed at a later stage. In  a  nutshell, what’s  especially  important  for  our  purposes  is  that mirror neurons have been  found which do not  fire  in  the absence of an object, even  if a grasping action  is being mimed by means of  the performance of  the appropriate sequence of movements.  In order  to elicit a response  in  these neurons, an actual act of grasping—one in which an object is actually grasped—has to be carried out, while the relevant bodily movements alone will not suffice to elicit a response5. A series of  additional  results,  to be  reviewed  in what  follows, will  point us  further away  from  the  idea  that  mirror  neuron  activation  might  correlate  with  mere movements.  
2. Outcomes: more than mere movements Further flexibility in the responses of some F5 neurons was found by means of an experiment by Umiltà and co‐workers (2008),  in which monkeys were trained to grasp a piece of food with two different kinds of pliers: normal pliers and reverse pliers. The  former  require  the  subject  to  first  open and  then  close one’s hand  to grasp an object. The  latter  require  the opposite  sequence of movements, namely first closing and then opening of the hand. With normal pliers, a typical recorded                                                         4 Indeed, the same conclusions could have been drawn from Gallese et al. (1996, reported in  Csibra,  2007),  where  it  is  shown  that  the  sight  of  a  hand  pretending  to  grasp  in  the absence of a target object fails to elicit a mirror neuron response in the macaque monkey brain. 5 Some might worry that it is the presence or absence of an object that primarily or even exclusively  plays  a  role  in  eliciting  a mirror neuron  response.  This worry  is  going  to  be addressed in section 4 of the present chapter. 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neuron  started  to  fire  as  soon as  the hand  started  to  close,  reaching  the peak of activation approximately when the piece food was grasped; with the reverse pliers the same neuron would start to fire in register with the beginning of hand opening, and also reached its maximum activation when the food was grasped. The results show  that  the  recorded  neurons  exhibited  the  same  firing  pattern  during  the grasping phase, regardless of whether this involved normal or reverse pliers—that is, regardless of whether this involved first opening and then closing one’s hand as opposed to first closing and then opening. This finding gives further plausibility to the idea that mirror neurons fire in correlation to something that’s more abstract than  mere  movements,  since  opposite  movements  can  give  rise  to  the  same pattern of activation. But what is it that mirror neuron activation correlates with, which is dependent on and yet more abstract than mere movements? An action can be analyzed as composed of an outcome (or goal, or end) and the means to achieve it. Consider as an example (Csibra 2007, p. 438) the action of sealing an envelope by licking it. Here we have an action whose outcome, sealing the  envelope,  has  been  attained  by  licking  the  envelope,  but  could  have alternatively been achieved by pressing the envelope on a wet sponge. The same distinction may be applied to the grasping of an envelope.  If my hands are free,  I will normally grasp it with one of my hands, but if my hands are full as I approach the mailbox, and the mailbox is at a suitable height, I may well end up grasping the envelope with my mouth.  Either way,  the  outcome  of my  action  is  grasping  the envelope, and the means are either my hand or mouth movements.  Any given action may be interpreted as the attempt to bring about a certain outcome  via  certain means. What  counts  as  the  outcome  and what  count  as  the means may vary in interesting ways, of which I’m now going to provide examples. 
  26 
A seminal experiment by Meltzoff (1988, reported  in Gergely et al., 2001) on 14‐months‐olds was set up so that each infant was visually exposed to the following scenario: an adult model sat in front of a table on which there was a box covered by a  translucent panel containing a  light bulb;  the adult model caused the box to light  up by  lowering  the upper part  of  his  body  and  touching  the panel with his forehead. One week  later,  the  infant was made  to  come back and was presented with  the box with which the adult model had carried out his demonstration. The results of this study show that 67% of the infants imitated the action to which they had been exposed a week before. The action in question is not one that they would have spontaneously performed, so this experiment shows that imitative learning is present at 14 months. Meltzoff (1995, p. 509, quoted in Gergely et al., 2001, p. 325) reasons  as  follows:  14‐month‐olds  do  not  just  recognize  a  certain  outcome—i.e., the  lighting  of  the  panel—but  also  the  means  with  which  the  adult  model  has chosen  to  achieve  this  outcome,  namely  by  touching  the  panel  with  his  head.  If infants limited themselves to recognizing a certain outcome to be achieved, namely lighting the panel,  they wouldn’t necessarily try to achieve it by using their head. The fact that they lean forward with their upper body, according to Meltzoff, shows that  these  infants  imitate  the means  employed,  and  not  just  the  outcome  of  the action they’ve been exposed to. An interesting variation on Meltzoff’s (1988) experiment was carried out by Gergely and colleagues  (2001). Two groups of 14‐month‐old  infants were  tested, following a schedule analogous to that of the original Meltzoff’s experiment: each infant was  exposed  to  an  action performed by  an  adult model,  and was  brought back  one  week  later.  At  that  point  the  infant  was  allowed  to  act  in  the  same environment in which he’d witnessed the action performed by the adult model, in 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her presence. Once again, a box that could be lit up was displayed on a table. The first group, consisting of 13 infants, was tested in the hands free condition, in which the  infant could see  that  the model’s hands were  free, and yet  the model did not use  them.  Just  like  in Meltzoff’s  experiment,  the model  leaned  forward with  her upper  body  and  lit  up  the  lamp  by  touching  it  with  her  forehead,  which  she repeated three times. The second group, consisting of 14 infants, was tested in the 
hands  occupied  condition,  in  which  the  model,  before  acting  on  the  box,  asked another  experimenter  for  a  blanket,  pretending  to  be  cold.  At  that  point,  the experimenter gave the model a blanket, and the model covered her shoulders with it  and held  it with both hands  for  the  rest of  the experimental  session. Then she performed  the  lowering of her upper body and  lit up  the box with her  forehead, and  repeated  this  action  three  times.  The  two  conditions  are meant  to  differ  in terms  of  the  constraints  that  may  account  for  the  model’s  performance  of  her action  in  the  specific  way  in  which  she  executes  it.  In  the  hands  free  condition, nothing  forces  the  model  to  use  her  forehead  instead  of,  more  simply  and naturally,  her  hand  (or  hands)  to  light  up  the  box.  By  contrast,  in  the  hands 
occupied  condition,  the  set  up may  suggest  that  the model  lights  up  the  box  by touching  it with her  forehead,  instead of  using her hands,  because  the  latter  are occupied,  since  the  model  is  simultaneously  holding  tightly  a  blanket  wrapped around  her.  The  question  was  whether  the  presence  or  absence  of  visible constraints would have a bearing on the way in which the infants chose to imitate the model’s action.  Indeed,  the  two  conditions  produced  different  responses  in  the  tested infants.  In  the  “Hands  free”  conditions,  75%  of  the  tested  infants  imitated  the action  they’d  been  exposed  to,  thus  replicating  Meltzoff’s  (1988)  results.  By 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contrast,  out  of  the  infants  tested  in  the  “Hands  occupied”  condition,  only  27% imitated  the  action  performed  by  the  model  by  touching  the  box  with  their forehead. The majority (73%), instead, touched the box with their hand—an action that is much easier to perform, and thus more rational. Much more than Meltzoff’s (1988)  original  experiment,  this  one  shows  a  clear  separation between outcome and means, and indeed provides an example of the possibility to achieve the same outcome—lighting up the box—by different means—either touching the box with one’s  forehead,  or  with  one’s  hands.  In  Meltzoff’s  experiment,  the  difference between outcome and means was only implicit.  I’ve already mentioned Meltzoff’s interpretation  according  to which  the  tested  infants  imitated  both  the  outcomes and  the  means,  but  another  interpretation  could  be  put  forward  according  to which,  in  Meltzoff’s  set  up  as  well  as  in  Gergely  and  colleagues’  hands  free condition, the outcome had to be  identified not so much with  lighting up the box, but rather with lighting up the box by touching it with one’s forehead. Gergely and colleagues’ hands occupied  condition provides, on the other hand,  the example of an explicit separation between an outcome and at least two means for carrying it out. Another experimental result  in a similar vein, clearly showing the difference between outcome and means, is due to Bekkering and colleagues (2000, reported in Grafton & Hamilton, 2007, p. 594). This study shows that, when a child is faced with another person grasping her own ear either ipsilaterally or contralaterally to the acting hand, the child shows a tendency to reproduce the outcome (grasping a given ear) rather than the means (the hand with which the grasping is carried out).  In a nutshell,  it  is possible to perform different actions that have the same outcome  by  varying  the  means  to  achieve  it,  which  may  amount  to  performing significantly  different  movements  (see  Butterfill  &  Sinigaglia,  2012).  The 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framework of interpretation featuring outcomes and means is especially useful to make sense of a number of experimental results concerning mirror neurons, such as the one involving reverse pliers (Umiltà et al., 2008) reviewed at the beginning of this section. That experiment featured two actions in which the same outcome—grasping  an  object—is  achieved with  different means—opening  vs.  closing  one’s hand.  Some  mirror  neurons  exhibited  a  pattern  of  neural  activation  which,  we could plausibly say, correlated with the achievement of the outcome—grasping the object—while  abstracting  away  from  the  means—the  opening  or  closing movement  of  the  hand.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  the  same  study,  some neurons  were  also  registered  in  the  area  F1  (Umiltà  et  al.,  2008,  p.  2210),  and divided into two functional categories. Those belonging to the first category had a pattern  of  activation  that  correlated  with  the  progressive  achievement  of  the grasping  outcome,  whereas  those  belonging  to  the  second  category  fired  in relation  to  hand movements  (namely  depending  on whether  the  hand  closed  or opened), and thus differentiated between grasping with normal pliers vs. grasping with reverse pliers. We could say  that  the  firing of  the neurons belonging  to  this second  category  correlated with  the means,  rather  than with  the outcome  of  the action under consideration. It  is  now  worth  exploring  another  sense  in  which  it  could  be  said  that mirror neuron activation  can be  said  to  correlate with  the outcome of  an action. Let  us  consider  the  case  of  actions  that  require  a  series  of  different  steps  to  be brought to completion. In particular, I’m going to look at two actions: that of eating a piece of food, which requires first grasping the piece of food and then bringing it to the mouth, and that of placing an object into a container, to perform which one first  has  to  grasp  the  object,  and  then  to  put  it  into  a  container.  In  a  single‐cell 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recording  study  carried  out  in  the  inferior  parietal  lobule  (IPL)  of  the macaque monkey  brain  (Fogassi  et  al.,  2005),  neurons were  studied  both when monkeys performed the two above described kinds of action, and when they observed the same  actions  executed  by  an  experimenter.  Let  us  first  focus  on  the  results obtained  during  action  execution,  rather  than  during  action  observation.  Most motor IPL neurons whose activation had been shown to correlate with the act of grasping fired differentially according to whether the monkey’s act of grasping was followed by eating as opposed to by placing. It might seem appropriate to say that the neurons in question fired in correlation with the action outcome, in the sense of the result that the subject ultimately wants to bring about.  But can this kind of interpretation be put forward? That is, can we suppose that the activation of these grasping neurons correlates with the outcomes placing vs.  eating,  or  isn’t  it  the  case  that  the  differential  activation  of  the  neurons  in question  reflects  a  preparation  to  performing  one  of  two  very  different  kinds  of 
movement?  The  latter  deflationary  interpretation  may  seem  plausible  if  we consider  that  the  placing  condition  requires  arm  abduction,  i.e.  movement  of drawing  the  arm  away  from  the  body,  by  contrast  with  the  arm  movement required to bring the piece of food to the mouth. In order to rule out the hypothesis that the differential discharge of the grasping neurons can be accounted in terms of a  different  following  movement  as  opposed  to  a  different  outcome,  a  further experimental condition was added in which the monkey placed a piece of food (or an object) into a container located on the monkey’s shoulder (Fogassi et al., 2005, p.  663). As  a  result,  the  arm  trajectory  for  this  second kind of placing was more similar  to  the arm trajectory  for eating. Once  this  third condition was added,  the neural discharge still differentiated between eating and placing, regardless of the 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location  of  the  container.  For  instance,  all  the  neurons  whose  activation  was stronger  in  the  grasping‐to‐eat  condition  exhibited  a  lower  activation  in  both grasping‐to‐place conditions, included the one in which the container was close to the  mouth.  The  similarity  in  arm  trajectory  didn’t  elicit  a  similar  response. Interestingly,  the wrist velocity  for grasping‐to‐place  in  the original condition (in which the container was away from the monkey’s body) was lower than that in the grasping‐to‐eat  condition, whereas  the wrist velocity  for grasping‐to‐place  in  the modified  condition  (in which  the  container was  on  the monkey’s  shoulder) was higher than that in the grasping‐to‐eat condition. The reported differences in wrist velocity make it impossible to account for the recorded responses solely in terms of movements, without making reference to action outcomes. In the course of this section, I’ve dwelled on the difference between action outcomes and means to achieve those outcomes. On this basis, it has emerged that an action outcome can be more abstract than the movements employed to fulfil it Working  on  these  assumptions,  and  on  the  basis  of  a  number  of  experimental results  concerning  mirror  neurons,  I’ve  shown  that  mirror  neuron  activity correlates with action outcomes, rather than with movements.  
3. The intention interpretation and its attractiveness 
3.1 How do we shift from outcomes to intentions? What changes? Having  shown  a  correlation  between  action  outcomes  and  mirror  neuron activation,  I’d now  like  to  introduce an  interpretation according  to which mirror neuron activation correlates with a certain kind of intentions, which are later going to  be  termed  motor  intentions.  The  full  development  of  the  notion  of  motor intention, together with the explanation of its theoretical implications as far as the 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connection  between  intentions  and  actions  is  concerned,  is  going  to  occupy  the rest of this thesis. For the time being, let us simply see how we get to this idea by working on the assumption, developed and argued for in the previous section, that mirror neuron activation correlates with action outcomes. Recall  the  study  by  Gergely  and  colleagues  (2001)  that  I  reported  in  the previous section. Suppose we were to modify that kind of scenario in such a way that an adult individual was faced with the model in the hands occupied condition, and was given the generic instruction to do the same as the model. In this sort of situation,  confronted  with  such  an  unusual  action,  in  order  to  comply  with  the instruction to do the same as the model, the experimental subject may well wonder whether the model’s intention was simply to light up the box, in whatever way (and touching  it  with  the  forehead  was  reckoned  to  be  the  best  way  to  achieve  the desired  outcome  given  the  simultaneous  need  to  hold  the  blanket  in  place),  or rather  to  light  up  the  box  using  one’s  forehead.  Indeed,  an  agent’s  intention determines what outcome an action is meant to bring about, and thus, in a context of  learning  by  imitation,  the  agent’s  intention  determines  what  the  relevant outcome  is  that  the  learning  subject  is  meant  to  reproduce.  Thus  we  have  an example of a context in which a question about the outcome of an action—namely an event or state of affairs6—is reasonably turned into a question about the agent’s 
intention—namely  a mental  state.  The  transition  I’ve  just made  from  a  question about outcomes  to a question about  intentions will be wholly  justified under  the theoretical  viewpoint  in  chapter  2  (section  3),  where  it’ll  be  explained  that  a necessary condition for a mental state to be an intention is that it should represent an action outcome—that which  the subject  intends  to bring about. Can  the same                                                         6 Csibra (2007) suggests that outcomes are best conceived as states of affairs. I disagree, and I’m going to tackle this question in chapter 4 (section 4). 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shift—from a question about outcomes to a question about intentions—be made in the interpretation of mirror neuron activation?   At  this  point,  we’re  working  on  the  assumption  that  mirror  neuron activation  correlates with  action  outcomes.  Given  that, minimally,  intentions  are mental  states  representing  action  outcomes,  it may  seem  that,  by  virtue  of  this, there’s  also  a  straightforward  correlation  between mirror  neuron  activation  and intentions on the other hand. However, as I’m going to show, there are two kinds of action  outcomes,  and  only  one  of  these  two  kinds  of  outcome  correlates  with intentions. As is going to be explained in the course of chapter 2 (and made more precise in chapter 3, sections 3.2‐3.3), another minimal requirement on intentions is that their content should be available to introspection. But it’s not obviously the case that the content of all action outcomes is introspectable. In chapter 3 (section 1), I’m going to explain that action production seems to rely at least in part on the existence of motor  representations, which,  roughly,  represent an action outcome by  depicting  the  self  in  action  in  a way  that  determines what  the  pattern  of  the subject’s movements  is  going  to  be,  and  is  therefore  apt  to  be  transformed  into bodily movements  (Jeannerod,  1994,  2006). Now,  some of  these  representations specify action outcomes in striking detail, one that may prima facie seem to likely to  defy  availability  to  introspection.  Consider  the  phenomenon of maximum grip 
aperture  (Jeannerod,  1981,  reported  in  Jeannerod,  2006,  p.  5):  whenever  one reaches towards an object to grasp it, fingers open more than the size of the target object actually requires, but in a way that is proportional to it. It is likely that some motor representations involved in the act of grasping are going to specify in their content the extent to which fingers open. 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So,  some motor  representations  represent  outcomes with  a  very  detailed kind  of  content—one  that may,  for  instance,  involve  the  extent  to which  fingers should open in a grasping act. For action outcomes of that sort,  it  is unlikely that there  exist  intentions  representing  them.  It  is  unlikely,  for  instance,  that  there should exist intentions whose content involves the extent to which fingers should open  in a grasping act. So,  the correlation between mirror neuron activation and intentions  doesn’t  straightforwardly  follow  from  the  correlation  between mirror neuron  activation  and  action  outcomes.  This  is  because  there  exist  different outcomes.  Some  of  them  are  introspectable,  and  are  thus  apt  to  constitute  the content of an intention. Some, on the other hand, are unlikely to be introspectable, and, to that extent, they’re not apt to constitute the content of an intention.  Lastly,  an  observation  about  one  consequence  of  shifting  from  an interpretation  of  mirror  neuron  activation  as  correlating  with  outcomes  to  an interpretation  in  terms of  the  correlation between mirror  neuron  activation  and intentions. One may well interpret the experiments by Meltzoff (1988) and Gergely and  colleagues  (2001)  as  supporting  the  idea  that,  while  acting,  one  is simultaneously  fulfilling  many  outcomes.  From  this,  however,  it  doesn’t straightforwardly  follow  that  one  has  as  many  intentions  as  the  outcomes  he’s fulfilling. For instance, one may think that, at any given time an individual is acting, she’s acting under just one intention, which constitutes the primary reason of her acting (see Davidson, 1963, and chapter 2, section 2). This issue will be expanded in section 4 of the present chapter and an answer will be proposed in chapter 6. 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3.2  What  rests  on  interpreting  mirror  neuron  activation  in  terms  of 
intentions? Even before one assesses the likelihood of the proposal that mirror neuron activity correlates with intentions, one may first of all wonder what rests on interpreting neuron activation in terms of intentions under the theoretical viewpoint. As part of an  answer  to  this  question,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  a  few  theorists  have treated the hypothesis that mirror neuron activity might correlate with intentions in conjunction with a hypothesis about action understanding and mindreading7,8. More  generally,  some  theorists  (e.g.,  Rizzolatti  et  al.,  2001;  Gallese  &  Goldman, 2008;  Goldman,  2009a)  have  considered  the  hypothesis  that  action  mirroring might play a role in action understanding. I am going to suggest that, while there are deep and difficult questions as  to what  role,  if  any,  action mirroring plays  in action understanding, we stand a better chance of answering those questions if we assume that mirror neuron activity correlates with intentions.  While giving a detailed account of the connection between mirror neurons and  mindreading  in  the  present  work  would  take  me  too  far  afield,  it  is  worth reviewing  some  of  what  has  been  said  about  mirror  neurons  and  intentions  in connection with mindreading, so as to give an idea of the way in which my claim concerning the connection between mirror neuron activation and intentions would be  helpful  for  the  purposes  of  the  more  general  debate  concerning  action 
                                                        7  I’m  going  to  give  a  detailed  explanation of  both notions  in  the  course  of  the  following sections.  8  It  is  to  be  specified,  however,  that  not  all  those  who  have  supported  the  idea  of  a contribution of mirror neuron activation to action understanding have subscribed to  the idea  that  mirror  neuron  activation  correlates  with  intentions.  Some  have  settled  for weaker claims on what mirror neuron activation correlates with, even within the context of a defence of a role of mirror neuron activation in action understanding. This idea will be explored in section 3.2.4 in this chapter. 
  36 
understanding.  Later  on  in  this  chapter  (section  3.2.5),  I’m  going  to  sketch  an account  of  the  way  in  which  conceiving  of  mirror  neuron  activity  in  terms  of intentions  might  be  theoretically  fruitful  within  the  context  of  a  version  of  the Simulation Theory of mindreading, whose tenets I’ll expound in due course. Let’s see what this is all about. 
  
3.2.1 What is mindreading? How does it connect with action understanding?  
Mindreading  is  the ability  to ascribe mental  states,  such as beliefs, desires and intentions, to another individual (Baron‐Cohen, 1995). It  is the sort of ability that is required when we want to understand in what mental state a given person is at a given moment, in the light of both her other mental states that are known to us (e.g., beliefs, desires) and the circumstances she’s in. In the light of the definition of mindreading given above, in order to be said to mindread, an individual has to fulfil  at  least  two  conditions  (Goldman,  2008,  p.  312).  First,  one  has  to  judge another person as being in a certain kind of mental state, which makes it the case that, for instance, judging that a person is performing a certain action by itself isn’t an  act  of  mindreading,  and  likewise  judging  that  a  person  is  uttering  a  certain sound isn’t an act of mindreading: none of them consists in a judgement about an individual’s  mental  state.  Secondly,  one  has  to  represent  another  individual  as undergoing  a  certain mental  state.  Cases  of  empathizing,  so  long  as  the  latter  is conceived  merely  as  echoing,  or  resonating  with,  another’s  mental  state,  are therefore not to be considered acts of mindreading insofar as, in order to be said to mindread, it is not sufficient for an individual to represent a certain mental state, 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such as an emotion: one must also represent a given personas being in that mental state9.  What  about  the  connection  between  mindreading  and  action understanding? Action understanding, as mentioned at the outset of this chapter, is a process whereby an individual understands what another is doing. The two are connected in interesting ways. We could think that there are, first of all, inferential connections of the following sort. Suppose I see you picking cherries from a tree. If I  ascribe  to  you  the  belief  that  cherries  are  a  delicious  kind  of  food,  I  may understand your action as one of picking cherries  in order to eat them. If, on the other hand, I ascribe to you the belief that trees would look a lot better without red fruits hanging  from them,  I might  further ascribe to you a desire, or  intention,  to free the tree in front of you from a series of ugly red fruits, and understand your action as an attempt  to  fulfil  the desire or  intention  to do so by picking cherries. Both cases instantiate processes of action understanding that are based on acts of mindreading: a judgement (or more judgements) about another person being in a certain  mental  state  is  given,  and  subsequently  that  person  is  understood  as performing a certain action or other on the basis of the ascribed mental state. But  it  is  possible  to  think  that  there  are  also  constitutive  connections between action understanding and mindreading. Consider again Goldman’s (2008, p. 312) example according to which judging that a person is performing a certain action isn’t an act of mindreading. Suppose we judged that a person is performing an  intentional  action,  and  suppose  we  further  thought  that,  whenever  one 
                                                        9  The  person  in  question  may  well  be  the  subject  who  is  performing  the  act  of mindreading.  In  this  case,  we’ll  say  that  the  act  of  mindreading  is  of  first­person 
mindreading.  Otherwise,  the  act  of  mindreading  is  going  to  be  termed  a  case  of  third­
person mindreading. 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performs an intentional action, one thereby has the intention to so act10. Then we’d have the grounds for performing an act of mindreading by means of which we also ascribe  to  the  person  in  question  an  intention  to  execute  the  action  that  we’ve judged she’s executing. So, in that case, while it would be strictly speaking true that judging  that  a  person  is  performing  a  certain  action  isn’t  by  itself  an  act  of mindreading, this  judgement would however license another judgement from the point of view of the subject to the effect that the person in question is in a certain mental state, namely has an intention to so act—and so judging indeed constitutes an act of mindreading.  
3.2.2 Simulation Theory and simulation­based action understanding  Having said a few words about mindreading, action understanding, and how they are related we still have  to  find out how they connect with mirror neurons. The  connection  goes  via  one  of  the  leading  theories  of mindreading,  namely  the Simulation Theory (Goldman 1989, 1992, 2006; Gordon 1986, 1995)11.  According to  the  Simulation  Theory,  our  ability  to  form  judgements  about  other  people’s mental states is grounded in our ability to simulate those mental states, i.e., in our being  able  to  reproduce  other  people’s mental  states  and  processes  in  our  own mind.  More  generally,  according  to  the  Simulation  Theory,  mindreaders  gain insight into the mental processes of others by using their own ones as a model (see                                                         10  This  is  a  formulation  of  what  Bratman  (1984,  1987)  calls  the  Simple  View  on  the relation between intentions and intentional actions. 11 The main competitor of Simulation Theory is the so‐called Theory Theory (Baron‐Cohen 1995;  Gopnik  &  Meltzoff,  1997;  Gopnik  &  Wellman,  1992;  Leslie,  1994),  according  to which we  attribute mental  states  on  the  basis  of  a  theory  about  how mental  states  are connected  to  behaviour.  Lately,  theories  of mindreading  as  a whole,  namely  Simulation Theory  and  Theory  Theory,  are  facing  another  opponent  as  to  how  social  cognition—namely  the  ability  to  understand  and  interact  with  other  people—has  appeared: Interaction  Theory  (e.g.,  Gallagher,  2001,  2004;  De  Jaegher,  2009),  which  does  without mental state ascription. 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Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 496). Let us try to get a rough idea of what this could signify by means of an example. Kahneman and Tversky (1982, reported in Gallese &  Goldman,  1998,  p.  496)  exposed  subjects  to  the  following  narration:  two individuals travelling towards an airport by sharing a car are caught in a traffic jam and thus end up missing their respective flights, which were scheduled for half an hour before their actual arrival to the airport. Mr A finds out that his plane left on time,  whereas  Mr  B  gathers  that  his  flight  had  been  delayed,  and  so  he’s  just missed  it  by  five  minutes.  Interrogated  on  which  of  the  two  travellers  must  be more  upset,  the  vast  majority  of  experimental  subjects  replied  that  it  is  Mr  B. According  to  the Simulation Theory, people arrive at  the  judgement  that Mr B  is more upset than Mr A by putting themselves in the travellers’ shoes and imagining how  they  would  feel  in  that  situation  (Goldman  1989,  reported  in  Gallese  & Goldman, 1998, p. 496). In particular, in the given example, subjects are presented with a narration that gives them some information about the travellers’ mental states while they’re en route to the airport (e.g., presumably, their desire, if not intention, to catch their flight,  the  belief  that  their  flight  leaves  at  a  certain  hour,  etc.).  As  the  narration proceeds, experimental subjects acquire more information about the circumstances of  the  travellers:  in  particular,  about  the  fact  that  they  get  to  the  airport  half  an hour  later  with  respect  to  their  scheduled  departure.  Also,  they  acquire  more information about the travellers’ beliefs, as they are informed of their actual flight departure times. At this point, when asked to judge who’s feeling more upset, what would  experimental  subjects do  according  to  the  Simulation Theory? First  of  all, they’d  have  to  simulate  their  targets’  mental  states,  i.e.  reproduce  in  their  own minds mental  states  that  are  relevantly  similar  to  those  that  they presume  their 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target  subject—say,  Mr  B—to  undergo12.  These  are  going  to  be  pretend  beliefs, desires,  and  so  on:  experimental  subjects  know  that  they’re  not  themselves  en route  to  an  airport  and  that  they  do  not  have  a  scheduled  flight,  but  pretend  to believe  that  they  are  and  that  they  do.  Once  that  is  done,  they  run  the  sort  of mental processing that they would actually undergo first when acquiring the belief that  they’ve  got  to  the  airport  half  an  hour  late,  and  then  on  learning  that  their flight  left  five minutes  before,  and  not  half  an  hour  before. What  sort  of mental state would their own mental processing of all this information output? By letting this  processing  run  on  their  complex  of  pretend beliefs,  desires,  and  so  on,  they obtain as an output a  complex of pretend mental  states,  such as a pretend belief along the lines of “I could have just about made that flight”, and the accompanying pretend emotions (e.g., regret).  If  the  process  were  to  stop  at  this  stage,  we  wouldn’t  have  an  act  of mindreading,  since,  as  mentioned  beforehand  about  empathizing,  simply replicating  someone  else’s  mental  state  isn’t  enough  to  be  said  to  mindread.  In addition to the simulation of the target’s mental state, there has to be a further step in  which  the  simulated  mental  state  is  ascribed  to,  or,  in  technical  terms,  is 
projected  onto  the  target  subject  (Goldman,  2006,  p.  40).  At  this  point,  the experimental  subjects  project  all  they’ve  obtained  as  the  output  of  their mental processing  onto  their  target—Mr  B,  in  this  case.  By  applying  an  analogous procedure  to  Mr  A,  experimental  subjects  obtain  as  output  another  complex  of pretend mental  states  that  they  can  project  onto Mr  A,  and,  to  comply with  the                                                         12 Notice that, for a subject to be said to simulate a target’s mental state, there must be the relevant  sort  of  connection  between  the  simulated  mental  state  and  the  target  mental state. If two individuals happen to be in the same mental state, one independently of the other, it cannot be said that one is simulating the other’s mental state. Rather, it has to be the case  that  the  simulated mental  state  is causally  connected  to  the  target mental  state. That is, the target mental state must be the cause of the simulated mental state. 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instructions  that  they’ve  been  given,  they  can  compare  the  two  complexes  of pretend mental states and, on that basis, judge that Mr B must be more upset than Mr A.   
3.2.3 What is the relation between simulation and mindreading? The above example should have made it clear that Simulation Theory characterizes mindreading as a process during which  the mindreader at  least  tries  to replicate the workings of the target’s mind (Goldman, 2000, reported in Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 497).  In  the  simulation  scenario  there  is  a  distinctive  matching  or ‘correspondence’  between  the  mental  activity  of  the  simulator  and  the target. […] Thus, ST hypothesizes that a significant portion of mind‐reading episodes involves the process of mimicking (or trying to mimic) the mental activity of the target agent. (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 497)  Now  think of  a  situation  in which one  individual  is  performing  a  certain  kind of action  that  mirror  neurons  are  typically  sensitive  to—say,  she’s  grasping  an apple—while someone else observes her. In the agent, the mirror neurons whose activation correlates with the act of grasping are going to fire. In the observer, the mirror neurons whose activation correlates with the act of grasping are also going to fire—and this activation in observation phase, which we may refer to as action 
mirroring, is caused by the observation of the action of the target. There’s a sense in which mirror neuron activation in the observer is a way in which the workings of  the observer’s mind mimic  the mental activity of  the  target agent. Gallese and 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Goldman  (1998,  pp.  497‐498)  take  this  idea  even  further  and  claim  that  if  we interpret  mirror  neuron  activation  in  the  agent’s  brain  as  a  plan  to  perform  a certain action,  such as grasping an apple,  then, when mirror neurons correlating with that action fire in the observer’s brain, they still constitute a plan to perform that action. The mirror neuron activation in the observer’s brain is thus treated as alike to the formation of a pretend mental state. Notice that there are grounds for saying  that  this  is  the  equivalent  of  a pretend mental  state  insofar  as,  as Gallese and  Goldman  (1998,  p.  497)  point  out,  no  movement  production  follows  from action  mirroring,  i.e.  from  mirror  neuron  activation  in  the  observer’s  brain. Furthermore,  since  the  observer  has  a  visual  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the observed agent is executing the action in question, it is possible to assume that the observer,  so  to  speak,  labels  the  plan  constituted  by  her  own  mirror  neuron activation as belonging to the target. This is the equivalent of the projection stage.   Thus MN activity seems to be nature’s way of getting the observer into the same ‘mental shoes’ as the target – exactly what the conjectured simulation heuristic aims to do. (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 497)    Now,  having  pointed  out  a  few  similarities  between  action mirroring  and simulation,  it might also seem obvious to you that  there are relevant differences. For instance, I’ve depicted simulation processes as voluntarily initiated and carried out explicitly by a subject13, none of which would prima  facie seem to be  true of                                                         13 Although it is true that, in everyday life, we may well undergo simulation processes that we do not voluntarily initiate, but are rather elicited by the circumstances, and which are not carried out explicitly by the subject, as when we spontaneously and uncontrollably feel sorry for someone who, we hear, has just been the victim of a catastrophe. 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mirror  neuron  activation.  Intuitive  as  these  differences may  seem,  it’s  especially hard  to  pinpoint  what  they’re  about.  Goldman  initially  (2006)  spelled  these differences out in terms of  low­level vs. high­level simulation, and then (Goldman, 2009b), in response to de Vignemont (2009), abandoned these terms in favour of 
mirror­based  simulation  vs.  simulation  based  on  what  he  terms  enactment 
imagination.   
3.2.4  What  is  the  role  of  mirroring  in  action  understanding?  Causal  vs. 
constitutive role Either  by  taking  into  account  both  similarities  and  differences  between action mirroring and simulation, or by stressing the similarities between the two, a few  theorists  have  framed  action  mirroring  in  terms  of  action  understanding, sometimes  in  connection  with  an  interpretation  of  mirror  neuron  activation  as correlating  with  intentions.  I’m  going  to  review  a  couple  of  suggested  views  on action  mirroring  and  action  understanding—the  first  having  it  that  action mirroring  constitutes  action  understanding,  while  mirror  neuron  activation doesn’t  correlate  with  intentions;  the  second  maintaining  that  action  mirroring contributes to action understanding, and mirror neuron activation correlates with a certain kind of intentions. Let us start with the mirror neuron researchers themselves (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Gallese et al., 2004), who have proposed the idea mirror neuron activation in the observer constitutes action understanding. Interestingly for my purposes, this proposal comes with an explicit rejection of the idea that mirror neuron activation may correlate with an intention—by stark contrast with what I’m going to suggest later on in this chapter. 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[…] the ‘direct‐matching hypothesis’ […] holds that we understand actions when we map  the  visual  representation  of  the  observed  action  onto  our motor representation of the same action. According to this view, an action is  understood  when  its  observation  causes  the  motor  system  of  the observer to ‘resonate’. So, when we observe a hand grasping an apple, the same  population  of  neurons  that  control  the  execution  of  grasping movements  becomes  active  in  the  observer’s  motor  areas.  By  this approach, the ‘motor knowledge’ of the observer is used to understand the observed  action.  In  other  words,  we  understand  an  action  because  the motor representation of that action is activated in our brain. (Rizzolatti et al., 2001, p. 661)  I’m  characterizing  the  direct‐matching  hypothesis  as  making  a  claim  about  a constitutive role of action mirroring in action understanding insofar as this seems to be the best way to make sense of a statement such as “an action is understood when its observation causes the motor system of the observer to  ‘resonate’.” It  is true that, at the same time, a statement that occurs immediately afterwards to the effect  that  “we  understand  an  action  because  the  motor  representation  of  that action  is  activated  in our brain”  (my emphasis)  sounds more  like  indicating  that mirror  neuron  activation  in  the  observer’s  brain  gives  a  causal  contribution  to action understanding14. Still, I think there are independent grounds on the basis of which we  can  say  that  the mirror  neuron  researchers  are making  a  constitutive claim—for  instance,  insofar  as  they  appeal  to  action  mirroring  as  providing  “a                                                         14 As a matter of fact, Goldman (2009, p. 238), more cautiously than me, has claimed that “members  of  the  Parma  team  probably  lean  toward  the  constitution  construal”  (my emphasis). 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direct experiential grasp of the mind of others” (Gallese et al., 2004, p. 396, quoted in Goldman, 2009a, p. 238).  Now, unfortunately, Rizzolatti and colleagues are not very specific as to how action mirroring by itself should constitute action understanding. One of the ways in  which  they  make  this  connection  explicit  is  by  claiming  that  “[the]  observer understands the action because he knows its outcome when he does it” (Gallese et al.,  2004,  p.).  As  in  this  claim,  their  explanations  of  the  relation  between  action mirroring and action understanding resort to the notion of an understanding from 
the inside, whereby the observer grasps the outcome of the action she observes by understanding what  it would mean  for her  to perform  it15—an  idea  that,  since  it shifts the focus from the observer agent onto the observer, would be best suited to a framework in which action mirroring is meant to provide a causal contribution to action understanding, and this understanding from the inside is followed by a step that takes care of the attribution of the understood action to the target. We can still make  sense  of  this  idea  of  understanding  from  the  inside  by  surmising  that  the mirror  neuron  researchers’  interpretation  of  action mirroring  is  only  concerned with action categorization, and not with intention attribution. As a matter of fact, the  mirror  neurons  researchers  (e.g.,  Rizzolatti  et  al.,  2001,  p.  667)  are  rather explicit  in  separating  the  understanding  of  an  action,  which,  in  their  opinion,  is provided  by  action  mirroring  through  direct  matching,  from  intention understanding,  which  mirror  neuron  activity  by  itself,  in  their  opinion,  doesn’t 
                                                        15  […]the  parieto‐frontal  mechanism  allows  an  individual  to  understand  the actions of another individual ‘from the inside’ and gives the observing individual a first‐person grasp of the motor goals and intentions of another individual. (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, p. 264) 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seem  to  be  able  to  provide.  Notice  how  they  interpret  the  earlier  described experiment by Umiltà and colleagues (2001).   It is important to stress that we are not claiming that, in the experiment of Umiltà et al. […], the monkeys understood the intention of the agent of the action (that is, why the observed action was performed), but only that they understood the action meaning (that is, what the agent did). (Rizzolatti et al., 2001, p. 667, my emphasis)   Let us now move onto a different approach to action mirroring, namely that provided by Jacob and Jeannerod (2005). Jacob and Jeannerod endorse, if only for the  sake of  argument16,  a version of what  they  call motor  simulation,  namely  the idea that one may represent an action outcome, as well as the observed subject’s motor  intention,  by  matching  the  observed  movements  onto  her  own  motor repertoire (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 22), and thus simulating an action in one’s own motor system. An individual’s motor repertoire (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008) is composed by a series of elements, each of which is a population of neurons that is  sensitive  to  a  given  action  at  a  certain  level  of  generality  (e.g.,  grasping,  or grasping  with  the  hand,  or  grasping  with  the  hand  with  a  precision  grip),  and corresponds to the actions that the agent is actually able to perform. 
                                                        16 Their ultimate goal is to show that, even if the notion of motor simulation is tenable, it doesn’t play either a necessary of a sufficient role in action understanding, insofar as there are  actions  that  may  be  understood  without  relying  on  the  simulation  of  the  observed movements (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 23), and motor simulation yields understanding of motor  intentions  only,  but  not  of  prior,  social  or  communicative  intentions  (Jacob  & Jeannerod, 2005, pp. 22‐23). 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They  draw  a  distinction  between  motor  intentions17  and  other  kinds  of intentions  (prior,  social  and  communicative  intentions—see  Jacob  &  Jeannerod, 2005, pp. 22‐23). Their characterization of motor intentions is twofold. On the one hand, they resort to the idea that an action consists in a goal‐directed sequence of bodily movements, and they suggest that this sequence of movements is  initiated and monitored by a motor intention (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 22). On the other hand,  they appeal  to the notions of basic action and non‐basic action, which they characterize by means of the following example: turning on the light is a non‐basic action which can be performed by  the basic action of pressing a  switch  (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 22). They also resort to the distinction traced by Searle (1983) between  prior  intentions  and  intentions  in  action18,  and  they  identify  motor intentions with  intentions  in action, as well as with  intentions  to execute a basic action19.  In  line with the example they’ve given about the contrast between basic actions and non‐basic actions, they suggest that, on the basis of the prior intention to  perform  the  non‐basic  action  of  turning  on  the  light,  one may  then  form  the motor intention to perform the basic action of, e.g., pressing the switch with one’s right  index  finger  (Jacob  &  Jeannerod,  2005,  p.  22).  At  this  point,  Jacob  and Jeannerod claim that                                                         17  I’m  going  to  spend  a  lot  of  time  on  the  notion  of  motor  intention  from  chapter  3 onwards, and I’ll show in what sense my characterization of this notion differs from Jacob and Jeannerod’s. 18  In  chapter  5,  I’m  going  to  show  that  the  distinction  between  prior  intentions  and intentions in action is inadequately motivated, and I’ll thus suggest dropping the notion of prior intention altogether. I’m presently going to accept talk of prior intentions, as well as of  motor  intentions  in  a  way  that’s  different  from my  characterization,  for  the  sake  of argument. 19  I’ll  broach  the  topic  of  basic  actions  in  chapter  6,  and  there  I’ll  give  reasons why  the identification  between  motor  intentions—conceived  in  the  way  that  is  going  to  be formulated  throughout  this  thesis—and  intentions  to  fulfil  basic  actions  shouldn’t  be made. For  the  time being,  I can anticipate  that one of  the reasons  for not  identifying  the two notions is that there are more motor intentions than intentions fulfilling basic actions. 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 by simulating the agent’s perceived movement of pressing the switch with his right index  finger,  an  observer will  understand  the  agent’s motor  intention  to  execute the basic action, not his prior intention to execute the non‐basic action. (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005, p. 22)  Jacob and Jeannerod therefore outline a view of action mirroring such that:   (a) mirror neuron activity in the observer’s brain correlates with intentions—a specific kind of intentions, as I’m also going to argue—and (b) this correlation serves the purposes of action understanding through what they  refer  to  as  motor  simulation,  with  the  proviso  that  action understanding mediated by motor simulation is only going to grant access to motor intentions, and not to other kinds of intentions.  Let me  take stock. While, as  I  said,  the mirror neuron researchers are not overly explicit in spelling out how action mirroring could constitute action understanding, there’s  a  more  general  thought,  explored  in  the  previous  section,  according  to which action mirroring can be compared with the simulation stage of a simulation process. If that is so,  it becomes plausible to suppose that action mirroring needs to  be  supplemented  by  an  equivalent  of  the  projection  stage  which  is  part  of  a process of simulation20. So, the idea that action mirroring might play a causal role, rather  than  a  constitutive  one,  in  action  understanding  seems  to  stand  a  better                                                         20 In the previous section,  it was reported that Gallese and Goldman (1998) suggest that the projection stage might be obtained through the observer’s visual knowledge of the fact that the observed agent is executing the action in question: by means of that knowledge, the  observer  would  label  the  plan  constituted  by  her  own mirror  neuron  activation  as belonging to the target. 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chance  to  be made  to work.  Having  said  this,  there’s  still  a  lot  of work  to  do  in order  to  clarify  how  mirroring‐based  action  understanding  could  take  place.  I claim  that  a  proper  interpretation  of  what  mirror  neuron  activation  correlates with is going to bring us closer to a solution of the issue as to how mirroring‐based action understanding works. After all, if mirror neurons are to play any role at all in  the  process  of  action  understanding,  we  need  to  be  clear  on  just  what  they contribute  to  this  process.  I  claim  that,  in  particular,  interpreting mirror  neuron activation  in  terms  of  intentions  is  going  to  be  a  helpful  step  towards  the comprehension  of  mirroring‐based  action  understanding,  insofar  as  being provided  with  the  intention  that  the  observed  agent  is  trying  to  fulfil  is fundamental  for  understanding what  she’s  up  to.  In  the  following paragraph  I’m going  to  sketch  a  version  of  Simulation  Theory  applied  to  action  understanding that  acknowledges  a  causal  role  to  action  mirroring  and  that  works  on  the assumption that mirror neuron activity correlates with intentions of a specific sort.  
3.2.5  How  the  intention  interpretation  could  help  identifying  the  role  of 
action mirroring in action understanding Having  explored  the  general  connection  that  there  can  be  between interpreting  mirror  neurons  in  terms  of  intentions  and  theories  on  how  action understanding  takes  place,  I’m  going  to  review  two  experiments  to  give  an example of why interpreting mirror neuron activation in terms of intention might be  fruitful  under  the  theoretical  viewpoint,  first  independently  of,  and  then  in conjunction with,  a  version  of  the  Simulation  Theory  of mindreading  applied  to action  understanding.  I’ll  leave  the  rest  of  the  explanation  of  the  theoretical 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advantages  of  the hypothesis  concerning  the  correlation between mirror neuron activation and intentions to chapter 6 (section 5).   Let  me  start  with  a  study  conducted  by  Ferrari  and  colleagues  (2005, reported in Csibra, 2007, pp. 445‐446) on macaque monkeys. Monkeys underwent a visual training of actions that required tools, such using sticks to pick up pieces of food.  This  visual  training  consisted  in  letting  monkeys  passively  observe  the experimenters using the tools  in question. Crucially, monkeys never  learned how to  use  these  tools  themselves.  In  support  of  the  fact  that  these  monkeys  were unable  to  use  the  tools  involved  in  the  actions  shown,  it  is  reported  that,  for instance,  one of  the  tested monkeys, when  faced with  a piece of  food outside  its cage, did not even make an attempt to use a stick to get hold of  it. Still, after two months  of  observational  training,  some  mirror  neurons  that  would  normally discharge when monkeys themselves grasped a piece of food with their hand fired in response to the sight of an experimenter picking up a piece of food by means of a  stick.  Ferrari  and  colleagues  (2005,  p.  216,  reported  in  Csibra,  2007,  p.  445) interpret  their  finding  in  terms of a similarity between the goal  (or, we may say, the outcome) of the observed action on the one hand and that of the action that the monkey itself would be able to perform in a similar situation on the other hand. So, the  monkey  mirror  neuron  response  to  the  observation  of  an  action  that  the monkey was unable to execute corresponded to an action with the same outcome as that of the observed agent, but an action that the monkey was able to perform.  These results can be interpreted in the following terms. Grasping a piece of food is an outcome that can be achieved, among other ways, by using one’s hand (or hands) or by using sticks. One may thus generically intend to grasp a piece of food, or specifically intend to grasp a piece of food by using sticks—this will be the 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case  for  the  experimenter  who’s  responsible  for  the  visual  training  of  the monkeys—or  intend  to  grasp  a  piece  of  food  using  one’s  own  hand.  The experimenter’s action of grasping a piece of food is understood by the monkey not just as  fulfilling  the  intention  to grasp a piece of  food, but as  fulfilling  the specific intention  that  the  monkey  itself  would  be  able  to  form  on  the  basis  of  its  own abilities, which  enable  it  to  grasp  a  piece  of  food with  its  hands.  It would  seem, then,  that  the  experimenter’s  intention  is mapped onto  the  intention  relevant  to the  circumstances  at  hand  that  the  monkey  would  be  able  to  form  in  order  to achieve the outcome of grasping a piece of food.  Gazzola  et  al.  (2007)  have  conducted  the  following  study  on  aplasics, namely  individuals  born  without  some  limbs.  In  the  study  of  Gazzola  and colleagues, two aplasic individuals born without hands or arms underwent an fMRI scan  while  they  watched  hand  actions,  and  their  brain  activity  was  studied  in comparison with that of sixteen typically developed individuals. During this study, both  in aplasics and  in  typically developed subjects, effector‐specific areas of  the brain were individuated as they executed actions with different effectors. The main finding of this study is that both aplasic individuals, while observing hand actions, activated those areas in their brain—part of the mirror neuron system—that had previously been  shown  to be  involved  in  the execution of  foot or mouth actions. Just like in the study by Ferrari and colleagues (2005), here we have an outcome—a given action—that can be executed by different means—hands, mouth or feet. A plausible  interpretation  of  this  finding  would  be  that  aplasics  recognize  the typically developed individuals’ intention to execute hand actions, and map it onto the  intention  that  they  would  form  in  order  to  perform  the  same  action,  an intention which is going to specify the effectors that are actually available to them, 
  52 
namely mouth and feet21. That is, they re‐interpret the observed action in the light of their own motor repertoire. The  possible  interpretation  of  the  two  above  reviewed  studies  has  an intrinsic plausibility, to the extent that  it builds up on an interpretation based on action  outcomes  that  the  previous  sections  should  have  shown  to  be  more appropriate  with  respect  to  an  interpretation  based  solely  on  movement parameters.  This  is  not  the  whole  story,  however,  insofar  as  the  proposed interpretation  would  neatly  fit  into  a  bigger  theory  concerning  action understanding,  namely  a  version  of  Simulation  Theory,  which  is  faithful  to  the fundamentals of  the  theory as  I’ve expounded  them: mirror neuron activation  in the  observer  reflects  the  intentions  that  the  observer,  given  her  possibility  for action  (we  might  say,  given  her  motor  repertoire),  would  form  to  achieve  the outcomes  that  she  sees  the  target  agent  achieving  on  the  basis  of  the  latter’s possibilities for action. In other words, by means of action mirroring, an observer literally puts herself in the target’s shoes, and has a grasp of what it would be for 
her to execute the action that the target is performing.  
3.3 Some provisional conclusions Let  me  sum  up  where  we’ve  got  so  far.  In  the  present  section,  I’ve  put forward  an  interpretation  of  a  series  of  experimental  results  concerning mirror neurons in terms of their correlating with:   (a) the  intention  of  the  acting  agent, when mirror  neurons  fire  during action execution;                                                         21 See chapter 3  for an alternative  interpretation  (in  terms of action  representations) of the same study compatible with the present one. 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(b) the intention of the observed agent, mapped onto the intention that the  observing  agent would  form  in  the  circumstances  in which  the observed  agent  acts,  when  mirror  neurons  fire  during  action observation (Ferrari et al., 2005; Gazzola et al., 2007).  The  interpretation  of  mirror  neuron  activation  in  terms  of  intentions  has  an intrinsic  plausibility  that  builds  on  the  unavailability  of  a  deflationary interpretation that relies solely on movement details, and on the  likelihood of an interpretation in terms of action outcomes. Still, there is a non‐trivial step involved in shifting  from an  interpretation  in  terms of action outcomes  to one  in  terms of intentions, insofar as   (i) it  is  not  clear  that  all  outcomes  that  one  fulfils  while  acting  are  apt  to constitute  the  content  of  an  intention,  since  the  content  of  an  intention should be introspectable, and (ii) working  on  the  assumption  that,  while  acting,  one  simultaneously  fulfils many outcomes, it is not obvious that one thereby has as many intentions as outcomes she’s fulfilling.   An  interpretation  in  terms  of  correlation  between mirror  neuron  activation  and intentions would also lay the foundations for a version of the Simulation Theory of mindreading applied to action understanding. 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4. Which intentions? How many intentions? For the sake of argument, let us suppose for the time being that an interpretation of mirror neuron activation having it that mirror neuron activation correlates with intentions could be made to work. A lot more still needs to be specified about what this  interpretation  would  have  to  say  about  the  various  experimental  results reported in this chapter22.   For instance, consider once again the study by Ferrari and colleagues  (2005) and  that by Gazzola and colleagues  (2007). As  I’ve said  in the  previous  section,  both  can  be  seen  as  featuring  an  outcome  that  can  be achieved by multiple means. Take grasping a piece of food, which can be achieved, among  other  ways,  by  picking  it  up  using  sticks  or  with  one’s  hands.  Even assuming  that we’re going  to employ  the notion of  intentions  to characterize  the outcome which a given subject  tries  to achieve, how many  intentions, and which intentions, should we say are in play? Would it be more appropriate to say that the experimenter has the more general intention to grasp a piece of food, or the more specific  intention  to  grasp  a  piece  of  food  by means  of  sticks,  or  that  it  has  two intentions—a more general one to grasp a piece of food and a more specific one to grasp a piece of food by using sticks? Likewise, in Gazzola et al. (2007), should it be said that the observed individual has both the intention to perform a given action tout‐court, or a given action with a specific effector?   Now  recall  the  study  by  Fogassi  and  colleagues  (2005),  as  it  poses  a problem analogous to the one just raised. The authors suggest an interpretation of their  findings according to which some of the recorded mirror neurons “not only code the observed motor act but also allow the observer to understand the agent’s intentions”  (Fogassi  et  al.,  2005,  p.  662),  from  which  it  would  seem  that  they                                                         22  A  re‐interpretation  of  these  results  in  the  light  of  motor  intentions  is  going  to  be provided in chapter 6 (section 5). 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conceive of grasping and eating as the intentions of the acting individual, whereas it’s not clear that the act of grasping has an intention associated to it. Alternatively, it would be possible to say that:   (i) the  agent  intends  to  grasp  in  order  to  place  (only  one  intention  is involved), or (ii) the  agents  intends  to  grasp,  and  also  intends  to  grasp  in  order  to place, or  (iii) the agent intends to grasp and also intends to (subsequently) place, or (iv) the  agent  intends  to  grasp,  and  also  intends  to  subsequently place, and also intends to grasp in order to place.  Notice  that  the  equivalent  of  (iii)  or  (iv)  weren’t  available  for  the  previously mentioned  studies  (Ferrari  et  al.,  2005;  Gazzola  et  al.,  2007),  since  they  didn’t feature actions that could be segmented into temporally distinct components such as grasp plus eat or grasp plus place. A proposal to interpret experimental results concerning mirror  neurons  by  itself  doesn’t  specifically  commit  us  to  any  of  the earlier proposed alternatives. If the suggested interpretation in terms of intention can be made  to stand,  the  issue as  to which  intentions and how many  intentions are involved in the performance of a given action needs to be dealt with23.   Before I proceed any further, it is worth stressing what has been done and what hasn’t been done so far.  I’ve started out by considering an interpretation of mirror neuron activation according to which the latter correlates with movement                                                         23 And, indeed, it is going to be dealt with in chapter 6. 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parameters  only.  This  interpretation  has  been  shown  to  be  untenable,  given  the various  examples  of  mirror  neuron  activation  abstracting  away  from  fine movement details,  and an  alternative  interpretation  in  terms of  action outcomes has been proposed. Building up on the action outcome interpretation, it has been proposed  that  mirror  neuron  activation  correlates  with  the  intention  (or intentions—as  I’ve  highlighted  throughout  the  present  section)  of  the  agent  and the  corresponding  one  (or  ones)  of  the  observer.  It  is  essential  to  note  that my rejection of  an  interpretation of mirror neuron  activation  in  terms of movement parameters  shouldn’t  be  read  as  a  complete  dismissal  of  the  role  of  bodily movements  in  the  characterization  of  the  relevant  high‐level  outcome. Unfortunately,  the  interpretation  of  mirror  neuron  activation  in  terms  of movement  parameters  has  sometimes  been  formulated  as  antithetical  to  that  in terms of high‐level outcomes. The following section is devoted to showing that this contraposition is mistaken.      
5. Mirror neuron activation: high or low? In this section, I’m going to review an argument that has been proposed by Csibra (2007)  to  the  effect  that mirror  neuron  activity  can  be  embedded  in  one  of  two competing  models  of  action  understanding—direct  matching  and  action reconstruction.  Csibra  further  argues  that  the  latter  is  more  plausible  than  the former, partly by resorting to a number of experimental results concerning mirror neurons, results that Csibra takes to witness that observed actions are understood at a relatively high level of abstraction. I don’t mean to side with Csibra nor am I interested  in  adjudicating  between  the  two  hypotheses  that  he  contrasts concerning how action understanding works. Rather,  I’m  interested  in defending 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the  idea  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  mirror  neuron  activation  and intentions  of  a  specific  kind,  and  this  idea  is  likely  to  be  compatible with  either hypothesis on how action understanding works  considered by Csibra. Reviewing Csibra’s argument is mainly going to serve the purpose of removing obstacles for the  idea  that  I  ultimately  want  to  defend,  for  the  following  reason.  Csibra’s argument  seems  to  be  based  on  an  assumption  on  the  individuation  of  action outcomes such that, above a certain level of abstraction, the individuation of action outcomes  doesn’t  rely  on  movement  details  at  all.  I  mean  to  show  that  this assumption is mistaken, and this is going to provide the basis for arguing in favour of  a  specific  kind of  intentions—motor  intentions—corresponding  to  the  kind of outcomes—which  I’m  going  to  term  motor  outcomes—that  are  seemingly  not contemplated in Csibra’s theoretical framework. Csibra  starts  by  considering  that  an  action  may  be  understood,  and therefore  reproduced,  at  different  levels  of  interpretation.  Over  the  previous sections we saw many examples of this: in Meltzoff’s (1988) experiment the action in question could be understood either as a lighting up the box or as a lighting up the box using one’s forehead, and in Gazzola and colleagues’ study (2007) a given action could be characterized  in a way  that does or does not  specify  the effector employed, and so on. An influential proposal (Rizzolatti et al., 2001) about the way in which mirror neuron activation might mediate action understanding consists in the so‐called direct­matching hypothesis, which states that “an action is understood when  its  observation  causes  the  motor  system  of  the  observer  to  ‘resonate’” (Rizzolatti  et  al.,  2001,  p.  661,  quoted  in Csibra,  2007,  p.  436). According  to  this hypothesis,  an observer would  reproduce  the observed action  in her own motor system, and would  thus be enabled  to understand  the outcome of  the action she 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observes24 (Csibra, 2007, p. 436). Now,  the  reproduction  of  an  action  in  one’s  motor  system  is  meant  to consist in a conversion from the visual description of the observed action given at some level of interpretation into the motor description of the same action, which is produced in the observer’s motor system (Csibra, 2007, p. 437). Csibra considers it a  crucial  question  at  what  level  of  action  interpretation  the  reproduction  of  an action  in  the  observer’s motor  system  takes  place. He  claims  that  the  notions  of 
direct matching  and motor  resonance  are  likely  to  be  based  on  the  idea  that  the above  mentioned  conversion  must  take  place  at  a  relatively  low  level,  where movement  details  are  described,  and  possibly  in  great  detail—and  indeed, according  to  him many  results  concerning mirror  neuron  activation  seem  to  be compatible  with  this  idea25.  At  the  same  time,  however,  Csibra  (2007,  p.  443) claims that a series of other results concerning mirror neuron activation seem to indicate that the conversion between the visual description of an observed action into a motor description must take place at a very high level of  interpretation. In support  of  this  idea,  he mentions  results  that  have  been  reported  earlier  in  this chapter:  mirror  neurons  do  not  respond  to  mimed  actions,  even  though  the movement details of the mimed action are very similar (if not the same as) those of a target object‐directed action (Gallese et al., 1996). Csibra also quotes the results obtained by Umiltà and colleagues (2001): there is no activation of mirror neurons 
                                                        24 The  process  of  action  understanding mentioned  in  the  context  of  this  hypothesis  has been referred to as motor simulation (e.g., by Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005), and indeed seems to fit the general principles of the Simulation Theory of mindreading. 25  For  instance,  he mentions  the  existence  of  strictly  congruent mirror  neurons,  whose firing  corresponds  to  relatively  fine  details  of  the  action  that  is  being  performed  or observed—that is, these neurons correlate not just with grasping with the hand, but also with the specific kind of grip (precision grip or whole hand prehension) employed (Gallese et al., 1996). 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whenever an action is performed partly behind an occluding screen if the monkey knows that no target object has been placed behind the screen, in spite of the fact that  the relevant movements are being performed—although the presence of  the relevant  movements  should  be  enough,  according  to  Csibra,  for  low‐level mirroring to occur. According to Csibra (2007, pp. 446‐447), the direct‐matching hypothesis as it  is  normally  presented  by  its  supporters  is  flawed  by  a  tension  between  the following  conflicting  ideas: on  the one hand,  action mirroring  is  taken  to  rely on mechanisms of  low‐level resonance, sensitive to relatively fine movement details, and,  on  the  other  hand,  action  mirroring  would  seem  to  be  significantly independent of  fine movement details (as  in Gallese et al., 1996, and in Umiltà et al., 2001), and rather to reflect action understanding at a high level. To the extent that  action  mirroring  can  be  shown  to  consist  in  a  close  reproduction  of  the movement details of the action that  is being observed, the less there seems to be reason  to  identify  action  mirroring  with  action  understanding—i.e.,  with  the understanding  of  the  high‐level  outcome  that  is  being  pursued  by means  of  the action in question. By contrast, to the extent that action mirroring is shown to rely on an interpretation of actions at a high level, there seems to be no role for action reproduction to play in the observer’s motor system at a relatively low level for the purposes of action understanding. In Csibra’s own words:   The tension arises  from the  fact  that  the more  it seems that mirroring  is nothing else but  faithful duplication of observed actions,  the  less evidence  it provides  for action understanding; and the more mirroring represents high‐level interpretation of  the  observed  actions,  the  less  evidence  it  provides  that  this  interpretation  is generated by low‐level motor duplication. 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(Csibra, 2007, p. 447)    Taking this tension into account, Csibra proposes two alternative models of action  understanding,  which  are  primarily  differentiated  by  the  level  at  which action interpretation takes place, and, on the basis of that, assign different roles to mirror  neuron  activation.  In  one model, which  is  still  called direct matching,  the interpretation of  the observed action  takes place at a  relatively  low  level. Mirror neuron activation provides this low‐level motor resonance, and thus contributes to action  understanding  in  the  way  that  is  going  to  be  explained  in  the  following paragraph. By contrast, an alternative  interpretation—action reconstruction—has it  that  the  interpretation of  the  observed  action occurs  at  a  relatively high  level, possibly outside the motor system, and is then passed on to the motor system, and it’s only at that point that mirror neurons fire.  Csibra makes reference to hierarchical models of motor control (Wolpert et al.,  2003),  according  to which  there  are  hierarchically  organized motor modules that  are  reciprocally  connected.  On  the  basis  of  these  models,  he  links  the  two proposed  alternatives  concerning  the  level  at which  action  interpretation occurs with two hypotheses concerning the propagation direction of activation within the action  control  system  (Csibra, 2007, pp. 441‐442).  In  the direct‐matching model, according  to  which  action  interpretation  takes  place  at  a  low‐level,  motor resonance  would  determine  an  upward  propagation  in  the  observer’s  motor system producing an estimate of the higher level subgoals and goals likely to be at the  origin  of  the  observed  action.  On  the  alternative  model,  that  of  action reconstruction, according to which action interpretation occurs at a high level, the high‐level outcome is mapped onto the observer’s action control system, where it can be propagated downwards thus eliciting the relevant covert emulation of the 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action (Csibra, 2007, p. 441). In the former case, it can be said that mirror neuron activation contributes to (or even constitutes—see discussion in section 3.2.4 of the present chapter) action understanding. In the latter case, it is more appropriately described as reflecting action understanding (Csibra, 2007, p. 443).   Csibra’s argument can be summarized as follows:   (1) Action reproduction in the observer’s motor system can only take place at one level of a hierarchy; (2) There is a level at which action outcomes encompass movement details, and  a  level  at  which  action  outcomes  abstract  away  from  movement details, and the two are different (and are, respectively, low and high); (3) Mirror neuron activation  is action reproduction either at a  low or at a high level, but not both.   One cannot have one’s cake and eat it too: the discharge of a set of MNs cannot represent the activation of the observer’s motor system at low and high levels at the same time. (Csibra, 2007, p. 447)  (4) If mirror neuron activation is action reproduction at a low level, then it 
contributes  to action understanding  in  the way specified by  the direct‐matching model. If mirror neuron activation is action reproduction at a high level,  then it reflects action understanding in the way specified by action reconstruction.  Csibra further argues for action understanding as opposed to direct matching. As I 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said,  I’m not  going  to pronounce myself  on  this  contrast,  but  I mean  to question assumption (2), according to which the specification of an action outcome should either involve or fail to involve the movement details of an action—the assumption that makes direct matching an alternative incompatible with action reconstruction. Earlier  on  in  this  section  I mentioned  some  experimental  results  (Gallese  et  al., 1996, and Umiltà et al., 2001) on which Csibra seemingly bases  this assumption, but I think the justification for (2) heavily relies on Csibra’s idea that, in a series of experiments  concerning  mirror  neurons  that  I’ll  discuss  below,  contextual  cues play a predominant and seemingly exclusive role in the individuation of an action outcome, as opposed  to movement details.  I’m going  to show that,  in  the  light of the  details  of  the  experiments  under  consideration,  Csibra’s  reflections  can  be shown to be defective, and thus his assumption (2) concerning the individuation of action  outcomes  can  be  shown  to  be  questionable.  I’m  going  to  rely  on  the correlation between mirror neuron activation and action outcomes established in sections 1 and 2  to point  to  the existence of action outcomes, which  I’m going to term motor  outcomes,  that  are  at  the  same  time  dependent  on  the  movements employed  to  achieve  them  and  also  independent  of  the  fine  details  of  those movements.    Recall  the  study by Fogassi  and colleagues  (2005),  and  let us now  look at the results obtained in observation condition. Many motor IPL neurons fired also while  the  monkey  observed  the  grasping  for  eating  and  grasping  for  placing actions  performed  by  others.  Most  of  them  exhibited  a  differential  activation depending on whether the grasping act in correlation with which they responded was going to be followed by eating or placing. Note that the differential discharge in question occurred before  the beginning of  the  following  act,  namely  eating or 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placing. It is to be specified that the container would be present only in the placing trials, and not in the eating ones. Csibra makes the following claims.    Although  the  actions  themselves  did  not  carry  information  about  the further  goal  of  the  actor  in  the  studies  cited  above,  the  context  did.  For example, the monkey in the Fogassi et al. (2005) study could figure out the further  goal  of  the  observed  action  from  the  kind of  object  (food or non‐food) involved, and whether or not a container was present. (Csibra, 2007, p. 445)   While  these  considerations  make  sense  in  principle,  it  is  also  true  that Fogassi and colleagues (2005, p. 664) controlled for the effect that the specific kind of object produced on the monkey. A series of neurons (20) were therefore tested in a modified version of the observation task, in which three actions were shown to the monkey:  grasping  food  to  eat,  grasping  food  to  place,  and  grasping  solid  to place. The recorded neurons still exhibited selectivity  towards the specific action following  grasping,  regardless  of  the  object  employed.  To  be  precise,  12  of  the recorded neurons did not show any difference in activation between grasping food to  place  and  grasping  solid  to  place,  while  8  neurons,  which  were  selective  for grasping to eat, discharged more strongly in response to grasping food to place as opposed to grasping solid to place. In a nutshell, although the nature of the object involved could  in principle have been sufficient  to account  for a neural  response anticipating the outcome of the action, it turned out not to be sufficient.  We  haven’t  yet  discussed  the  role  of  another  contextual  cue,  namely  the presence or absence of the container in Fogassi and colleagues’ experiment—a role that  Csibra  considers  prominent,  to  the  detriment  of  movement  details,  in  the 
  64 
individuation of a given high‐level outcome, as witnessed by this reflection:   if we accept Fogassi et al.’s (2005) argument that the selectivity of MNs was independent  of  the  kinematic  parameters  and  reflected  ‘intention’ understanding  based  on  contextual  cues,  then  nothing  in  this  study provided  evidence  that  such  an  understanding  is  based  on  low‐level mirroring (i.e. motor resonance).  (Csibra, 2007, p. 447)  But  note  that  Fogassi  and  colleagues  only  establish  that  their  results  cannot  be accounted  for  solely  in  terms  of movement  parameters,  insofar  as  no  systematic connection holds between  those parameters and mirror neuron responses26. But this  doesn’t  amount  to  denying  that  movement  parameters  play  any  role whatsoever  in  action  understanding.  At  this  point  it  is  especially  helpful  to consider  Umiltà  and  colleagues’  (2001)  study  insofar  as  its  two  conditions featuring an occluding screen are concerned. Conclusions analogous to those that I’m going to draw about that study should hold for the experiments by Fogassi and colleagues. First,  a  consideration of a more general kind  is  in order.  It  cannot be said  that  only  contextual  cues,  consisting  in  the  visible  presence  of  the  relevant objects  (the  object  to  be  grasped  in  the  study  by Umiltà  and  colleagues  and  the container  in  that  by  Fogassi  and  colleagues),  are  responsible  for  the  recorded mirror neuron response. This is because, in the first place, mirror neurons do not respond  to  the  sight  of  objects  alone  (Gallese  et  al.,  1996; Rizzolatti  et  al.,  1996; both reported in Umiltà et al., 2001)—by contrast with canonical neurons (Murata                                                         26  This  lack  of  systematic  connection  was  verified  on  monkeys  in  the  action  execution condition,  and  it  should  be  reasonable  to  assume  that  it  holds  also  for  a  human experimenter performing the same actions. 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et al., 1997). Secondly, mirror neurons do not fire until the beginning of the action, even though the contextual cues are already present (Fogassi et al., 2005).  In the study by Umiltà and colleagues (2001, p. 160), seeing the object that is going to be acted  upon  being  placed  behind  the  occluding  screen  doesn’t  elicit  any  mirror neuron response.   The  condition  in which  the occluding  screen  is  employed and an object  is acted  upon  is  useful  for  the  following  consideration.  The  neurons  that  fired  in correspondence with the late phase of grasping and during holding produced the maximal  response  at  the  end  of  the  hidden  action.  Furthermore, mirror  neuron activation  was  significantly  larger  in  the  phase  in  which  the  hand  was  hidden compared to that in which the hand was still visible in the population as a whole (Umiltà et al., 2001, p. 160). So it is not necessary for a contextual cue to be visible in order to elicit a mirror neuron response. Taken together,  these results are not meant  to show that contextual  cues do not play any role  in eliciting  the relevant mirror neuron response, but  they can be taken to signify  that contextual cues do 
not play  the predominant or even exclusive role—to  the detriment of movement details—that Csibra seems to grant them.  I started out by meaning to question Csibra’s underlying assumption on the individuation of action outcomes such that, above a certain level of abstraction, the individuation  of  action  outcomes  doesn’t  rely  on  movement  details  at  all.  This assumption  relied  on  the  idea  that,  whenever  mirror  neuron  activity  does  not correlate with  fine movement details,  it  can be mainly or even wholly accounted for by invoking the presence of relevant contextual cues. However, my discussion of the experimental results that Csibra appeals to shows that contextual cues alone cannot account for the obtained mirror neuron response, and thus it’s not the case 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that mirror neuron activation, in those cases, correlates with a high‐level outcome whose characterization  is  completely  independent of movement details.  It would rather  seem,  on  the  basis  of  the  discussion  of  the  role  of  contextual  cues  in  the experiment by Fogassi  and  colleagues,  that  action outcomes exist  that  are  at  the same time relatively high level, insofar as they abstract away from fine movement details,  while  their  characterization  is  still  relatively  low  level,  insofar  as  it essentially  relies on movements details,  as  contextual  cues  alone  cannot  account for them. These action outcomes—motor outcomes—are going to play a key role in the definition of motor intentions, namely the intentions with which mirror neuron activation correlates.   
Conclusion: motor outcomes—not so high, not so low  Once  it  is  established  that  mirror  neuron  activation  correlates  with  motor outcomes, which, on the one hand, cannot be reduced to mere movements, but at the  same  time  to  some  extent  depend  on movements, we  can  set  out  to  suggest that mirror neuron activation correlates with a kind of intentions that I’m going to term motor intentions—in a related but different sense with respect to Jeannerod (1994), Pacherie (2003, 2006, 2008) and Jacob and Jeannerod (2005). The notion of motor intention is what is going to constitute an answer to the central question of  the  thesis,  namely  how  actions  are  connected with  intentions.  A  hint  to  why motor intentions are going to provide this connection can be found in the notion of 
motor  outcome,  which  has  been  worked  out  in  the  previous  section.  Motor outcomes are at the same time relatively high level, insofar as they abstract away from  fine  movement  details,  and  low  level  enough  that  their  characterization essentially relies on movements details. So, if the idea of a motor intention can be 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made to work, the sort of outcome that it represent is going to be a motor outcome in the way just characterized, and, in the light of the discussion that has occupied section 3 of the present chapter, it’s going to be possible to say that mirror neuron activity  correlates with motor  intentions.  Still,  a  lot  of  steps  are  still  required  to reach  a  satisfactory  notion  of  motor  intention,  and  to  show  that  it  answers  the question as to how intentions connect with actions. First of all, we’re going to need to  tackle  the  notion  of  intention  itself,  in  order  to  identify  the  distinguishing characteristics  of  an  intention,  so  as  to  be  able  to  show  that  a  motor  intention satisfies them. After that, I’m going to focus on the distinguishing characteristic of motor intentions, namely the relevant similarity in content that they bear to motor representations.  This  is  going  to  be  the  topic  of  chapter  3.  There  the  notion  of motor intention will be introduced by appealing to the idea that intentions as well as motor representations represent action outcomes. Chapters 3 and 4 are going to deepen the idea that action outcomes represented by motor intentions are not so high,  insofar  as  they  are  concerned with  bodily movements  (and,  as  a matter  of fact, specify sequences of bodily configurations), and they’re not so low insofar as they’re  endowed  with  a  certain  degree  of  abstraction  with  respect  to  greater detailed  representations  of  movements.  The  notion  of  motor  intention  could  in principle be thought to be similar to Searle’s (1983) notion of intention in action. Chapter 5  is  going  to  show  that,  as  a matter of  fact,  Searle’s distinction between intentions in action and prior intentions is inadequately motivated, in particular as far  as  the  temporal  dimension  it  involves  is  concerned.  So  the  notion  of  motor intention  is significantly different  from that of  intention  in action. Once we reach chapter  6,  we’ll  finally  be  in  the  position  to  appreciate  that  intentions  can  be ordered hierarchically, and that motor  intentions occupy the  lowest  levels of this 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hierarchy.  The  special  connection  holding  between motor  intentions  and motor representations, which  is going  to be spelled out  in chapters 3 and 4,  is going  to explain  why  motor  intentions  provide  the  connection  between  intentions  and actions: since motor representations are the proximate causes of movements (see Pacherie,  2000,  p.  403),  and  motor  intentions  have  a  kind  of  content  that  is relevantly similar to that of motor representations, motor  intentions are the best candidates  among  intentions  for  providing  a  linkage  between  intentions  and actions: as it were, they’re not so high, insofar as they bear relevant similarities to motor representations, and they’re not so low, since, after all, they are intentions. 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§2. What is an intention?  
Introduction  Very often, when a man says  ‘I am going  to do such‐and‐such’, we should say that this was an expression of intention. We also sometimes speak of an action  as  intentional,  and we may  also  ask with what  intention  the  thing was done. (Anscombe, 1957, p. 1)  As  this  quote  illustrates,  providing  an  account  of  what  intentions  are  is  made difficult  by  their  appearance  in  at  least  three  forms:  intentions  for  the  future,  as when I  intend to open the curtains in an hour,  intentions with which one acts, as when  I  open  the  curtains with  the  intention  let more  light  into  the  room27,  and intentional action, as when I intentionally open the curtains. Desirable as it might be (since we could plausibly think that there must be just one concept underlying these  three  forms  of  intention),  it  is  far  from  easy  to  give  a  unitary  account  of intention.  Radically  different  accounts  of  intentions  have  ensued  depending  on 
                                                        27  This  example  appears  in  Bratman  (1987,  pp.  128‐ff.).  There  Bratman  distinguishes different notions of acting with an intention, beginning with the difference between what he calls ‘acting with a further intention’, of which an example is opening the curtains with the  intention of washing the windows, and acting with an  intention (tout‐court), such as opening the curtains with the intention of thereby getting more light. In the first case, the intentional  action  is  included  in  a  larger  plan,  part  of  which  consists  in  a  distinct  and successive action of washing  the windows.  In  the  second case,  the action of opening  the curtains  is  all  that’s  needed  in  the  given  circumstances  to  obtain  more  light.  These distinctions will be put to work in chapter 6. 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which form of intention has been taken as primary. In what follows, I’ll attempt to give an account of intentions and intentional actions.   
1. What is an intentional action? A  methodological  claim  on  relating 
intentional action to responsibility attribution  First of  all,  I’m going  to  consider  the  idea  that  the notion of  intentional  action  is bound up with that of responsibility attribution. We may think, that is, that insofar as one acts intentionally, one may then be held responsible, and thus praiseworthy or  blameworthy,  for what  she  does.  This  sort  of  connection  indeed  seems  to  be part of our folk psychological intuitions about the notion of intentional action28, if you consider  the  following example:  if you step on my  foot, and  it  turns out  that you’ve  done  that  intentionally,  I  may  consider  you  blameworthy  for  it  and therefore be very angry at you. On the contrary, if you step on my foot and I learn that  what  you’ve  done  is  not  intentional,  then  I  may  be  inclined  not  hold  you blameworthy for it29, and thus forgive you. I’m now going to review some results showing that the connection between intentional action and considerations to do with responsibility, blame or praise attributions should be regarded with suspicion as  it’s  not  especially  reliable. With  this,  I  don’t mean  to  deny  that  the  notion  of intentional action is  irrelevant for the purposes of ascribing responsibility, blame                                                         28 I’ll later say to what extent I mean to rely on folk psychology, and why. 29 Bratman (1987, p. 1) provides a similar example:  If  I  poison  the  inhabitants,  but  do  not  do  so  intentionally  and  do  not  act with the intention of poisoning them, you will react very differently to me than if I had acted with that intention and poisoned them intentionally; and so will our legal institutions.  But cf. the example concerning a drunk driver (Mele & Moser, 1994, p. 51) mentioned later on in the chapter. 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or praise: on the contrary, as stated at the beginning of the present work, I  think that  the  notions  of  intention  and  intentional  action  have  a  bearing  on responsibility, blame or praise attribution. What I set forth to deny is the converse kind of  connection, namely  that,  to  clarify what  an  intentional  action  consists  in, we should resort to notions of responsibility, blame or praise.   Knobe  (2006) has  looked  into people’s  intuitions as  to whether  specific actions should be judged intentional or not. He presented individuals with pairs of cases  that  are  almost  exactly  alike,  except  that  in  one  a  given  behaviour  has beneficial consequences towards someone or something, and in the other case the same  behaviour  brings  damage  to  someone  or  something.  As  a  result,  people’s intuitions differ on the two cases. Let us see how by looking at an example of a pair of cases (Knobe, 2006, pp. 205‐206).   Here  is  the  first  case.  The  vice‐president  of  a  company  submits  the following proposal  to  the chairman of  the board. The company could start a new program, which is going to increase the profits, but also damage the environment. The  chairman  agrees  to  start  the  new  program  on  the  basis  of  the  fact  that  he wants  to  increase  the  profits, while  he  doesn’t  care  about  the  environment.  The program  is  therefore started, and  the environment  is  indeed damaged. Question: did the chairman damage the environment intentionally? Most people will answer affirmatively to this question, and, asked to motivate their answer, they’ll resort to the  fact  that  the chairman knew  in advance  that  the program would damage  the environment, and yet agreed to start it.   Now consider the second case. This is entirely analogous to the first one, except  for  the  fact  that  the  proposed  program  is  going  to help  the  environment, rather than damaging it. Once again, the chairman shows indifference towards the 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effects  of  the  program  on  the  environment,  and  agrees  to  start  it.  Now,  did  the chairman help  the environment intentionally? This time most people are going to say  that  the  chairman  does  not  help  the  environment  intentionally.  In  terms  of knowing  in advance,  though,  the  second scenario  is  analogous  to  the  first one  in that  the  chairman  is  indeed  aware  of  the  effects  of  the  program  on  the environment before starting it.    These  results  suggest  that  people’s  judgements  as  to  whether  a  given action is intentional or not seem to be influenced by considerations concerning the moral  status of  the behaviour  in question—namely considerations as  to whether that  behaviour  is  good  or  bad.  The  results  are  replicated  even  once  the  pair  of cases is modified so as to involve the bearing of trying, foresight and skill (Knobe, 2006, pp. 208‐ff.). This may be taken to mean that what people have in mind when they express  judgements about an action being intentional or not reflect rather a question  as  to  whether  the  piece  of  behaviour  in  question  is  one  for  which  the subject  may  be  held  responsible,  and,  more  specifically,  blameworthy  or praiseworthy (see Adams & Steadman, 2004, mentioned in Knobe, 2006, p. 21430; and Mele, 2001).     While  I  think  that  these  results  should  be  taken  to  indicate  that moral considerations  distort  intentional  action  attributions,  Knobe  instead  rationalizes people’s reactions to the proposed pairs of cases. He does so by suggesting a view according  to  which  people  use  the  notion  of  intentional  action  as  a  tool  for determining how much praise or blame a given person deserves  (2006, pp. 225‐226).  This  determination,  according  to  Knobe,  goes  via  a  two‐step  process 
                                                        30  “When  a  person  utters  the  sentence  ‘He  didn’t  do  that  intentionally,’  there  is  often  a clear  implicature  that  the agent  is not  to blame  for what he has done.”  (Knobe, 2006, p. 214) 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whereby  a  first  sub‐process  determines whether  the  given  behaviour  is  good  or bad, and, on  the basis of  that, which  features are  relevant  in order  to  judge  it  as intentional,  and  a  second  sub‐process  looks  for  the  relevant  features  in  the behaviour under examination and, on the basis of the presence or absence of those features,  outputs  an  intentional  judgement.  Knobe,  in  short,  endorses  a  view according to which moral considerations, rather than distorting intentional action attributions,  instead  turn  them  into  useful  tools  for  evaluating  whether  a  given behaviour is praiseworthy or blameworthy.    I’m going do draw a different conclusion from Knobe’s results. Consider the  alternative  view  according  to  which  blame  or  praise  attributions,  and responsibility  attributions  more  generally,  are  simply  divorced  from  intentional action attributions,  as  in  the example provided by Mele and Moser  (1994, p. 51) according to which a drunk driver may well be held responsible for running over a pedestrian, even though his running over the pedestrian was not intentional. If we take  this  sort of  intentional action  (or  lack  thereof) attribution seriously, we can only  interpret  Knobe’s  results  as  showing  that  the  folk  psychological  notion  of intentional  action  simply  shouldn’t  be  trusted.  The  view he  proposes  provides  a rationalization of people’s attributions of intentional action that only makes sense a posteriori  on  the basis of  subsequent blame or praise  evaluations.  In  line with this  idea,  Malle  and  colleagues  (Malle,  2006,  Malle  &  Nelson,  2003,  reported  in Knobe,  2006,  p.  217),  give  the  plausible  suggestion  that  people’s  feelings  about blame distort their judgements about intentional actions. Essentially, according to them the order of explanation goes as follows: people judge an agent’s behaviour immoral, hence  judge her blameworthy, and thus  label her behaviour  intentional 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as a justification to the blame judgement already assigned (Knobe, 2006, pp. 217‐218).    After  all  these  considerations,  a methodological point  is  in order.  I  take Knobe’s results to show that if there is any interesting notion of intentional action that  matters  for  philosophical  purposes,  we  are  not  going  to  get  it  from  folk psychology, which seems rather to be led astray by moral considerations when it comes to employing the notion of  intentional action. I’m therefore going to try to capture  a  notion  of  intentional  action  that,  while  aiming  to  be  far  from  a philosophical  fiction  (see  Mele,  2001,  quoted  in  Nadelhoffer,  2005),  may  still occasionally  depart  from  common  sense—for  instance,  I won’t  try  to  rationalize people’s attributions of  intentional actions as  they appear  in Knobe’s results, but will rather consider them misguided. I think that we’re going to get a much more illuminating account of intentional action if we steer clear of considerations to do with  blame  and  praise,  and  if we  rather  look  for  the  bases  of  intentional  action attribution  in  the connection between  intentional actions and  intention. To  this  I now turn.   
2. First attempt: reducing intention to intentional action So,  how  are  intentional  actions  and  intentions  related?  Consider  the  following reflection:   how  do  we  tell  someone’s  intentions?  or:  what  kind  of  true  statements about people’s intentions can we certainly make, and how do we know that they are true? That is to say, is it possible to find types of statement of the form ‘A intends X’ which we can say have a great deal of certainty? Well, if 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you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, you will have a strong chance of  success  if you mention what he actually did or  is doing. For whatever else he may intend, or whatever may be his intentions in doing what he does, the greater number of the things which you would say straight off a man did or was doing, will be things he intends. (Anscombe, 1957, pp. 7‐8)   Anscombe  suggests  that  intentional  actions  and  intentions  are  so  close  that  the latter  may  be,  as  it  were,  read  off  the  former:  to  reach  a  belief  that  has  a  high likelihood  to  be  true  about what  a man  intends,  one would  do well  to  consider what the man in question is doing, because, most likely, he’s going to intend to do whatever  you’d  straight  off  describe  him  as  doing.  But  this  statement  shifts  the focus on the following issue: just what would you straight off describe someone as doing? What does this qualification—straight off—refer to? Suppose you’re presented with  the  following  scenario: Mary and  John are standing in front of each other, and Mary is pointing to her side, away from them both, while angrily and loudly telling John that he should never show up again in front  of  her.  What  is  Mary  doing  at  that  point?  Well,  she’s  telling  John  that  he should never show up again in front of her, she’s screaming loudly, she’s pointing to her  side,  and  she’s  also moving a  lot of  air molecules31. Anscombe’s  appeal  to things  that  we’d  straight  off  say  that  someone  is  doing  is  meant  to  rule  out descriptions  such  as  the  latter,  according  to  which  Mary  is  moving  a  lot  of  air molecules,  insofar  as  it’s  going  to  be  “a  very  recondite  piece  of  information”  to most  people  (Anscombe,  1957,  p.  8).  The  sort  of  descriptions  that,  according  to Anscombe, matter  for  the purposes of arriving at what one  intends  to do are  the                                                         31 This example draws inspiration from Searle (1983, pp. 98‐100). 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sort  of  things  that we’d  be  expected  to  report  in  a  law  court  on  being  asked,  as witnesses, what a certain person did or was doing (Anscombe, 1957, p. 8).  Admittedly,  none  of  this  might  sound  especially  illuminating  if  we’re interested in pinpointing all and only those descriptions of what someone is doing that may be  a  good guide  for us  to  find out what  she  intends.  Still,  at  this  stage, Anscombe  is  only  interested  in,  however  approximately,  getting  across  the following  idea: as observers, we are generally  in a good enough position  to  form judgements as to what a man is doing that are relevant towards his intentions. In the previous example, most people closely observing John and Mary would readily be able to say that Mary is telling John that he should never show up again in front of her, that she’s screaming loudly, and that she’s pointing to her side. That there are a number of things that we can easily tell about what someone is doing at any given time is, indeed, something that it seems reasonable to accept. If Anscombe’s idea, that a man’s actions are the privileged way to get to his intentions, could be made  to stand,  it would  follow that we’re generally  in a good enough position  to judge  what  a man  intends  just  on  the  basis  of  what  we  can  easily  observe  him doing—against the  intuitively appealing  idea that “what a man’s  intentions are  is only  authoritatively  settled  by  him”  (Anscombe,  1957,  p.  9)32.  This  makes Anscombe’s idea an attractive one, and worth considering. In order to be able to rely on Anscombe’s proposal, we first need to clarify the following. Not everything that a man does at any given time is going to be an intentional action of his. Suppose, for instance, that you and I see a man thrashing about in the grip of an epileptic seizure. If you ask me what the man is doing, I can                                                         32  Studies  on  behaviour  parsing  (Newtson,  1973;  Kurby  &  Zacks,  2008),  hinted  at  in chapter  6  (section  4)  tell  us  that  there’s more  to  the  idea  that  observers  are  in  a  good enough position to judge what a man is doing than meets the eye. 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tell you precisely that he’s thrashing about under an epileptic seizure, and this will be  an  appropriate  answer  to  your  question  to  the  extent  that  it  gives  a  correct description of this man’s behaviour. Strictly speaking, though, I haven’t described anything that the man in question is doing, insofar as he’s not acting intentionally: he’s  rather  best  described  as  there  being  something  happening  to  him33.  So,  if Anscombe’s suggestion, according to which a subject’s intention has to be worked out  from  her  intentional  actions,  is  to  be  any  use,  we’re  then  going  to  need  a criterion for telling intentional from non‐intentional actions.  Indeed, Anscombe does try to provide the requested criterion. Her proposal is that an intentional action is one “to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is  given  application”  (Anscombe,  1957,  pp.  11‐ff.).  Since we’re  going  to  find  that Anscombe’s idea cannot be made to stand, I’m not going to dwell on her criterion for intentional actions beyond what is actually going to prove relevant for the rest of  my  enquiry  into  the  notion  of  intention.  In  particular,  I’d  like  to  focus  on  a specific  way  in  which,  according  to  Anscombe,  the  question  “Why?”  refuses application. This is when the person interrogated as to why she’s doing something replies that she wasn’t aware that she was doing it.  Now, the notion of not being aware that one is performing a certain action deserves qualification. Recall the example of Mary telling John that he should never show up again in front of her. Suppose that someone comes along and tells Mary: “Oh,  I  see  you’re  throwing  a  real  temper  tantrum  there!”  At  that  point,  if  Mary 
                                                        33 The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him, or between the bodily movements that he makes and those that occur without his making them. (Frankfurt, 1978, p. 157) 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happens  to  never  have  heard  the  word  tantrum  before,  she  may  well  reply: “Really?  I  didn’t  know  I  was.”  As  Anscombe  (1957,  pp.  11‐12)  points  out,  it  is generally  the  case  that  one  and  the  same  action  can  have  many  different descriptions34, and someone might know his own action under one description and not  under  another.  In  particular,  it  may  well  be  the  case  that  Mary  knows  her action  as  one  of making  a  scene,  and  even  as  one  of  giving  John  a  tell­off,  still without  knowing  it  as  one  of  throwing  a  temper  tantrum,  simply  because  she’s never heard that expression before. But once she learns that a temper tantrum is no other than an angry outburst,  then it’s not the case that she was not aware of doing  such  a  thing—she  knew  it  very well,  and  simply  didn’t  know  that  specific term to describe it. By contrast, suppose that, by screaming at John, Mary makes it incredibly  difficult  to  concentrate  for  a  student  whose  window  gives  onto  the street  where  the  scene  is  taking  place.  At  some  point,  the  student  loses  his patience, opens the window and angrily asks Mary why she’s driving him insane. Now, in this situation she may legitimately answer that she wasn’t aware that she was doing such a thing, so that the question refuses application: since Mary didn’t mean  to drive  the  student  insane  in  the  first  place,  the question  as  to why  she’s doing it cannot even be raised. So, according this piece of reasoning, it follows that being  aware  that  one  is  performing  a  certain  action  is  a  necessary  condition  on performing it intentionally35.   
                                                        34 The idea that one and the same action may be picked out by different descriptions is not accepted by everyone. Anscombe,  for one,  subscribes  to  this  thesis, and  I  limit myself  to reporting  her  view  as  being  in  line  with  it  without  endorsing  this  thesis  myself.  See chapter 6 (section 2.1) for an alternative view on individuating actions (due to Goldman, 1970)  according  to  which,  roughly,  there  is  an  action  type  for  each  different  available description. 35 Anscombe (1957, p. 12) points out that, however, awareness is not sufficient. Take tics an  example  (1957,  p.  13):  suppose  that  someone who  suffers  from  tics  suddenly winks 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Let us now step back and look at the bigger picture again. We’ve seen that Anscombe’s  proposal  is  that  intentions  might  be  somehow  read  off  a  subject’s intentional  actions.  If  this  were  true,  then  we  would  need  just  one  theory  that explains  both  intentions  and  actions.  That  is,  a  theory  of  intention  could  be reduced to a theory of action. As a matter of fact, one of the early versions of the leading  theory  in  philosophy  of  action,  the  Causal  Theory  of  Action  (Davidson, 1963), held precisely something along these lines. Consider the fact that there are things  that  we  do  with  the  intention  of  doing  other  things—one  of  Davidson’s examples  is going  to church with  the  intention  to please one’s mother (Davidson, 1963, pp. 689‐690). According to Davidson, intentions‐with‐which are simply ways of re‐describing what someone is doing in terms of a primary reason, conceived as a pro‐attitude towards actions having some feature F, together with the belief that the  action  in  question  has  that  feature.  In  the  reported  example,  pleasing  one’s 
mother would be the feature that the subject believes the action of going to church to  have.  It  is  by  virtue  of  a  relation  to  a  primary  reason  that  actions  count  as intentional.  This  is  an  example  of  a  reductive  theory  of  intentions‐with‐which  and  of intentional actions to a theory of action featuring primary reasons. But, as it turns out,  this  attempt  to  reduction  neglects  the  fact  that  intentions  for  the  future, namely intentions directed to an action that is going to be performed at some point in the future, include intentions from which no actions ensue. Suppose that, while talking  to  a  friend  of mine,  I  learn  about  a  book  that  she’s  recently  read whose                                                                                                                                                                   several  times  in  a  row,  while  being  fully  aware  of  this  repeated  winking.  Yet,  if  asked: “Why  did  you wink  several  times  in  a  row?”  he may well  answer:  “It was  involuntary”, which,  according  to  Anscombe,  is  another  way  of  refusing  application  to  the  question “Why?” 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content, as she reports it, sounds extremely interesting to me—so interesting that I right away form the  intention to buy  it as soon as possible, namely the  following day as I do my shopping. As it happens, come the following day I forget to look for the book  in question,  and  fail  to  execute  the  corresponding  action.  Furthermore, from  then  onwards,  I  end  up  never  buying  the  book—my  intention  never materializes.  Davidson  (1978)  recognized  that  intentions  for  the  future  are sometimes cases of pure intending, in which no steps of any kind are taken towards the  completion  of  an  action.  Cases  of  pure  intending  constitute  examples  of intentions  that  a  theory  of  action  is  not  in  a  position  to  capture.  Therefore,  the reduction of a theory of intention to a theory of action cannot be performed.  
3. Second attempt: intentions are just desires While in the previous section it was shown that a theory that reduces intentions to intentional action, there are reasons why we might still want to retain the idea that there is a close connection between an intention and a corresponding intentional action. Recall that in chapter 1 (section 2) it was suggested that an action may be interpreted as the attempt to bring about a certain outcome via certain means. In the  same chapter,  in  section 3.1,  I pointed out  that  it  is  an agent’s  intention  that determines  what  outcome  an  action  is  meant  to  bring  about.  But  how  does  an agent’s intention determine this outcome? What is the relation between an agent’s intention and the outcome that she wants to bring about? Recall the experiment by Meltzoff (1988) reported in chapter 1 (section 2). When the subject bends forward to  touch  the  panel with  her  forehead,  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  she  intends  to 
light up the box. It’s also possible to say that lighting up the box is an outcome that she wants to bring about. So, the outcome that the subject wants to bring about is 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part  of  the  content  of  her  intention,  and  so  it’s  possible  to  say  that  an  intention 
represents the outcome to which an action is directed. This  is  something  that  Searle  (1983)  proposes  in  his  development  of  the notion of intention, and we can say more about how an outcome is represented by an intention on the basis of his theory. The assumption that Searle works on is that intentions, just like beliefs and desires, are Intentional states, namely mental states characterized  by  a  directedness  upon  objects  and  states  of  affairs  in  the  world (1983, p. 1). Just as when I believe I always believe that something is the case, and when I desire I always desire something, or that something should be the case, so, whenever I intend, there must always be something that I intend to do. Intentional states can thus be analysed as made up of a psychological mode plus an Intentional or  representative  content  (ibid.,  pp.  5‐6).  If  I  believe  that  it  is  raining,  my Intentional state can be analysed as composed of a psychological mode—belief—plus  an  Intentional  content—that  it  is  raining.  Some  Intentional  states  have  a 
direction  of  fit  (ibid.,  pp.  7‐8),  namely  determine  a  relation  between  mind  and world that has a specific direction, regulating which between mind and world is to conform to which. For a belief to be true, it must conform to how the world is—it has a mind‐to‐world direction of fit. For a desire or an intention to be fulfilled, the world  has  to  conform  to  that  desire  or  intention—they  have  a  world‐to‐mind direction  of  fit.  Let  us  notice  an  important  commonality  that  has  just  emerged between  intentions  and  desires:  both  intentions  and  desires  are  mental  states representing their content with a world‐to‐mind direction of fit.  For  those  Intentional  states  that do have a direction of  fit,  such as beliefs, desires and  intentions,  the content of an  Intentional  state  is also  the condition of 
satisfaction of that state—e.g., my belief that it is raining will be true if and only if it 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is raining. We may thus provisionally settle on an account of intentions as mental states with  a world‐to‐mind  direction  of  fit,  insofar  as  they  represent  outcomes that the subjects wants to bring about, and of intentional actions as the conditions of satisfaction of intentions.  We  could  therefore  say  that,  while  intentions  cannot  be  reduced  to intentional  actions,  the  two  are  still  related  in  the  following  way:  intentions represent  action  outcomes  that  may  be  brought  about  by  means  of  intentional actions, and intentional actions are the conditions of satisfaction of intentions. To go back  to  the example given on  the basis of Meltzoff’s experiment,  the subject’s intention is to light up the box: lighting up the box is the outcome that the subject wants to bring about. The subject’s intentional action of lighting up the box fulfils her  intention  to  light  up  the  box.  On  the  basis  of  this,  it  may  seem  natural  to propose  the  idea  that  the  relation  between  an  intentional  action  and  the corresponding  intention  is  going  to be  given by what Bratman  (1987)  terms  the Simple View: one’s intentionally A‐ing implies her having the intention to A.  Still,  recall  that  earlier  on  in  this  section  I  pointed  out,  on  the  basis  of Searle’s  theory,  that mental  states  representing action outcomes with a mind‐to‐world  direction  of  fit  include  not  only  intentions,  but  also  desires.  For  instance, suppose  that  I desire  to go  to London tomorrow at 10 a.m.  I have a mental state representing an outcome—going  to London  tomorrow at 10 a.m.—with a world‐to‐mind  direction  of  fit,  whose  condition  of  satisfaction  is  that  I  actually  go  to London  tomorrow  at  10  a.m.  If  I  do  go  to  London  tomorrow  at  10  a.m.,  I  will thereby  satisfy  my  desire  to  do  so.  How  does  my  having  an  intention  to  go  to London  tomorrow  at  10  a.m.  differ  from  a  desire  with  the  same  content?  If  no difference could be found, then there would be no need to postulate a further kind 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of mental  state—intentions—in  addition  to  desires.  The  reasons why  intentions are  indeed  different  mental  states  with  respect  to  desires  is  provided  in  the following sections, and is based on Bratman’s idea that the main role of intentions is  to enable us  to effectively make and carry out plans,  and, because of  this  role, intentions are subject to constraints that do not likewise apply to desires. As we’re going  to  see,  these  constraints  are  also  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  Simple View.  
4.  Connecting  intentions  with  actions  via  the  Simple  View  and  the  Single 
Phenomenon View 
4.1 Why intentions are not just desires: Bratman on intentions as plans Consider  the  following  scenario. You hear me saying  that  I’d  really  like  to  spend the whole day relaxing in London tomorrow, and that I’d also really  like to finish this  chapter  tomorrow.  Presumably,  this  statement  won’t  strike  you  as  either especially  strange,  since  it’s  a  typical manifestation of  a  conflict between desires that  most  people  have  to  face  on  an  everyday  basis,  or  as  inappropriate:  you’ll think that I may well have conflicting desires—I’ll  just have to make up my mind before tomorrow. Compare this scenario with one in which, by contrast, you hear me saying that I intend to spend the whole day relaxing in London tomorrow, and that  I  also  intend  to  finish  this  chapter  tomorrow.  I  take  it  that  your  natural reaction  (as  well  as  everyone  else’s)  will  be  to  think,  roughly,  that  things  don’t work this way, and that if I’ve stated something like this I must be very confused, at the very  least,  as  to  the meaning of  the verb  to  intend. The problem, as  it’s  soon going  to  be made more  precise,  is  that  one  cannot  intend  to A and,  at  the  same time, intend to B, if the bringing about of B plainly conflicts with the bringing about 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of A, on pains of being irrational (see Bratman, 1987, p. 32).   I take it that the two scenarios that I’ve described above point to features of the  folk  notions  of  desire  and  intention  that  should  be  both  deeply  rooted  and uncontroversial  enough  as  to  have  a  bearing  on  the  corresponding  technical notions. The reason why it sounds wrong to say that one intends to A and, at the same time, one also intends to B, if the bringing about of B and A are incompatible is because,  implicit  in  the notion of  intention  there  is a commitment  to whatever one has claimed she intends to do—something which, by contrast, is absent in the notion  of  desire.  Bratman’s  (1984,  1987)  theory  of  intentions  respects  the difference that I’ve just highlighted by insisting on a series of ideas. First of all, as human beings we’re subject to the need for (a) in advance deliberation over which course  of  action  to  take  among  conflicting  available  ones,  and  (b)  coordination, both intrapersonal (e.g., I need to harmonize my need to finish a chapter with that to  sleep,  eat,  and  do  something  different  from  all  the  above)  and  interpersonal (e.g., if you need to enter our house, I have to make sure that I’m not sleeping when you knock at the door and are without a key) (Bratman, 1987, pp. 2‐3). In short, as human beings we need to be able to effectively plan: our plans for the future must be  able  to  be  brought  to  completion by  taking  into  account  both  the  constraints we’re subject to and those concerning any other people on whose contribution our plans rely. Secondly, in line with the example given at the opening of this section, intentions  are  significantly  like  plans,  the  latter  conceived  as  “mental  states involving  an  appropriate  sort  of  commitment  to  action”  (Bratman,  1987,  p.  29). Working on these assumptions, Bratman proceeds to spell out a series of features belonging  to  intentions,  which,  among  other  things,  contribute  to  setting  them further apart from desires. 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 Connected to the aforementioned committal character of  intentions comes another  characteristic, which  licenses  talk of  being  settled  on  a  certain  course of action, namely a certain stability or inertia. Once I have formed a certain intention, I  will  not  normally  continue  to  deliberate  whether  or  not  to  do  whatever  that intention  is  about.  Once  an  intention  is  formed,  deliberation  is  over,  and reconsideration is thereby ruled out—at least,  in the absence of new information (Bratman,  1987,  p.  16).  This  is  one  of  the  things  that makes  the  statement  that tomorrow  I  intend  to  go  to  London  and  I  also  intend  to  finish  this  chapter contradictory.  If  I  intend  to  go  to  London  tomorrow,  it  means  that  I’ve  already taken into consideration alternative things to do tomorrow incompatible with my going to London (such as finishing this chapter), and decided that I’m not going to do  them.  Bratman  (1987,  pp.  16‐17)  points  out  that  this  ceases  to  hold  if information  that  I  didn’t  possess  at  the  time  of  deliberation  suddenly  becomes available:  if,  once  I’ve  stopped  deliberating  and  I  intend  to  go  to  London,  I  am suddenly  told  that  public  transport  in  London  tomorrow  will  undergo  serious disruptions,  I  might  then  give  up my  plan.  Deliberation  is  always  ended  on  the basis of a certain body of information—learning something new might bring one to carry on deliberation. As  a  consequence  of  stability,  there  comes  another  characteristic  of intentions, namely their being conduct controllers36 (Bratman, 1987, p. 16), which consists in the following fact. My intending to go to London tomorrow at the very least it implies that, if nothing stops me (e.g., if I don’t fall ill), I will actually go to London  tomorrow.  I’m not only  inclined  to do  it,  but  also  committed  to doing  it.                                                         36 Notice that Bratman doesn’t present the conduct‐controlling character of intentions as a consequence of their stability. Still,  it seems to me that it’s easier to justify the former as following from the latter. 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Bratman  points  out  that  herein  lies  another  difference  between  intentions  and desires. He notes  that both  intentions and desires are pro‐attitudes,  in  the  sense that they can play a motivational role,  i.e.  they can move us to act (together with the relevant beliefs). Desires potentially influence our course of action, but, when weighed against  conflicting desires,  they may be abandoned. Bratman  (1987, pp. 15‐16)  provides  the  example  of  one’s  desire  to  drink  a milk  shake  at  lunchtime which  potentially  influences  what  one  does  at  lunchtime,  but  when  lunchtime comes one might end up not even trying to have a milkshake (e.g., because one has weighed  the  desire  of  having  a milk  shake  against  that  of  losing weight).  Unlike desires, which are mere potential influencers of action, intentions are also conduct­
controlling pro‐attitudes, i.e. they involve a special commitment to action. Another  (and  more  fundamental,  for  the  purposes  of  what  is  going  to follow)  characteristic  of  intentions  is  that,  once  formed,  they  lead  to  further intentions by way, e.g., of means‐end reasoning (Bratman, 1987, p. 17). If I intend to go to London tomorrow, I may thus form the further intention to take a certain means  of  transport  in  that  direction.  Not  only  I may  form  such  intentions,  but  I 
have  to  form  such  intentions  between  the  end  of  deliberation  and  the  onset  of action. If I intend to go to London tomorrow at 10 a.m., between now and 10 a.m. tomorrow I simply have to have worked out how to go there, or I won’t actually be able  to  go.  Intentions  have  the  further  feature  of  intentions  is  the  possibility  to feature as elements in larger plans. For instance, I could have the intention to go to London as part of a larger plan to visit the UK. Now,  by  insisting  on  the  idea  that  the  notion  of  plan  is  central  to understanding that of intention, Bratman (1987, p. 31) proceeds to point out some requirements on plans that are meant to ensure the effectiveness of a plan. First, 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there  are  a  couple  of  consistency  constraints.  A  plan  should  be  internally 
consistent:  it  shouldn’t be  the  case  that  the bringing about of  one element of  the plan conflicts with the bringing about of another element of the plan—it should be possible to successfully execute the entire plan. A plan that includes travelling on bus n. 1 between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and travelling on bus n. 2 between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. of the same day is not internally consistent. Furthermore, it should be possible to successfully execute the entire plan working on the assumption that my beliefs  are  true—that  is,  my  plan  should  be  strongly  consistent,  relative  to  my 
beliefs. If I intend to go to London and, in order to do so, I set off northward while knowing that London is down South with respect to where I am, my plan fails to be strongly consistent.  Also, my plans should be means­end coherent. This requirement is based on the idea that plans are usually formulated as partial, that is, not specifying from the outset  the  way  in  which  they’re  going  to  be  carried  out.  I  might  plan  to  go  to London while leaving it unspecified whether I’m going to go there by train, or by bus, and so on. For this plan to be means‐end coherent, it has to be the case that I fill it in with a specification as to the means to getting there. Means‐end coherence doesn’t  set any constraint on when  the missing details of a given plan should be provided, nor does it require that a plan should be supplemented with the details in question all in one go—in Bratman’s (1987, p. 31) words, “it is enough that they be sufficiently filled in before it is, by my lights, too late”. Once I form an intention, my intention becomes inserted in a web of other intentions and plans, and on this web bear the requirements of consistency and means‐end coherence listed above. Notice that, in line with the idea that intentions may feature as elements in plans, it can be the case that an intention features as one of the premises in a piece 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of practical reasoning. This gives me the chance to reintroduce and expand on an idea  that was  introduced  earlier  on  in  this  chapter  (section  2).  In  the  course  of presenting  Anscombe’s  view  on  the  relation  between  intentional  actions  and intentions, I dwelled on her suggestion that, for an action to qualify as intentional, the  agent must be  aware  that he’s performing  it. Now  I’d  like  to  suggest  that  an analogous constraint holds on intentions—specifically, in order to be said to have an intention, one must be aware of having that  intention, and, therefore, must be aware of the content of that intention (chapter 3, sections 3.2‐3.3, is going to add a series of provisos to this idea).  John Hawthorne (2004, pp. 29–31) argues for the idea that our instances of practical reasoning should only take as premises propositions we know, by means of  the  following  piece  of  reasoning.  Suppose  a  person  were  in  possession  of  a lottery  ticket,  and  is offered a penny  for  it,  and suppose  this person reasoned as follows: (i) the ticket is not a winning one; (ii) so, if I keep the ticket, I won’t gain anything. (iii) If I sell the ticket, I’m going to earn a penny; (iv) so I should sell the ticket. But now, unless the ticket holder has managed somehow to find out that his ticket is  not  a  winning  one  (maybe  by  hearing  the  winning  number  announced, unbeknownst to the potential purchaser), in which case he’d know that the ticket is not  a  winning  one,  this  piece  of  reasoning  is  going  to  be  held  unacceptable  by anyone  that’s  presented with  it.  Hawthorne  (2004,  p.  31)  concludes  that  “[at]  a rough first pass […] one ought only to use that which one knows as a premise  in one's deliberations.” 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 Since Bratman has shown that one’s intentions may feature as premises in pieces of practical reasoning meant to establish the means for accomplishing one’s intentions,  by  adding  the  requirement  identified  by  Hawthorne  it  follows  that  a constraint  on  intentions  is  that  we  must  be  aware  that  we  have  them,  and therefore  must  be  aware  of  their  content,  and  so  this  content  has  to  be introspectable (chapter 3, sections 3.2‐3.3 is going to specify that one only needs to be able to introspect the content of one’s intentions at some point, and not all the time).  Now,  I’ve  focused  on  Bratman’s  planning  conception  of  intentions,  while saying  nothing  as  to  his  view  on  intentional  actions,  and  on  their  relation  to intentions. Given that the notion of intention and some of the constraints which it has to obey are now in place, it is time to broach the topic on the relation between intentions in the planning conception and intentional actions. 
 
4.2 Why the Simple View doesn’t work (I): the video­games case Bratman (1987, p. 111) points out that it is part of our ordinary conception that  intentionally doing something and having an intention must be connected in some way (and, indeed, sections 2 and 3 of the present chapter have explored this idea), and yet it’s hard to specify how. Now, an intuitively plausible idea on what this connection could consist  in  is  the  following. While  I’m acting  intentionally—say,  as  I’m going  to London—there’s  surely  something  that  I  intend  to do. Given that  what  I’m  doing  is  going  to  London,  among  the  things  that  I  intend  while performing that action there will be going to London (Bratman, 1987, p. 112). This suggests that the connection between an intentional action and an intention could 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be the following: for me to intentionally A, I must intend to A. This is what Bratman (1987, p. 112) terms the Simple View37. And here is why it doesn’t work. Bratman (1987, pp. 113‐116) builds up his case against the Simple View by means  of  three  steps.  In  the  first  step,  Bratman  supposes  that  a  subject  plays  a video game in which he has to guide a missile to a target. Bratman supposes that the subject (a) is skilled at playing this video game, and (b) is however doubtful as to his success due to the difficulty of the game.  In spite of his doubts,  the subject hits the target, in a way that depends on his skills, which are present according to (a), and therefore in a way that is not a matter of luck. It can be thus said that the subject hits  the  target  intentionally. This  is what  the subject has  tried  to do, and, Bratman  underlines,  hitting  the  target  depends  on  the  subject’s  skills  at  playing this game. On  the basis of  the Simple View,  the subject’s  intentionally hitting  the target implies that the subject intends to hit the target.    Now  onto  the  second  step.  This  features  the  addition  of  a  second  video game, just like the one described in the first step. In this case, the subject, who is supposed  to  be  ambidextrous,  simultaneously  plays  two  video  games  involving guiding a missile  to a certain  target, one with each hand. Once again,  (a) and (b) hold:  the  subject  is  skilled  at  playing  the  video  game  while  being  doubtful  of success. This time, the subject hits target 1 but misses target 2. As his success with target 1 depends on what he was trying to do as well as on the relevant skills, it can 
                                                        37 Bratman (1987, p. 112) hastens to add that the Simple View, while requiring that, at the time at which one is  intentionally Aing, her mental states must include an intention to A, doesn’t  say  that  intending  to  A  should  constitute  a  separate  event  with  respect  to intentionally Aing. 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once more be  said  that  the  subject hits  target 1  intentionally. Assuming  that  the Simple View is correct, it follows that he intends to hit target 1. Bratman points out that  since  an  analogous  attempt  is  being  carried  out  towards  target  2,  with  an equal  amount  of  skill  involved,  if  the  subject  intends  to  hit  target  1  he  must therefore also be said to intend to hit target 2, so that we should conclude that the subject intends to hit both targets.  Trying  to  follow  this  piece  of  reasoning,  one may  realize  that  the  Simple View leaves open the following: from what point in time does the subject have the intention to do whatever he’s going to do intentionally? If this is left open, a strong version of the Simple View could in principle hold, according to which a subject’s intentionally A‐ing  from x1 onwards  implies his having an  intention  to A  from x1 onwards,  and  not  beforehand.  If  this  version  of  the  Simple  View  held,  we  could question  the  step  from  (3)  to  (4),  on  the  basis  of  the  fact  that  the  Simple  View doesn’t  grant  that  an  intentional  action  beginning  at  time  x1  implies  that  the intention to so act could be held during a time interval running from x0 to x1, where x0  strictly  precedes  x1.  But  even  assuming  a  strong  version  of  the  Simple  View along  these  lines  is  enough  for  Bratman’s  purposes.  Suppose,  according  to  a stronger version of the Simple View, that a subject only has an intention to hit the target  only  beginning  at  the  time  at which  the  target  is  actually  hit.  Note  that  a possible  outcome  of  the  game  is  that  the  subject  hits  both  targets.  Given  the subject’s effort and skill, he can be said to hit both targets intentionally, and hence, however momentarily, has the intention to hit target 1 as well as target 2. This is enough for setting up the stage for the third step. Bratman  further  complicates  the  scenario proposed at  the  second  step by means  of  the  following  assumption:  the  two  video  games  are  so  linked  that  one 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may hit target 1 and miss target 2, or vice versa, or miss both targets, but if both targets  are  about  to  be  both  hit  the  whole  system  shuts  down,  thus  making  it impossible to hit both targets. It is possible to see both targets until the end of the game, so one can know which one he’s hit,  if any. Furthermore, there is a reward for hitting either target. The subject, in addition to being skilled at the video game as well as at playing both simultaneously, knows how the two are linked, and also about the reward. Given all this, the subject decides to play both games, in order to increase his chances of getting a reward, and for the same reason tries to hit both targets. By the same reasoning made at  the second step, whatever  target  is hit—say, target 1—can be said to be hit intentionally, and thus the subject can be said to have  an  intention  to  hit  that  target.  Again,  Bratman  says  that,  because  of  the symmetry of the case, the subject must also intend to hit target 2. On the basis of the two possible interpretations of the Simple View that I gave at the second step, this  is  a  justified  conclusion.  But  in  this  case,  the  subject  ends  up  having  two intentions that are inconsistent with his belief that he cannot hit both targets. This is a violation of the strong consistency requirement holding for  intentions, which makes the subject irrational. But, by Bratman’s lights, trying to hit both target is a perfectly  reasonable strategy,  so  the subject  shouldn’t be  judged  irrational.  Since what generates the charge of irrationality is the attribution of the two intentions, this attribution  is wrong. Since what  leads  to  this attribution  is  the Simple View, Bratman concludes that the Simple View must be false: I can intentionally A while not intending to A. Bratman takes this example to show that intentions are subject to a web of norms, one including the strong consistency requirement, that does not likewise apply to intentional actions. 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4.3 Why the Simple View doesn’t work (II): webs of norms   Specifically,  Bratman  contends  (1987,  pp.  133‐ff.)  that  typical  cases  in which I intentionally act—say, I intentionally A—are characterized by the fact that the following three are true: (a) I intend to A (b) I endeavour to A (c) I intentionally A. These may occasionally come apart insofar as they’re subject to different webs of norms.  In  particular,  intentions  are  subject  to  demands  for  rational 
agglomerativity—that  is, on the basis of  the role played by  intentions  in terms of plans, it should be possible for intentions to be put together into a larger intention, and it would be rational for an agent to try to put them together in this way. Not so for endeavouring, it turns out. Indeed, the video‐games case is an illustration of the fact  that  it  might  be  rational  for  an  agent  to  endeavour  to  hit  target  1,  and  to endeavour to hit target 2, while at the same time it’s rational for the agent not to endeavour to hit them both. Lack of demands for rational agglomerativity extends from  endeavouring  to  acting  intentionally.  This,  again,  can  be  seen  in  the  video‐games case: one may end up hitting target 1 intentionally, as well as hitting target 2 intentionally, thus, unfortunately, hitting both targets, while still not hitting both targets intentionally. The video‐games case, in short, provides an example of a case in  which  intending  to  A  on  the  one  hand  and  endeavouring  to  A  and  A‐ing intentionally  on  the  other  hand  come  apart,  insofar  as  the  former,  but  not  the latter,  is  subject  to  demands  for  consistency  (see  section  4.1  of  the  present chapter) and agglomeration. 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 Bratman  contends  that  endeavouring  is  closer  to  intending  than  it  is  to intentional  action  in  some  respects.  These  have  to  do with what  he  calls  belief­
extendability.  He  resorts  to  the  following  example  (1987,  pp.  123‐ff.):  suppose  I intend to run a race, and I believe that, in so doing, I will wear down my sneakers. This is an unwanted, as much as it is unavoidable, consequence of my running the race.  Suppose  I not only believe  that  I’m going  to wear down my sneakers, but  I also  notice  that  I’m  doing  so  as  I  run  the  race.  On  the  basis  of  these  two assumptions, Bratman claims that wearing down my sneakers is something that I do intentionally (something that I’m going to challenge shortly). Still (and I agree with  this),  it would  be wrong  to  say  that  I  intend  to wear  down my  sneakers—witness  to  this  is  the  fact  that  I’m  not  ready  to  engage  in means‐end  reasoning designed to achieve this result. That is, (Bratman, 1987, p. 135), my belief that I’m going to wear down my sneakers doesn’t extend my intention to run the race to an intention to wear down my sneakers. Likewise, says Bratman (1987, p. 135), I do not  endeavour  to  run  down  my  sneakers:  my  belief  that  I’m  so  doing  doesn’t extend my endeavour to run the race to an endeavour to run down my sneakers.   Now  I’m  going  to  challenge  the  idea  that  the  action  of wearing  down my sneakers  in  the  previous  example  should  be  classified  as  intentional.  Mele  and Moser  (1994,  p.  45)  point  to  an  example  due  to  Gilbert  Harman  (1976,  p.  433), according to which a sniper, in the attempt to kill a soldier, knowingly acts in such a way  as  to  render  an  enemy aware  about his  presence. Mele  and Moser  rightly make  the  following  considerations.  Since  the  sniper  is  aware  that  he’s  going  to alert the enemy to his presence—he doesn’t do it by mistake or by accident—we cannot  say  that  he  unintentionally  alerts  the  sniper  to  his  presence.  Still,  our description  would  somehow  be  incorrect  if  it  said  that  the  sniper  intentionally 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renders  the  enemy  aware  about  his  presence,  for  the  sniper  does  not  aim  at rendering  the  enemy  aware  about  his  presence  in  any  way.  Cases  consisting  of known and unwanted consequences of one’s own action are captured by Mele and Moser in terms of a middle ground which they term nonintentional actions, which does justice to the fact that one does not aim to that consequence at all, and doesn’t take any steps in order to foster its realization (if anything, one will take steps to prevent that consequence). The case of wearing down one’s sneakers qualifies as more aptly located in this middle ground. Even  if  we  might  not  (as  I  am  not)  ready  to  accept  the  attribution  of intentional action in the sneakers case, and, if so, we might want to challenge the need to separate out the notion of endeavouring from that of acting intentionally, on the basis of the missile case Bratman has still enough grounds for rejecting the Simple View, on the basis of the idea that intentions are plans and so are subject to a  different  web  of  norms  with  respect  to  intentional  actions  and  endeavouring (Bratman, 1987,  §§8‐9). Bratman, however,  still  allows  that  there  is  a  significant connection between intentionally Aing and some intention, though not necessarily the intention to A. He thus proposes what he terms the Single Phenomenon View (1987,  pp.  119‐ff.),  such  that,  whenever  one  intentionally  As,  one’s  intentional action  is  within  the  motivational  potential  of  an  intention  to  B,  where  B  isn’t necessarily identical with A. As for a non‐trivial case in which A differs from B, the video‐games  example  is  an  illustration  of  the  possibility  of  intentionally  hitting (say) target 1 as part of the motivational potential to carry out my intention, which is not straightforwardly to hit target 138. This view avoids difficulties such as that introduced via  the video‐games  case, while  retaining  the  idea  that  an action A  is                                                         38 As to a positive characterization of what I intend in the video‐games example, Bratman (1987) considers different options at pp. 120‐122. 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intentional  by  virtue  of  being  suitably  related  to  some  intention,  though  not necessarily the intention to A.  
6. “What good is a will?” Taking stock, we might settle on a provisional view of intentions that sees them as mental states that have the following characteristics:  (i) they  represent  action  outcomes  with  a  world‐to‐mind  direction  of  fit (section 3; chapter 1, section 3.1; Searle, 1983); (ii) they enable effective planning, and are inserted in a specific web of norms that  differentiates  them  from  other  propositional  attitudes  (sections  4.2‐4.3; Bratman, 1987)—specifically desires, which have the same direction of fit; (iii) endowed  with  a  content  that  is  accessible  to  introspection  (by  virtue  of their role in planning; Hawthorne, 2004, pp. 29‐31). 
  What we can conclude on the basis of the previous sections, and particularly of Bratman’s theory, is that intentions play a motivating and a conduct‐controlling role in action production—a role that seems to be especially salient when we are still at the planning stage of a certain action, or, as it were, when our intentions are still future directed. To put it in the way in which Velleman (2007, p. 195) sums up Bratman’s theory, we can say the following things about intentions:  (1) future directed plans are the paradigm of all intentions; 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(2) intentions  enable  one  to  organize  deliberative  effort  by  making  it possible to deliberate in advance, when there are enough resources (in terms of time and information) to do so, and to preserve the results of our  deliberation  until  the  time  for  acting  comes,  when  deliberation might prove more difficult; (3) intentions make  action  coordination  easier,  both  for  the  agent  herself (at  the  intrapersonal  level) and  in relation to other people with whom the agent might wish to coordinate (at the interpersonal level).  Bratman also subscribes to the Single Phenomenon View, according to which:   (4) whenever one intentionally As, one has an intention—the intention to B, where A and B are not necessarily the same.   It  is certainly true that, on many occasions, our actions are preceded by a, however brief, phase of making up our mind. On those occasions, it is plausible to think  that  our  actions  are  informed  by  a  kind  of  mental  states—intentions—endowed with the characteristics described by (1)‐(3). It is therefore also plausible to think that (4) holds on those occasions. Still, consider that there are situations in which  no  deliberation  at  all  seems  to  take  place.  Velleman  (2007,  pp.  197‐198) raises the following doubt: what room is there for intentions conceived according to  (1)‐(3)  in  those  situations?  First  of  all,  a  distinction needs  to  be made  among different cases of actions seemingly not preceded by any deliberation. One is given by sudden instinctive actions, such as reaching up and catching a ball thrown at me without  warning  (Bratman,  1987,  p.  126;  reported  by  Velleman,  2007,  p.  197). 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Bratman  claims  that  catching  a  ball  in  these  circumstances  (i.e.,  in which  one  is instinctively reacting to an event that catches her us by surprise) fails to qualify as an intentional action, insofar as, although it is under the subject’s control and is not a reflex, it is however too “automatic and unreflective” (Bratman, 1987, p. 126) to count  as  intentional,  though  it’s  not  unintentional.  While  more  would  probably need  to  be  said  to  be  justify  this  interpretation  of  spontaneous  actions,  let  us accept it for the sake of argument39. There is another class of situations that do not seem to be preceded by any deliberation are exemplified by the following. Suppose that we’re at a party sitting on a chair and talking to someone, when suddenly we’re offered a plate of cookies.  The question is why we bother to form intentions when there is no longer any  opportunity  for  them  to  serve  the  functions  for  which,  according  to Bratman,  the  mental  state  of  intention  is  designed.  When  the  plate  of cookies is held out to us, why do we make up our minds to take one? Why doesn’t our hand just shoot out and grab, as it does when we spontaneously and automatically react to a sudden throw? (Velleman, 2007, p. 197)  This worry is based on the hypothesis that the functions of an intention may be  exhausted  by  (1)‐(3).  If  that  hypothesis were  true,  it  would  be  unclear what function an intention could play once the time for acting comes, at least for actions 
                                                        39 Note  that Bratman  (1987, p.  126)  suggests  also  an  alternative  account of  this  kind of actions, an account that characterizes them as the execution of a long‐standing policy—in the case of the catching the ball example, e.g., that of protecting oneself. According to this interpretation, these actions would still involve an intention, although one with a general content, not tailored to the specific case. It is not clear that this interpretation would fare any better in countering the objection that is going to be raised shortly. 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such  as  grabbing  a  cookie  as  in  the  example  by  Velleman  (2007).  I’m  going  to suggest (along the  lines of what has been done by Searle, 1983, and by Pacherie, 2000,  2003,  2006,  2008)  that  if  we  think  that  the  functions  of  intentions  are exhausted  by  (1)‐(3),  we’ll  only  see  half  of  the  picture  as  far  as  the  connection between  intentions  and  actions  is  concerned.  In what  follows,  I’m  going  to  give hints  as  to  what  the  other  half  of  the  picture  is  going  to  be  about.  A  proper exploration of this other half is going to occupy the rest of the thesis, and will help me answering the question as to how actions are connected with intentions.  Causal  theories  of  action,  originated with Davidson  (1963),  have  it  that  a given piece of behaviour counts as an action by virtue of  its prior causal history. This may imply, and indeed has been taken to imply (e.g., by Frankfurt, 1978) that actions and mere bodily movements or happenings do not essentially differ at the time  of  their  execution40.  Frankfurt  thinks  that  this  is  a  mistake,  insofar  as,  by focusing  on  the  causal  antecedents  of  actions,  causal  theories  ignore  and  do  not account for  the most  salient  differentiating  characteristic  of  action:  during  the  time  a person  is  performing  an  action  he  is  necessarily  in  touch  with  the 
movements  of  his  body  in  a  certain  way,  whereas  he  is  necessarily not  in 
touch with  them  in  that  way  when movements  of  his  body  are  occurring without his making them. (Frankfurt, 1978, p. 158, my emphasis)  
                                                        40 This, according  to Frankfurt,  is what gives rise  to  the so‐called wayward causal chains (see  Davidson,  1973,  pp.  153‐154,  reported  in  Searle,  1983,  p.  83),  which  I’m  going  to mention later on in this section. 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The  difference  between  a  persons’s  being  and  not  being  “in  touch  with  the movements  of  his  body  in  a  certain  way”,  or  between movements  being  or  not being “under the person’s guidance” (1978, p. 158) certainly picks out distinct real phenomena, which can be illustrated as follows. Frankfurt makes reference to the thrashings  about  of  a  person’s  body  during  an  epileptic  seizure  (1978,  pp.  158‐159). In the latter case, clearly, the person is not controlling the movements of his body.  Compare  a man’s  raising  his  arm with  his  arm  going  up  as  a  result  of  the stimulation of his motor cortex. It could be the case that he is strongly opposed to his  arm going up, but  still  can’t prevent  it  from moving once his motor  cortex  is stimulated. Again, the man is not controlling the movements of his body. Could  intentions have anything  to do with  the aforementioned expounded difference  between  bodily  movements  being,  or  failing  to  be,  under  a  person’s guidance? Notice that there is a tight connection between this question and that as to whether  an action  is  intentional or not. Recall Anscombe’s  characterization of intentional  actions  as  those  to  which  a  certain  sense  of  the  question  “Why?”  is given application. This question may well be applied  to  those bodily movements that are under a person’s guidance, and those are the only ones to which it can be applied: by contrast, movements that are not under the person’s guidance, such as an  epileptic’s  thrashing  about,  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  terms  of  reasons why one made them—there is a sense in which the person didn’t make them at all.  We  have  so  far  explored  the  motivational  contribution  of  intentions  to actions—we perform certain actions because we want to fulfil certain intentions—but  it  would  be  very  strange  if  an  intention  didn’t  have  anything  to  causally contribute  to  the  execution  of  the  corresponding  action.  Suppose  that  there  is  a complex of neurophysiological mechanisms that are responsible for the execution 
  101 
of a given action A—call this complex MA. Now call IA the intention to A. It’s hard to imagine  that MA  and  IA  could bring  about  the  execution of A  in  complete mutual independence. If they did, there would be the danger that MA and IA could pull the relevant  agent  in different directions.  So  there must be  some kind of  connection between  them41.  So,  there  are  reasons  for  thinking  that  there  must  be  a  causal connection  between  an  intention  and  the  corresponding  action.  But  how  should the  causal  link  between  intentions  and  actions  be  characterized?  Is  it  to  be conceived along the  lines of a billiard ball collision? That  is, do  intentions simply initiate the corresponding actions, so that their causal contribution ceases with the onset of action? Or does their causal role extend beyond action onset?   Searle  (1983)  has  provided  a  causal  account  that  features  two  kinds  of intentions:  prior  intentions,  and  intentions  in  action.  Prior  intentions  are characterized  as  intentions  that  are  formed  prior  to  the  initiation  of  an  action, whereas intentions in action are conceived as causes of the bodily movements by means of which a certain action is executed. Not all actions have prior intentions, whereas all actions have intentions in action. The causal picture goes as follows: a prior intention (where there is one) causes an action, where the latter is made up of an intention in action causing a bodily movement. So prior intentions indirectly cause the bodily movements constituting a certain action, through an intention in action.  Some examples of so‐called wayward causal chains  illustrate why an event may fail to qualify as an intentional action in spite of the presence of the relevant prior intention. A climber who wants to get rid of the weight and danger of holding                                                         41  A  similar  piece  of  reasoning  is  put  forward  by Butterfill  and  Sinigaglia  (2012)  to  the effect that an intention and a corresponding motor representation must be related to each other in the context of a subject’s bringing about a given action. 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Introduction   Searle’s  (1983)  dual  theory  of  intention  distinguishes  between  prior  intentions, which may be assimilated to  intentions as they are standardly conceived (e.g., by Bratman, 1987), and intentions in action. He characterizes intentions in action as causes of bodily movements (1983, p. 95), namely as something that “proximately causes the physiological chain leading to overt behaviour” (Pacherie, 2000, p. 403). Work  in  the  neurophysiology  of  action  provides  us  with  the  notion  of  motor 
representation (see Jeannerod 1994, 2006), consisting in the representation of an action outcome that specifies the pattern of movements that the subject is going to perform,  and  which  thereby  drives  action  execution.  More  will  be  said  in  the course  of  this  chapter  (section  1)  about  the  characteristics  of  motor representations,  and  in  particular  it  will  be  shown  that,  insofar  as  motor representations play a key  role  in  the production of behaviour,  they are obvious candidates  for  fulfilling  the  role  of  intentions  in  action—a  position  endorsed  by Pacherie (2000, but see also 2003, 2006, 2008) and motivated thus:   The  reason  for  equating  Searle’s  intentions  in  action  with  Jeannerod’s motor representations is that they are assigned the same function in both models,  i.e.  they  are  the  proximal  causes  of  actions  and  they  play  a continuing causal role in shaping the action, guiding and monitoring it until completion. (Pacherie, 2000, p. 409)  
  104 
On these assumptions, should we accept the conclusion that motor representations are intentions?  Some would reject  this  idea. Bach (1978),  for  instance, suggests  that what he terms effective representations,  the characterization of which is rather close to that  of  motor  representations,  may  underlie  the  execution  of  voluntary movements. Still, Bach denies that effective representations are intentions:  Effective  representations  are  not  intentions.  Aside  from  characteristically not  being  conscious,  unlike  intentions,  they  need  not  represent  the behavior  as  an  action  on  the  part  of  the  agent.  Moreover,  effective representations  are  more  fine‐grained  than  intentions,  representing  not the behavior as a whole but merely the next bit of behavior (insofar as we can legitimately speak of bits).  (Bach, 1978, p. 367)  Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2012), on the other hand, argue that, while some motor representations  are  relevantly  similar  to  intentions  insofar  as  both  represent action outcomes, still, motor representations are also unlike  intentions  insofar as they have a motor format, which makes it impossible for motor representations to be inferentially integrated with intentions. Since intentions should be amenable to mutual  inferential  integration,  motor  representations  cannot  be  intentions.  In short,  arguments  can be  found  to  the  effect  that motor  representations bear  too distant  a  relation  to  intentions  standardly  conceived  (e.g.,  Bratman,  1987)  to deserve that qualification. So,  there  are  reasons,  on  the  one  hand,  to  maintain  that  motor representations are intentions, and, on the other hand, reasons to think that motor 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representations are the wrong thing to be identified with intentions, although the two  must  be  somehow  related.  In  this  chapter  I’m  going  to  argue  for  an intermediate, neutral position according to which, although intentions and motor representations are in principle distinct, it is however the case that the content of some motor representations can be a good guide to the content of some intentions, which,  following  Jeannerod  (1994)  and  in  a  different  sense  with  respect  to Pacherie’s  (2003, 2006, 2008) use of  the  term,  I’m going  to call motor  intentions. My  stance  leaves  open  the possibility  that  some motor  representations  could  be intentions, but none of what follows is going to hinge on this possibility.  Pacherie  proposes  the  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  intention  whose function  is  to  initiate,  sustain,  guide  and  monitor  actions:  present‐directed intentions  (or  P‐intentions)  on  the  one  hand,  and  motor  intentions  (or  M‐intentions) on the other hand. These two kinds of intentions are supposed to differ, among  other  things,  in  terms  of  possible  contents—the  contents  of  P‐intentions being accessible to  introspection, while the contents of M‐intentions are typically not. I partially agree with Pacherie as far as the possible contents of intentions are concerned. More specifically, I endorse the idea that the content of intentions can encompass all the contents that she describes as pertaining to P‐intentions and at least some of the contents that she describes as belonging to M‐intentions, with the exclusion of contents concerning action adjustments. Still,  I reject  the notion that two  kinds  of  intentions  should  be  distinguished  on  the  basis  of  accessibility  to introspection. 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1. What are motor representations and why think they could be intentions? In  what  follows,  the  notion  of  motor  representation  will  be  presented  as  the encoding in the brain of an action, or rather of some of its parameters, prior to its execution.  The message  that  this  section  is meant  to  convey  is  that  there  exists evidence for this kind of in advance encoding, regardless of the amount of detail in which  an  action  may  be  represented  in  advance,  which  deserves  careful  but separate  treatment.  I’m  going  to  stress  the  amount  of  independence  that  action encoding  seems  to  enjoy  with  respect  to  the  sensory  input  that  may  lead  to movement corrections, a point  that will become relevant  towards  the end of  this chapter.  The  concept  of motor  representation  (see  Jeannerod,  2006,  pp.  8‐ff.  for  a review) was introduced in motor physiology at the end of the nineteenth century, in  response  to  the  sensory‐motor  theory  of  action  generation.  According  to  the latter theory, actions would in one way or anther consist in reactions to changes in the  environment.  While  this  view  is  reasonable  as  far  as  reflex  movements  are concerned,  it  is  not  straightforwardly  applicable  to  the  notion  of  a  voluntary movement,  insofar  as  it’s  not  obvious  to what  extent,  if  any,  the  generation  of  a voluntary movement should depend on sensory input. What lent plausibility to the sensory‐motor  theory  of  action  generation  was  a  series  of  deafferentation experiments  carried  out  on  monkeys  (Mott  &  Sherrington,  1885).  These experiments  involved  the  suppression of  sensory  input  from a  given  limb  to  the central  system,  by  means  of  a  section  of  the  dorsal  spinal  roots  on  the  side corresponding  to  that  limb.  As  a  result,  the  deafferented  limb  was  almost paralyzed, and could only be used to produce awkward movements if the monkey was  forced  to  resort  to  that  limb.  Based  on  these  observations,  Mott  and 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Sherrington’s  conclusion was  that movement  initiation and execution depend on sensory input to a large and significant extent.   Revision  to  the  sensory‐motor  theory  of  action  generation  was subsequently  suggested,  and  Lashley  was  among  the  main  proponents  of  this revision on the basis of the following observations. A patient with a deafferented leg, who thus received no sensations from that leg, was able to bend his knee at a given  angle,  or  to  bring  his  foot  at  a  given  height  that  the  experimenter  had indicated  (Lashley,  1917).  The  absence  of  sensations  from  the  deafferented  leg excludes  that  the patient  could be  relying on  sensory  input  from  that  leg  for  the production  of  the  requested  movement.  The  patient  was  also  blindfolded, something  which  rules  out  a  contribution  of  visual  feedback  to  the  successful performance of the given task. A compelling interpretation of these data suggests that there has to be an encoding of the action in the brain that  is going to enable action performance independently of sensory input—this is what I’m going to refer to  as  a motor  representation.  Bizzi  and  colleagues  (Bizzi  et  al.,  1971)  carried out more  deafferentation  experiments  in  support  of  the  notion  of  motor representation.  They  showed  that  a monkey whose  forelimbs were  deafferented was still  able  to perform elbow movements directed  to a visual  target, while not seeing the limb, with reasonable accuracy. Lashley  (1951)  found  further  evidence  in  support  of  the  notion  of motor representation  in  the  rapidity  of  many  movements  performed  by  typically developed  subjects.  When  one  plays  a  musical  instrument,  it  is  possible  to alternate  one’s  fingers  reaching  the  frequency  of  16  strokes/s,  something  that makes  the  influence  of  any  sensory  feedback  on  the  production  of  those movements  impossible.  Hence,  Lashley  concluded  that  the  succession  of  those 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movements  had  to  be  encoded  prior  to  action  execution.  Note  that  another (related)  conclusion  follows:  not  only  the  movements  have  to  be  encoded  in advance, but they are also seemingly insensitive to sensory feedback, so that what we  call  motor  representation  in  this  case  does  not  encompass  movement corrections that might be induced by this feedback.   Thus  far,  evidence  has  been  brought  in  support  of  the  idea  that  motor representations  exist,  which  encode  some  features  of  the  corresponding  action prior to its execution. Within the context of some of the evidence reported, it was hinted that these motor representations seem to be independent from the kind of sensory feedback that might prompt movement corrections. Now notice that two things haven’t been established yet. First, it hasn’t been explained how actions are generated on the basis of motor representations. This is a problem that would take us  too  far  afield,  and  that will  therefore  be  left  aside  (possible  solutions  to  this problem are proposed, e.g., by Wolpert et al., 1995 and Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). Secondly, I haven’t addressed the question as to what the content of these motor representations is—that is, what features of the corresponding action they specify, and  in what detail. An answer  to  this question, by contrast,  is  crucial  for my purposes, and will only be partially addressed in the following sections, while a more comprehensive treatment of the content of motor representations will have to wait until chapter 4. The provisional take‐home message is the following: motor representations exist, and  their defining characteristic  is  the representation of at least some features of the corresponding action prior to the execution of the latter. To  the  extent  to  which  motor  representations  represent  action  outcomes,  they have  something  essential  in  common with  intentions  (see Butterfill &  Sinigaglia, 2012). Can we draw the conclusions that they are intentions, then? 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2. Are motor representations intentions? In  the  previous  section  it  was  established  that  intentions  and  motor representations  are  alike  in  that  they  both  represent  action  outcomes.  The question  then  naturally  arises,  then,  as  to  whether  motor  representations  are intentions.  In  this  section,  I’m going  to  show  that  intentions may  influence  those motor representations that represent action outcomes, and vice versa. This double influence,  while  not  constituting  sufficient  grounds  for  claiming  that  motor representations are intentions, still points to a close connection between the two. This connection, as it’ll become clear in the course of this section, often seems to be provided by motor  imagery, namely “the ability to generate a conscious  image of the acting self” (Jeannerod, 2006, p. 24). This ability, which seems to mediate the reciprocal  influence between  intentions and motor  representations, provides  the grounds  for  settling  on  the  view  that  intentions  and  motor  representations, regardless  of  whether  they  should  be  identified  with  each  other,  exhibit  an interesting commonality  in  terms of content—which  is going  to warrant our  talk of, e.g., the intention to grasp, as well as provide the foundations for an answer to the question as to how intentions connect with actions.    Before I proceed to show the reciprocal influences between intentions and motor representations, a few words on motor imagery are in order. Motor images (Jeannerod, 1994; 2006, pp. 23‐ff.) are mental images of the unfolding of an action that  the  subject  imagines  herself  executing.  As  such,  they  involve  a  conscious content, which they share with mental images in general, as well as an unconscious content that preserves many of the features of executed actions. Early evidence in favour  of  motor  images  preserving  features  of  actions  therein  represented  was 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provided  by  Landauer  (1962),  who  showed  that  the  physical  and  the  mental performance  of  the  same  action  took  approximately  the  same  time  (his observations  concerned  the  action  of  reciting  a  series  of  numbers).  The fundamental  feature  of motor  images,  for  the  purposes  of  my  argument,  is  that they are significantly similar both  to  intentions and to motor representations. As for  the  former,  the  content  of  motor  images  is  at  least  partially  accessible  to introspection.  As  for  the  latter, motor  images  display  striking  commonalities  (in terms of timing, encoding of programming rules and biomechanical constraint, as well  as  in  terms of  shared neural  resources) with  the  actions  that  are  imagined, which leads us to think that an enquiry into the content of motor images is going to shed light on the content of motor representations.  As for the extent to which intentions influence some motor representations, I’m going to consider evidence based on the mechanisms underlying everyday use of  objects  for  different  purposes,  and  on  the  disruptions  of  these  mechanisms (specifically, on  the utilization behaviour syndrome). To begin with, note  that an object,  such  as  a  fork,  can be used  for different purposes—e.g.,  for  eating,  or  for forcing a drawer open—and, on the basis of it, grasped in different ways.    The  act  of  grasping  a  fork,  […]  (see  Milner  and  Goodale  1995,  203), requires not simply the provision of an accurate precision grip, but a grip appropriate to the intended use of the fork. (Clark, 2001, p. 510)  Now consider the following piece of evidence (reported in Pacherie, 2006, p. 152). When  one  views  an  object,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  intention  to  act,  the possibilities for action afforded by that object are automatically detected, and they 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prepotentiate the corresponding motor programs (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Grèzes & Decety,  2002),  where  motor  programs  may  be  identified  with  motor representations. The motor program that is most suitable for the intended use may be selected in different ways. One possibility, reported by Pacherie (2006, p. 152), is  proposed  by  Shallice  (1988):  different motor  programs  compete  and  the  one that  shows  the  strongest  activation  is  triggered  as  a  result  of  a  process  called 
content scheduling. Another possible way of selecting the most appropriate motor program would consist  in explicitly reflecting on the different ways  in which one could act upon, and therefore grasp, a given object—something that might happen, for instance, in an unfamiliar situation. As a rather extreme example for this kind of situation, suppose that I intend to grasp a heavy vase that’s very ornate and very fragile to move it somewhere else, making sure I don’t break it. I might spend some time  considering  in which point(s)  I  should  grasp  that  object, with what  kind of grip,  and  so  on.  Thus  and  in  other ways  intentions may  lead  to  the  selection  of appropriate motor representations.  Conversely,  a  disruption  at  the  level  of  intention  formation may  lead  to  a disruption  in  the  activation  of motor  representations.  This  seems  to  be  the  case with  patients  exhibiting  utilization  behaviour  (Lhermitte  1983;  reported  in Jeannerod,  1994,  p.  200).  These  patients  present  prefrontal  lesions  that  may thought  to  be  responsible  for  an  impairment  in  inhibitory  control,  which  may ultimately  be  interpreted  as  an  impairment  of  intention  formation.  This  leads  to the compulsive imitation of gestures or of complex behaviour that unfolds in front of these patients, or to their compulsively using common objects placed in front of them. For instance, a patient exhibiting utilization behaviour, when presented with a glass and a bottle of water, would continuously pour water in the glass and drink 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from  it.  In  the  light  of  the  fact  mentioned  earlier  on  that  the  presence  of affordances  may  lead  to  the  automatic  prepotentiating  of  corresponding  motor programs (see Pacherie, 2008, p. 186), utilization behaviour may be interpreted as a disruption of intentions, manifested in a lack of inhibitory control, which leads to a disruption of motor representations, consisting in the compulsive recruitment of these representations. Interestingly as for the involvement of motor imagery in the mediation  between  intentions  and  motor  representations,  Jeannerod  (1994,  p. 200) points out that it is possible “that frontal patients with this syndrome should be  unable  to  generate  motor  imagery  without  immediately  transferring  the imagined action into motor output.”   Now  I’ll  show  that  the  reverse  kind  of  influence,  namely  from  motor representations representing outcomes to intentions, exists. I’m going to resort to evidence concerning apraxic patients (reported in Jeannerod, 1994, p. 200; 2006, pp. 12‐ff., and in Grafton & Hamilton, 2007, pp. 596‐ff.), which, as will soon become clear,  can  be  interpreted  as  witnessing  alterations  in  the  patients’  motor representations,  though  at  a  level  higher  than  that  of  elementary  motor representations42.  Liepmann  coined  the  term  apraxia  to  indicate  a  disorder characterized by the failure to execute complex actions, namely actions  involving the use and organization of more elementary motor representations in a sequence. Liepmann (1905, reported in Jeannerod, 2006, p. 12) assumed that these patients had lost what he termed movement formulas (a notion relevantly similar to that of motor  representation).  Following  Liepmann,  Jeannerod  (2006,  p.  12)  defines apraxia “as the consequence of a disruption of the normal mechanisms for action representations.”                                                          42 Cf. an alternative interpretation of apraxia put forward by Pacherie (2011, p. 71). 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This  disorder  shows  up  at  a  level  that  is  higher  than  that  of  elementary motor  representations. The ability  to perform elementary actions  is preserved—for  instance,  apraxic  patients  have  no  difficulties  when  it  comes  to  executing simple actions such as grasping an object (Jeannerod, 2006, p. 12). Their difficulty seems  to  reside  at  a  higher  level,  that  of  action  organization.  As  Liepmann emphasized  (see  Grafton  &  Hamilton,  2007,  p.  596),  apraxia  is  not  so  much  a disruption of movement, but rather of purposeful behaviour. To explain what the difference  between  movement  and  purposeful  behaviour  amounts  to  in  this context, and to characterize what the level of action organization consists in, recall the earlier reflection about the fact that an object may be grasped in different ways depending on the use one  intends to make of  it. Apraxic patients  fail precisely  in the selection of  the motor  representation  that’s most appropriate  to  the use of a given  object.  Clark  et  al.  (2004,  reported  in  Jeannerod,  2006,  p.  13)  found  that apraxic  patients  fail  to  pantomime  correctly  the  action  of  slicing  bread  in  the absence  of  both  bread  and  knife,  due  to  the  incorrect  orientation  of  their movements and to the deficient spatiotemporal coordination of their joints. Should you think that the problem with these patients lies in the inability to imagine the action without the tool that they’re meant to use, which would still be a significant finding,  and  point  to  the  role  of motor  imagery  in  action  planning,  Ochipa  et  al. (1997,  reported  in  Jeannerod,  2006,  p.  13)  collected  the  following  evidence  on patient G.W.: not only did  she  fail  in pantomiming  the use of 15  commonly used tools following just a verbal instruction, but she also failed when asked to imitate an  actor, when  shown  the  object  but  prevented  from using  it,  and  even  actually handling  the  object  in  question.  Yet  G.W.  could  correctly  distinguish  objects according to their function. The data concerning G.W. are especially interesting for 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our purposes  in  that  she’s  not  only  impaired  in  action  execution,  but  also  in  the generation of the motor imagery related to the execution of a given action. That is, if  asked what posture her hand would  take when performing an action,  she was unable to answer.  The difficulty of apraxic patients at  the  level of action organization  is also manifested  in  their  inability  to plan actions  that  require a number of  steps  to be performed.  Lehmul  and  Poeck  (1981,  reported  in  Jeannerod,  1994,  p.  200) observed  that  apraxic  patients  cannot  put  cards  portraying  different  stages  of  a common  complex  action  such  as  preparing  tea  in  the  correct  order.  This  is  a demonstration of the inability to organize elementary motor representations in a sequence as required by the planning and execution of a complex action. Furthermore,  experimental  evidence  concerning  aplasic  individuals (Gazzola et al., 2007, presented  in chapter 1,  section 3.2.5) can be  interpreted as showing an influence of motor representations on intentions—specifically, in this case, on  intention recognition. The main  finding of  this study  is  that both aplasic individuals, while  observing  hand  actions,  activated  those  areas  in  their  brain—part of the mirror neuron system—that had previously been shown to be involved in the execution of foot or mouth actions. A plausible interpretation of this finding would have it that aplasics recognize typically developed individuals’ intention to execute hand actions  in  terms of  the motor representations  that  they, as aplasics, would  recruit  to  execute  the  same  actions  with  the  effectors  that  are  actually available  to  them,  namely  mouth  and  feet.  Their  mouth  and  feet  motor representations,  that  is,  influence  the  recognition  of  typically  developed individuals’ intentions to execute hand actions. 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 The  presence  of  reciprocal  influences  between  some  intentions  and  some motor  representations,  as  shown  in  the  course  of  this  section,  points  to  a  close connection  between  the  two,  while  not  warranting  the  conclusion  that  the  two should be identified, and thus helps us to shed light on how intentions and actions are  connected.  Still,  some  of  the  data  reported  suggest  an  involvement  of motor imagery in the mediation between intentions and motor representations, whereas those  data  and  examples  for  the  explanation  of  which  motor  imagery  was  not explicitly invoked might still be interpreted as involving motor imagery. Consider again, for instance, the example concerning the lifting of a heavy, ornate and fragile vase. One may try out different possible grips before proceeding to lift it, or simply mentally  rehearse  those  different  kinds  of  grips.  Therefore,  while  I’m  going  to remain  neutral  on  the  question  as  to  whether  motor  representations  are intentions,  I’ve given reasons  for  thinking  that an  interesting overlap  in  terms of content, which  could be provided by motor  imagery,  seems  to hold between  the two. Just how much overlap there is, and what consequences this has for views on intentions that take into account motor representations such as Pacherie’s (2000, 2003, 2006, 2008) will be tackled in the course of the following sections.  
3. What’s  the relation between  the content of  intentions and  the content of 
motor representations? Suppose you’re about  to pick a piece of  fruit  from a basket – you  let your hand wonder over the basket for a bit, then choose – say – a plum, and finally grasp it. This is something that one normally does rather effortlessly, and hardly paying attention  to  what  he’s  doing.  You may well  be  absorbed  in  a  conversation with someone else sitting at the same table and yet successfully grasp the selected piece 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of fruit. Suppose I now tell you that, whether you’re aware of this or not, whenever you’re  about  to  grasp  something,  your  fingers  stretch pre‐shaping  in  accordance with the selected object. They do so in such a way that the grip size quickly reaches a maximum, which is proportional to the shape of the anticipated size of the object, before fingers flex again to match the size of the object (Jeannerod, 1986, p. 104). Presumably, the next time you happen to be in a similar situation to that described above  you’ll  pay  a  lot  of  attention,  maybe  by  considerably  slowing  down  your movements, to be able to verify that what I’ve told you actually happens—and it’s not clear that you’re going to succeed.  The comparison between the two times in which you grasp a piece of fruit from  a  basket,  before  and  after  learning  about  the  so‐called  maximum  grip 
aperture, yields an example of the fact that “an action can be performed in different ways, with different degrees of skill, control, effort, and attention” (Bach, 1978, p. 364). In the first case, you’re hardly paying attention and your movements are very fast;  in  the  second  case,  you’re  closely  following  every  step  and,  conceivably, moving a  lot more slowly. Given the way  in which an action  is performed, which includes  a  complex  of  various  degrees  of  skill,  control,  effort  and  attention,  how much of it, if any, is part of the intention to perform the relevant action?    In  the  case  mentioned  beforehand,  it  should  sound  very  reasonable  that some sort of proportion relation between grip aperture and the size of the object holds.  It might,  for  instance,  strike us  as natural  to  suppose  that  this  proportion relation is determined by our intention to grasp, say, a small plum as opposed to a big orange, which we can easily visually  recognize as  relevantly different  in  size. But what exactly  is  the relation between the  intention to grasp a small plum and the  corresponding  maximum  grip  aperture?  In  particular,  it  has  to  be  clarified 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whether the latter is (a) not part of the content of the intention to grasp the plum, and  not  part  of  the  content  of  any  intention;  (b)  not  part  of  the  content  of  the intention to grasp the plum, but part of the content of a different kind of intention (in a sense to be made more precise shortly); (c) if not part of the content of the intention to grasp the plum, part of the content of another intention (although not an intention of a different kind).   Bach (1978) seems to hold (a), as he states that   an  agent  could  intend  to  do  something  in  a  certain  specified way, with  a certain degree of skill, control, effort, and attention, but in general these are not matters  of  intention.  And  yet  they  do  seem  to  have  something  to  do with  the  agent's  awareness  of  what  he  is  doing  and  of  what  he  is  to  do. However, this awareness seems below the level of intentions […]. (Bach, 1978, p. 364)  Pacherie (2003, 2006, 2008)  instead supports (b), as she argues for some sort of division  of  labour  between  two  kinds  of  intention,  which  she  terms  present­
directed  intentions  (or  P‐intentions)  and  motor  intentions  (or  M‐intentions). Suppose that I am not entirely distracted by the conversation with another person at my table and I proceed to pick up a plum from the fruit basket as a result of a corresponding  consciously  formed  intention. This  intention  is  a P‐intention. Grip aperture, on the other hand, is part of the content of a M‐intention that specifies all the motor details of the corresponding P‐intention. I am going to develop and argue for a version of (c), by showing that where Pacherie distinguishes P‐intentions  from M‐intentions (section 3.1 of  the present chapter)  there  is  just  one  kind  of  intention  (sections  3.2‐3.3  of  the  present 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chapter).  Furthermore,  among  the  contents  that  Pacherie  allows M‐intentions  to take,  I’m  going  to  exclude  those  contents  concerning  fine  adjustments  of  actions (section 3.4 of the present chapter). 
 
3.1 How P­intentions and M­intentions are supposed to come apart Let us dwell for a while on the details of Pacherie’s distinction. She maintains that both P‐intentions and M‐intentions play a role during action execution, in contrast with  future‐directed  intentions,  which  are  in  some  cases  present  before  action onset.  Both  P‐intentions  and  M‐intentions,  in  her  framework,  have  initiating, sustaining, guiding and monitoring functions (Pacherie, 2006, p. 149): they trigger the  corresponding  action  (initiating  function),  sustain  it  until  its  completion (sustaining function, which is going to be discussed in chapter 5, section 2.1), guide the execution of  the action (guiding  function) and monitor  its effects  (monitoring 
functions). Pacherie’s contention is that the latter two functions can be executed at two different  levels.  The  former  is  consciously  accessible  and  subject  to  rational constraints,  whereas  the  latter  has  limited  conscious  access  and  occasionally escapes rationality constraints. P‐intentions are responsible for the former kind of control,  which,  following  Buekens,  Maesen,  &  Vanmechelen  (2001),  Pacherie characterizes in terms of rational control, which takes two forms: tracking control and  collateral  control.  Tracking  control  consists  of  keeping  track  of  the progress that one is making towards her goal, trying to maximize it, while collateral control is about trying to minimize the side effects that might ensue from the action as it unfolds,  to  the point of  abandoning  the  action  if  the  side  effects become  too big. Both forms of rational control are exercised consciously, and are contrasted with the sort of control that is exercised at the level of M‐intentions. 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 The notion of M‐intentions  stems  from  the  idea  (which has been  strongly challenged—see Rossetti et al., 2003—but will be assumed only for the purposes of  fleshing  out  Pacherie’s  distinction)  that  there  exist  two  visual  streams  of information: vision for action and vision for perception (Milner & Goodale, 1995), where  the  latter  consists  in  the  recognition  and  categorization  of  objects.  M‐intentions are roughly to be identified with the motor representations built up and employed in vision for action. Three characteristics of these motor representations are highlighted by Pacherie (2006, p. 151). First, they represent object features in such a way as to enable the selection of appropriate motor patterns. For instance, if one intends to grasp an object,  the characteristics of that object that are relevant for  grasping will  be  represented—e.g.,  its  size  and  shape will  be  represented  in term of the sort of grip that they enable. Secondly, motor representations respect the biomechanical constraints governing the motor system, so that uncomfortable or  awkward  positions  will  be  avoided  by  the  motor  pattern  selection.  Thirdly, motor  representations  take  into  account  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  sequence  of movements  in which  they play  a  role,  so  that,  for  instance,  if  I  intend  to  grasp a mug I will do so in a specific way that depends on whether I want to examine it as opposed  to  drink  from  it.  What  is  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  Pacherie’s distinction is that the content of a motor representation, i.e. of an M‐intention, can significantly  come  apart  with  respect  to  that  of  the  corresponding  P‐intention. We’ll see examples of this coming apart in the following. Pacherie  (2006,  p.  156)  reports  a  series  of  experiments  (Fourneret  & Jeannerod,  1998;  Slachewsky  et  al.,  2001)  in which  subjects’  awareness  of  their movements was investigated. Subjects were instructed to move a stylus to a visual target.  Only  the  stylus  trajectory was  visible  to  them  in  the  form  of  a  line  on  a 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computer  screen.  A  bias  was  then  introduced  on  the  line  appearing  on  the computer  screen  such  that  there was a discrepancy between  the visible  line and that  actually  traced  by  the  subject.  The  results  showed  that  two  very  different strategies were employed by the subjects, depending on the amount of discrepancy between  the  line  actually  traced  and  that  visually  perceived  by  the  subject.  In particular,  whenever  the  bias  was  small,  subjects  automatically  adjusted  the trajectory of their hand to  it. When the bias exceeded a mean value of about 14°, subjects  changed  strategy  and  began  to  use  conscious monitoring  of  their  hand movements to correct for the bias and to reach the target.  The case in which subjects are unaware of the adjustments they make to the trajectory of  the stylus  is  taken to exemplify a situation  in which P‐intention and M‐intention  come  apart.  When  asked,  subjects  declared  that  they  thought  their hand  had  moved  towards  the  target,  but  seemed  to  be  unaware  of  the  actual movements  they had performed (Jeannerod, 2006, p. 51). Thus,  their P‐intention to reach the target was dissociated from the M‐intention specifying the details of the hand adjustments. The way in which P‐intentions and M‐intentions are applied to the interpretation of these experiments is in line with the characterization of M‐intentions  as  having  a  content  that  is  not  always  accessible  to  introspection (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Slachewsky et al., 2001). A  further point made by Pacherie, which is also linked to the possibility of conscious control, has to do with the  timing  of  the  action:  for  an  action  to  take  place  quickly  and  smoothly, corrections  need  to  be  made  at  too  fast  a  pace  to  be  consciously  accessible (Pacherie 2008, p.  188). Hence  the need  for M‐intentions  that  take  care of  these fast  and  automatic  corrections,  in  contrast with  those  typical  of  rational  control that are a function of P‐intentions. 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 So far, the seeming plausibility of Pacherie’s picture, featuring P‐intentions as  well  as  M‐intentions,  should  have  been  made  clear.  I  am  now  going  to  put pressure on this picture, and in particular I’m going to challenge the idea that we need  two  kinds  of  intentions,  along  the  lines  of  Pacherie’s  P‐intentions  and  M‐intentions,  to  interpret  the  experimental  results  she  reports. While  I  agree with Pacherie that there is room for intentions even after during action performance, I disagree that more than one kind of intention is required.   
3.2 How far can awareness of action performance go? Jeannerod  (2006,  pp.  45‐47)  draws  a  useful  distinction  between  being aware of having a goal, e.g., the goal of reaching a certain place, and being aware of how the goal is being reached, e.g. of the movements that my legs should perform in order to reach a certain place. One may well be aware of the former, but not of the latter—as a matter of fact, that’s precisely what happens when one intends to walk  to  a  certain  place.  Think  again  of  the  experimental  results  reported previously,  and  specifically  of  those  involving moving  a  stylus  towards  a  target. The  target  was  always  reached,  but  subjects  weren’t  always  aware  of  the movements they had performed in order to achieve that goal. Jeannerod (2006, p. 51)  describes  these  situations  as  ones  in  which  there  is  perceptual  awareness without motor awareness, i.e., subjects were aware of the target of their action and were  able  to  reach  for  it,  but  didn’t  know,  or  had  partial  and/or  incorrect information  as  to  how  this  had  been  possible.    Question:  are  the  awareness  of having a goal and the awareness of how the goal is being reached both relevant to pick out the intention corresponding to the relevant action? If so, to what extent? 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First of all, Jeannerod (2006, p. 46) points out that the extent to which one is aware of the way in which a goal is being achieved may be a function of whether the corresponding action  is being  learned, or whether  it has been  learned and  is being  fluently  executed.  When  one  is  learning  to  perform  a  certain  action,  one cannot help paying more attention to the details of its execution, to the detriment of the performance. Conversely, there are occasions (e.g., piano playing) in which the only way to achieve a smooth performance is to execute one’s movements with a  certain  degree  of  lack  of  awareness.  It  is  an  open  question  how  the  intention underlying these different kinds of performance, e.g. that of a pianist exercising vs. playing  at  a  concert,  should  be  characterized  in  terms  of  intentions,  and  it  is unclear  that  Pacherie’s  framework  provides  the  best  way  to  account  for  these changes  in  the  degree  of  conscious  control.  In  particular,  she  describes  M‐intentions  as  having  a  content  that  in  some  cases  cannot  be  accessed  by introspection. But the pianist example introduces the doubt that most of the times we  actually  have  the  choice  of  introspecting  the  content  of  the  so‐called  M‐intentions, but avoid it insofar as doing so might hinder our performance. We  could  posit  just  one  kind  of  intention, which  I’m  going  to  label motor 





specifications As we’ve seen, accuracy of performance often requires that we dramatically  limit our conscious control of an action. Pacherie expresses this idea by resorting to the notion  of  the  tempo  of  an  action  (e.g.,  2006,  pp.  150‐151),  which  is  to  be understood  as  the  pace  at  which  an  action  unfolds.  A  slow  tempo  is  one which offers  more  possibilities  for  conscious  control,  insofar  as  one  has  more  time  to decide on the details of action execution, and on the modifications to make on the course of action.  If one  is practising a piano piece, without meaning  to attain  the pace at which she’ll actually perform it during a concert, she may for instance take the  time  to  calibrate  the  movements  of  each  finger  in  those  passages  that  are especially  tricky.  A  fast  tempo  is  one  that  considerably  limits  the  possibilities  of conscious  control,  insofar  as  little  time  is  conceded  to  make  the  necessary adaptations  to  accomplish  a  given  action.  Pacherie  (2006,  p.  150)  gives  the example of a game of tennis, in which one is allowed little time to decide how she’s going  to  return  a  serve.  In  the  pianist  example,  a  concert  performance  may  be characterized  by  a  fast  tempo:  the  rhythm  at  which  the  piece  is  to  be  played constrains the amount of conscious control that can be devoted to the execution to a point at which it’s very limited. Pacherie’s contention is that two different kinds of  intentions  are  required  to  deal  with  these  differences  in  tempo:  specifically, while an M‐intention always exercises control over an action, 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 for a P‐intention to play its role of guidance and control, it must be the case that  the  tempo  of  the  action  is  not  faster  then  the  tempo  of  conscious rational  thought;  or,  more  accurately,  it  is  only  on  those  aspects  of  an action the tempo of which does not exceed the tempo of conscious rational thought that P‐intentions can have rational control.  (Pacherie, 2006, pp. 150‐151)    According  to  Pacherie,  then,  the  difference  between  the  pianist  at  the practising  stage  and  at  the  performance  stage  should  lie  in  something  like  the following: while in the former situation she may have a series of P‐intentions such as “alternate index, ring, middle and ring finger” (while playing a trill), in the latter case  all  these  P‐intentions  will  be  no  longer  present  and  her  performance  will solely be guided by the relevant M‐intentions. Is this an effective description of the events  in  question? After  all,  the  boundaries  between  the  two  kinds  of  situation may not be so rigid. Even during a concert performance, a pianist might be aware that there is a certain point in the piece that she has to pay special attention to, and thus exercise as much rational control on that point as the rhythm of the execution allows. In Pacherie’s framework, this situation would be described as one in which every now and then the relevant P‐intentions flank the ongoing M‐intentions. Is it necessary to posit two kinds of intentions to characterize this situation?   Velleman  (2007,  pp.  213‐214),  for  one,  would  probably  judge  the  piano concert situation as one in which intentions are most likely to get in the way, and are  best  left  aside.  He  resorts  to  the  work  of  the  psychologist  Mihaly Csikszentmihaly (1990, 1997), who identified some activities as able to provide a sort  of  experience  which  he  terms  of  flow.  These  are  activities  demanding  the 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exercise  of  appropriate  skills,  and  in which  people  become  so  involved  that  the activities  become  spontaneous,  almost  automatic  (Csikszentmihaly,  1990,  p.  53; quoted  in Velleman,  2007,  p.  214).  Supporting  Csikszentmihaly,  Velleman  insists that  if  we  are  to  find  flow  we  have  to  suspend  deliberation  and  planning,  and thereby  to  suspend  intentions.  As  Velleman  doesn’t  embrace  any  equivalent  of Pacherie’s  notion  of  M‐intention,  he  altogether  rules  out  the  involvement  of intentions in those activities that generate the experience of flow. He and Pacherie clearly agree that something is lacking in this kind of activities, but how should this something be characterized?   First,  a  clarification  remark  is  in  order.  Both  in  the  concert  and  in  the practice  situation,  the  pianist  intends  to  do  something—playing,  say,  Beethoven’s Moonlight sonata. One may object at this point that even this overarching intention differs  in  the  two  cases,  for  in  the  former  one  intends  to  execute  Beethoven’s Moonlight  sonata, and  to practise  it  in  the  latter, but, assuming  that  this  subtlety has any substance, let us ignore it for the sake of argument. Given the similarity in terms  of  overarching  intention,  how  is  the  lack  pointed  out  by  Pacherie  and Velleman  alike  to  be  characterized?  One  possibility  is  that  the  content  of  the intention is much richer in the practice case with respect to the concert situation, for in the practice case the intention to play Beethoven’s Moonlight sonata can be re‐described as the intention to lift alternatively one finger and then another finger and so forth, whereas in the concert case this re‐description is not available. This solution  assumes  that  what’s  consciously  attended  to  has  a  bearing  on  the specification  of  the  content  of  the  relevant  intention.  In  the  case  in  which  the pianist devotes more or  less conscious introspection to his performance during a 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3.4 Intention and fine­tuning of action: two of a kind?   According to Pacherie (2006, p. 154), M‐intentions are also involved in the adjustments  to our motor commands  that are employed  in  the generation of our actions. She appeals to a series of experiments to show that we are often unaware of  those  adjustments,  even  though  they  may  end  up  in  contrast  with  our  own actions. Some pointing experiments (Goodale et al., 1986; Castiello et al., 1991) are based on a task in which subjects are required to point to a target with their finger. The  results  show  that  subjects  can  perform  the  task  accurately  on  all  trials, including those in which the target is suddenly displaced by a few degrees and the pointing  trajectories  are  adjusted  in  accordance with  this  displacement. More  to the point, subjects are unaware of this displacement. Pacherie interprets these and other  results  in  the  same  vein  in  terms  of  the  fact  that M‐intentions,  which  are supposed  to underlie  the adjustments of which  subjects  remain unaware, have a dynamics of their own, which is not entirely under the control of P‐intentions, such as the P‐intention to point at a target.    Now, why  think  that  it  is  the  function  of  intentions  (though  of  a  specific kind) to provide these adjustments? Pacherie’s answer to this question should be something  along  the  following  lines:  since  guidance  and  control  are  among  the functions  of  intentions  at  the  time  of  action  execution,  and  fast  movement corrections serve the purposes of guidance and control of action, then they should be described in terms of intention. But here is a problem, which should lead us to reconsider, or at least rephrase, the second premise. 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Movement corrections such as those featuring in the experiments reported are pervasive  in  the  course of  our  voluntary movements,  and do not necessarily play a role in action. Consider a case in which we’re idly listening to a speech while standing up still in the middle of a crowd. If we have any intentions at that point, they’ll have to do with listening to the speech, and will be quite independent of our bodily position. The intention to listen to the speech might prompt the intention to get closer to the speaker, or some such, but the fact that we’re in a specific bodily position, i.e. standing up, is completely irrelevant to the fulfilment of our intention. In particular, therefore, at that point we have no intention to stand up, nor can we say  that  the  action  of  standing  up  is  unfolding.  Yet  there  is  evidence  (see,  e.g., Ramenzoni  et  al.,  2011)  to  the  effect  that  even  standing  up  requires  a  series  of continuous  small  and  imperceptible  postural  adjustments.  The  above  example  is meant  to  show  that  such  fast  corrections  don’t  necessarily  serve  the  purpose  of guiding and control of an action, since there is no action involved, at least not to do with the person’s standing up.  The upshot is that, on pains of including too much within the content of an intention,  a  promising  interpretation  of  the  pointing  experiments  might  be  in terms  of  just  one  kind  of  intention  plus  a  series  of  postural  adjustments.  It  is plausible  that  these  adjustments  do  not  have  anything  to  do with  intentions,  at least below a certain threshold. Think of the experiments (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998;  Slachewsky  et  al.,  2001;  reported  in  Pacherie,  2006,  p.  156)  in  which subjects  were  instructed  to  move  a  stylus  to  a  visual  target.  Only  the  stylus trajectory was visible  to  them  in  the  form of a  line on a computer screen. A bias was then introduced on the line appearing on the computer screen such that there was a discrepancy between the visible line and that actually traced by the subject. 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The  results  showed  that,  whenever  the  bias  was  small,  subjects  automatically adjusted the trajectory of their hand to it. When the bias exceeded a mean value of about 14°, subjects began to consciously monitor their hand movements to correct for the bias and to reach the target. Pacherie would say that a P‐intention to move the stylus towards the target is  flanked  by  a  M‐intention  which  takes  care  of  the  postural  adjustments  that, below  the  threshold  of  14°,  are  not  consciously  accessed. But,  in  the  light  of  the considerations  based  on  the  work  of  Ramenzoni  et  al.  (2001),  an  alternative interpretation would have it that, when the bias is below 14°, only one intention, i.e. the intention to move the stylus towards the target, is in play, while a series of postural  adjustments  are  performed  in  conjunction with  it  to  help  fulfilling  that intention.  In  the case  in which  the bias exceeds 14°, on  the basis of  the previous reflections  we  could  either  say  that  the  content  of  that  intention  gets supplemented  by  the  further  intentions  to  adjust  one’s  movements,  or  that  the content  of  the  intention  remains  the  same,  but  more  introspection  is  employed during action execution. None of these cases requires the positing of a further kind of intention. In support of the proposed interpretation according to which intentions and fine‐tuning  of  action  may  come  apart,  consider  the  following  experimental  result. Graziano and Aflalo  (2007,  reported  in Uithol et al., 2012, p. 1082) carried out a study in which the premotor areas of a macaque monkey brain was stimulated for a relatively long time (500‐1000ms). This stimulation managed to evoke complex sequences of movements directed to a given location. An example of this sequence would be given by grasping, bringing to the mouth, orienting the head towards the hand  and  opening  the mouth.  The  striking  characteristic  of  these movements  is 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that they didin’t display any flexibility: in particular, when an arm encountered an obstacle  on  its  way  to  bringing  something  to  the  mouth,  it  didn’t  correct  its trajectory and thus ended up blocked against the obstacle (Graziano, 2010, p. 461, reported in Uithol et al., 2012, p. 1082).  
Conclusion In  this chapter  I’ve  introduced the notion of motor representation, and shown to what extent it bears a significant similarity to that of intention. This has given me the  chance  to  introduce  also  the notion of motor  intention. Motor  intentions  are not  a  separate  kind  of  intentions  with  respect  to  the  ones  we  know  and  love (examined in the course of chapter 2), but are characterized by a specific kind of content,  which  is  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  corresponding  motor representations.  Recalling  a  notion  that  was  introduced  towards  the  end  of  the first chapter (section 5), motor intentions represent motor outcomes. The relation holding between motor intentions and motor representations, which is going to be made more  precise  in  the  course  of  the  following  chapter,  paves  the way  for  an answer to the question as to how intentions connect with actions. I’ve suggested that motor intentions can do the work of both Pacherie’s P‐intentions and M‐intentions, by insisting on the idea that any kind of content that may be even temporarily introspected—including contents that were classified as belonging  to  M‐intentions—can  be  the  content  of  an  intention  standardly conceived. Now, where does this leave us with respect to the intention to grasp a plum by  stretching one’s  fingers  in  accordance with  the maximum grip  aperture phenomenon?  I  claim  that  this  is an empirical question. The present chapter has established  that  the  intention  to  grasp  a  plum  is  a  motor  intention,  which  is  a 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Introduction In the previous chapter, the notion of motor intention was introduced, namely that of  an  intention  whose  content  is  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  an  motor representation. It was also explained that it is possible for us to gather insight into the content of a motor representation by means of motor  images, where a motor image  is a mental  image of  the self performing an action. These  images preserve many features of the imagined actions—for instance, a motor image takes roughly the  same  time  to  unfold  as  the  imagined  action.  It would  then  seem  that motor images  represent  imagined actions  in great detail.  If we rely on motor  images  in order  to  draw  conclusions  about  the  content  of motor  representations,  we may think  that  all  motor  representations  represent  actions  in  as  much  detail.  If  the content  of  motor  intentions  is  thought  to  be  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  a corresponding motor representation, we may wonder what consequences this has for how the content of motor  intentions should be characterized.  In particular,  is this a kind of pictorial content or is it propositional? Is it conceptual? If we thought that  motor  intentions  had  a  pictorial  kind  of  content,  impossible  to  render  in propositional terms or to describe in terms of concepts (or in concepts available to the average subject), then it would become hard to justify calling them intentions. The  present  chapter  is  going  to  answer  the  aforementioned  questions  by shedding light on the variety of motor representations, and on their different levels 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of specificity. In particular, I’m going to resort to the notion of an action hierarchy (Shallice, 1988; Jeannerod, 1994; Hamilton & Grafton, 2007; Csibra, 2007), in order to show that an action can be represented in greater or lesser detail depending on the  hierarchical  level  under  consideration.  On  the  basis  of  this  variety,  it’ll  be pointed out that, while all motor intentions have something in common insofar as their  content  involves  sequences  of  bodily  configurations,  only  some  motor intentions may  be  safely  held  to  have  a  propositional  content  that  is  conceptual under the most demanding construal of the notion.  
1. Are motor intentions really intentions? In the previous chapter, along the lines of Jeannerod (1994, 2006), I introduced the idea  that  the  content  of  a motor  image may be  a  good  guide  to  the  content  of  a corresponding motor representation, and I described motor intentions as having a content  that  is  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  the  corresponding  motor representations.  In  this  section  I’m going  to point  out  potential  issues  related  to the similarity between motor intentions and motor images. Some  difficulties  arise  from  the  fact  that  motor  imagery  is  part  of  the broader phenomenon of mental imagery. Within cognitive science, a long‐standing debate  (the  imagery debate) has been concerned with how  the  format of mental images should be characterized. One side of the debate has it that mental imagery essentially  differs  in  format with  respect  to  linguistic  propositions  (Paivio  1986, referenced in Jeannerod, 1994, p. 188). In particular, according to this side of the debate,  mental  images  have  a  pictorial  or  analog  format  (Kosslyn  et  al.,  1979, referenced  in  Jeannerod,  1994,  p.  188).  Mental  images,  that  is,  exhibit  spatial representational properties of  the same sort as  those possessed by pictures—for 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instance, any part of a picture represents a part of the depicted scene, and spatial relationship  among  objects  in  the  depicted  scene  are  rendered  via  spatial relationships  on  the  picture  surface  (see  Thomas,  2010).  The  other  side  of  the imagery  debate,  on  the  contrary,  has  it  that  mental  imagery  does  not  differ  in format from other forms of mental representation: they all have the same abstract kind of representational format (Pylyshyn, 1984, referenced in Jeannerod, 1994, p. 188). While this is not the place to try and adjudicate the mental imagery debate, let us suppose for the sake of argument that the pictorial side of the debate is right. What bearing does this have on the notion of motor intention? Arguably,  intentions  have  a  propositional  format,  insofar  as  they  are standardly conceived as propositional attitudes  (see,  e.g., Bratman, 1987) and so it’s difficult to see how there could be commonality in content between any kind of intentions on the one hand and motor  images on the other hand,  if  the  latter are characterized as having a pictorial format (see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012, on the difference  in  format  between  intentions  and  motor  representations).  There  are further  difficulties  connected with  the  idea  that motor  imagery  is  an  instance  of mental  imagery:  consider  the  notion  that  there  is  a  gap  between  the  expressive power  of  a  picture  compared with  that  of  a  propositional  description.  Imagistic representations  are  often  conceived  to  be  analog  insofar  as  the  properties  they represent  vary  continuously  as  opposed  to  propositional  representations, which are digital insofar as what they represent varies in a discrete fashion (see Dretske, 1981,  on  the  analog  vs.  digital  distinction;  Pitt,  2012).  Granting  all  these  things, how can the content of an intention ever capture that of a motor image? As if this wasn’t enough, there is an additional difficulty connected with the fact  that  motor  imagery  is  special  with  respect  to  mental  imagery  generally 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conceived. As Jeannerod (1994, p. 189) points out, motor imagery is a first‐person process  in  which  the  action  is  represented  kinaesthetically,  and  not  so  much visually  (although,  arguably,  a  visual  component  may  well  be  part  of  a  motor image—after  all,  even  from a  first‐person point of  view, whenever  I  act my own body  looks a certain way as well as  feeling  in a certain way).  Jeannerod draws a contrast  between  the  difficulty  in  verbalizing  motor  images  and  the  relative accessibility  of  visual  images.  Putting  all  these  difficulties  together,  how  can we justify the idea that motor intentions are intentions? 
 
2. Action hierarchies and variable content specification Consider  the  following  example  (from  Csibra,  2007,  pp.  439‐440)  of  an  action hierarchy: I want to eat an apple, and this result takes a few steps to be achieved, each of which may be carried out in different ways. For instance, at some point the apple needs to be brought in contact with the mouth. In order to obtain this result, I may either bring the apple to the mouth or move the mouth to the apple. Suppose I choose the former way to bring the apple in contact with the mouth. Once again, there’s  room  for performing  this  action  in different ways,  insofar as  I may grasp the  apple  by means  of  a whole‐hand  prehension,  or  pick  it  up  by  the  petiole  by means of a precision grip. Suppose I decide to grasp the apple with a whole‐hand prehension. So  far,  I’ve highlighted three  levels of an action hierarchy: eating the apple occupies the top one, the two ways of bringing the apple in contact with the mouth  are  at  a  level  below,  and  the  two ways  of  grasping  the  apple  at  an  even lower  level.  It  should be  relatively uncontroversial  that  any  token action may be described  at  different  levels  of  a  hierarchy  along  the  above  lines  (as  a matter  of fact, this idea has been extensively examined in chapter 1). 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A  fundamental  characteristic  of  action  hierarchies  as  described  above  is that,  as  we  climb  down  the  hierarchy,  we  find  that  the  action  is  specified  in increasingly  great  detail  (Jeannerod,  1994;  Hamilton  &  Grafton,  2007;  Csibra, 2007;  this notion  is going to be made more precise  in chapter 6).  If comparisons between  the  motor  image  and  the  corresponding  action  in  terms  of  timing, biomechanical constraints and so on (see previous chapter and  Jeannerod, 1994; 2006, pp. 23‐ff.) are to be possible at all, the content of a motor image has to be as detailed  as  to  encompass  even  the  finest  level  of  the  hierarchy  described  in  the above  example.  In  particular,  it’s  likely  that  the motor  image  of my  grasping  an apple will take into account, if not the kind of grip employed, at least the fact that I grasp  the apple with one of my hands.   Therefore, motor  representations whose content  is  relevantly  similar  to  that  of  a  motor  image  are  going  to  encompass roughly  as  much  detail  as  the  corresponding  motor  image.  But  this  kind  of representations  does  not  exhaust  the  variety  of  motor  representations  that  are seemingly at work in action production (and observation, although the latter won’t be tackled in the present work). Jeannerod  (1994,  p.  200‐201), who has  extensively described  the  relation between  motor  representations  and  motor  images,  acknowledges  that  detailed motor  representations  along  the  above  lines  do  not  exhaust  the  representation mechanisms that operate in action production, insofar as motor representations at the  lower  levels  need  to  be  embedded  in  broader  encompassing  motor representations which represent long‐term goals. This in principle need for motor representations  higher  up  in  the  hierarchy  is  complemented  by  experimental evidence concerning the representation of actions at a higher degree of generality with respect to the detailed representations linked to motor images. To go back to 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the apple grasping example, note that, among mirror neurons (see chapter 1 for a general introduction), some have been recorded (Gallese et al., 1996) that fire only in  the  case  of  grasping  with  a  precision  grip  or  of  grasping  with  a  whole­hand 
prehension. These neurons, that is, respond selectively for one of the two grasping options highlighted in the apple grasping example, and are called strictly congruent 
mirror  neurons.  In  addition  to  these,  neurons  have  been  recorded  that  fire  in correlation with grasping with the hand,  independently of the kind of grip. These have  been  termed  broadly  congruent  mirror  neurons,  and  their  level  of specification  of  the  action  corresponds  to  the middle  level  in  the  apple  grasping example.  Broadly  congruent mirror  neurons  can  be  considered  evidence  for  the existence of motor representations at a higher level of generality.  Experimental  results  concerning  mirror  neurons  provide  evidence  for motor  representations  representing  actions  at  even  higher  levels  of  generality, insofar as (see chapter 1, section 2) there exist neurons firing in correlation with grasping not only regardless of the kind of grip, but also regardless of the effector employed (so, irrespectively of whether something is being grasped with the hand or with the mouth), and even in correlation with grasping carried out by means of tools  such  as  pliers. What  is  crucial  for  our  purposes  is  that  these  neurons  are evidence  for  the  representation  of  the  action  of  grasping  at  a  very  high  level  of generality. Now, given that this level of generality is such as to leave open whether the subject is moving her mouth or hand, and she’s moving her hand in what way, how  does  this  sit  with  the  similarity  in  content  between  a motor  image  and  an motor  representation?  The  issue  is  that  if  I  have  to  form  an  image  of  myself grasping, this image can’t leave it unspecified whether I’m grasping with my hand or with my mouth. Even  if  the  image  in question  is kinaesthetic  in character and 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not visual, it’ll still have to specify my action in one of these two ways. In the light of this, are there any specific motor images whose content may be relevant for the specification of the content of a grasping motor representation? And,  if not, what does this tell us about the content of motor representations at a higher degree of generality, and, more  to  the point, about  the content of  the corresponding motor intentions? 
 
3. Is the content of motor intentions conceptual? The piece of  reasoning  carried out  in  the earlier  section  should  lead us  to doubt that,  when  it  comes  to  motor  representations  of  higher  level  outcomes  such  as grasping (as opposed to, e.g., grasping with a precision grip), these representations are  still  going  to  be  relevantly  similar  to  motor  images.  The  higher  degree  of generality  that  they  enjoy may  lead us  to  think  that  a  relevant  change  in  format occurs  such  as  to  make  them  amenable  to  be  rendered  in  propositional  terms (contra Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012). Not enough is known in order to be able to conclude that the motor representation of grasping has the right kind of format to be  integrated  in a piece of practical  reasoning  (it  is  still possible  that  its  content consists  in  a  motor  image  corresponding  to  what  the  subject  considers  a prototypical act of grasping), but that is not crucial for my purposes. What matters and  should  be  relatively  uncontroversial  is  that  intentions  involving  contents  of such  a  high  level  of  generality  as  ‘grasping’  exist.  And  it  seems  that  there  may indeed be pieces of practical reasoning that incorporate intentions with that kind of content. Consider something along the lines of:  (1) I intend to get hold of the umbrella. 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(2) In order to get hold of an umbrella I have to grasp it, so (3) I intend to grasp the umbrella.     To sum up, the higher degree of generality of certain motor representations, regardless  of  their  actual  format,  warrants  conceiving  the  corresponding  motor intentions as propositional attitudes. Furthermore,  it  shouldn’t be difficult  to  see that they have a conceptual content, as the characterization of an action in terms of GRASPING  is  available  to  the  average  thinker44.  Can  the  same  be  said  about  the motor intentions whose content is relevantly similar to that of the corresponding motor images? Or should they be classified as having a nonconceptual content? The  notion  of  nonconceptual  content  (Evans,  1982)  has  a  bearing  on  the present discussion in at least two ways. One has to do with the idea that, as human beings  have  limited  conceptual  capacities,  we  may  simply  not  have  enough concepts  to  capture  the  content  of  our  motor  intentions.  Secondly,  even  when there  are  concepts  for  describing  the  content  of  at  least  some motor  intentions, they might not be the kind of concepts that the average thinker possesses. Since we would  expect  the  content  of  intentions,  qua  propositional  attitudes,  to  be conceptual, let us see whether and when we need to conceive the content of motor intentions as nonconceptual. As  for  the  first  issue,  it  has  been  argued  by  Evans  that  the  content  of perceptual experience outstrips our capacities for conceptualization:  
                                                        44  Interestingly,  it  has  been  proposed  that  the  activity  of  mirror  neurons  that  fire  in correlation with  the  various  instances  of  grasping may  underlie  the  concept  GRASPING (see Gallese, 2003; Sperber, 2004; Jacob, 2009). 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Do we  really  understand  the  proposal  that we have  as many  concepts  as there are shades of color that we can sensibly discriminate? (Evans, 1982, p. 289)  An  analogous  problem  may  be  extended  from  perceptual  experience  to  motor intentions (something that Pacherie, 2011, has considered), insofar as the content of motor  intentions may  be  thought  to  outstrip  our  conceptual  capacities.  Now, notice  that  I  previously  highlighted  the  existence  of  different  kinds  of  motor intentions, some of which have a kind of content that is relevantly similar to that of corresponding motor images, and some that don’t, being much more abstract. The latter  kind  of  motor  intentions  have  such  a  high  level  of  generality  that  there doesn’t  seem  to  be  a  problem  with  characterizing  them  in  conceptual  terms: indeed,  concepts  such  as  GRASPING  characterize  this  kind  of  intentions  well enough.  Things  are  not  so  simple when  it  comes  to motor  intentions  at  the  lower levels  of  an  action  hierarchy.  In  section  2  I  mentioned  the  digital  vs.  analog distinction  in order to point out  that  there  is a potential difficulty residing  in the content of a motor intention being significantly like the content of a motor image. The difficulty consists  in  the  fact  that  the content of a motor  image may outstrip our  capacities  for  conceptualization,  so  that,  at  least  in  the  case  of  those motor intentions whose content  is  relevantly  similar  to  that of  a motor  image,  it  seems that those  intentions must have a nonconceptual content. There are two possible answers to this point. One has been given by Pacherie (2011): she holds that the motor representations involved in action initiation and control are nonconceptual (on  the  basis  of  a  version  of  the  priority  argument),  while  holding  that  these nonconceptual representations ground what she refers to as executable concepts of 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actions. As soon as one masters a given action, and is capable of initiating it at will (by contrast with apraxic patients of individuals affected by utilization behaviour), one can thereby be said to possess the related executable concept. Another answer can  be  given  along  the  lines  of  Butterfill  and  Sinigaglia  (2012),  on  the  basis  of McDowell’s (1994) response to the earlier mentioned piece of reasoning by Evans. McDowell holds that we may well capture the content of our perceptual experience with whatever fineness of grain by means of what he calls demonstrative concepts, such as ‘that shade’ (to keep to the colour example). In particular, if we express the content of a motor intention by means of a demonstrative which makes reference to the relevant detailed motor representation, the content of the motor intention in question can be characterized as conceptual. Both strategies  rely on assumptions  that one may or may not be  ready  to accept—on  the  legitimacy  of  talk  of  executable  concepts  and  of  demonstrative concepts, respectively. If neither is accepted, this is going to mean that the variety of motor intentions includes some intentions whose content is nonconceptual, for which  some  may  therefore  wish  to  withdraw  the  term  intention.  What  should however be  clear  from  the  earlier  section  is  that  the  variety of motor  intentions still  includes  intentions,  which  I  characterized  as  occupying  higher  levels  of  an action hierarchy, that uncontroversially have a conceptual content. Now  let’s  consider a second respect  in which  the notion of nonconceptual content becomes relevant for motor intentions. Recall that in the previous section I mentioned the existence of neurons selectively firing in response to precision grip vs. whole‐hand prehension. While  the precision grip and whole‐hand prehension movements  are  captured  by  the  concepts  bearing  the  same name,  it  is  also  true that  these  concepts  are  not  possessed  by  the  average  thinker.  This  may  be 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considered enough to say that whenever someone (who is not a neurophysiologist or an experimental psychologist) intends to carefully grasp an apple by the petiole, by  explicitly  intending  to  perform  the  movements  that  are  technically characterized as forming a precision grip, she thereby possesses a motor intention with nonconceptual content. Answers to this kind of worry may be along the same lines as those provided in response to the earlier worry. Once more, depending on the assumptions that we are ready to accept, the content of the intention to grasp using  a  precision  grip  may  be  thought  to  have  a  conceptual  or  nonconceptual content. Again, even if we had to conclude that intentions such as that of grasping something with  a  precision  grip  are  better  described  as  having  a  nonconceptual kind of content,  thus  leading some to withhold the term  ‘intention’  for them, this still  leaves  room  for  motor  intentions,  such  as  the  intention  to  grasp,  whose content is uncontroversially conceptual. In  the course of  the preceding sections,  the possibility  to subdivide motor representations  into  two  categories  has  emerged.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are motor representations lower down the hierarchy, which have a very detailed kind of content, likely to be constituted by a motor image and to be nonconceptual. On the other hand, there are motor representations higher up the hierarchy, that have a  very  abstract  kind  of  content,  which  could  in  principle  be  rendered  in propositional  terms. On  the  basis  of  this  subdivision, we’re  now  in  a  position  to specify  what  the  similarity  relation  between  motor  intentions  and  motor representations  consists  in,  thus  shedding  light  on  how  intentions  connect with actions. Along the lines of Butterfill & Singaglia (2012), I’m going to propose that motor intentions refer to action outcomes of the more detailed kind by deferring to the corresponding motor representation. When it comes to motor representations 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of  a  more  abstract  kind,  however,  if  their  content  can  indeed  be  rendered  in propositional  term,  then  that  content  is  going  to  be  identical  with  that  of  the corresponding motor intention.  
4. What is the content of motor intentions? Now  that  I’ve  described  the  variety  of  motor  intentions  and  their  potential differences in terms of content, I’ll  focus on what brings them together. I’m going to take the intention to grasp as a paradigmatic example of a motor intention. The intention  to  grasp  has  as  its  content  a  state  of  affairs  that  crucially  involves  a specific  sequence  of  bodily  configurations.  To  fulfil  my  intention  to  grasp,  say,  a peanut, I must end up – in the most ordinary of cases – with the peanut between my  fingers.  I  mention  fingers  since  they  are  the  bodily  parts  most  likely  to  be employed to this end, but  it  is possible to  imagine a situation in which my hands are occupied, or are somehow blocked, or do not exist at all  (as may be  the case with aplasics, subjects who congenitally  lack one or several  limbs), and  I have  to grasp the peanut with my mouth or with my feet, where this  is possible. Not any bodily  part  will  do  (I  can’t  grasp  anything  with  my  nose,  due  to  anatomical constraints), but some bodily part has to be employed. The important feature, then, is that the content of my intention crucially  involves one of a  limited set of bodily 
parts, which has to undergo a specific change, one, for instance, that brings it in a specific relation to a certain object.  At this point, one may be tempted to define particular intentions of this kind (e.g.,  the  intention  to  grasp  something,  or  the  intention  to  tear  something) exclusively in terms of the possible final states that count as the accomplishment of that particular  intention. For  instance,  in  the case of catching, one may believe  it 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sufficient to characterize the content of the intention to catch a ball in terms of the ball being in my hands. But that’s not so, for that state of affairs won’t count as the satisfaction of my intention to catch a ball if it is the result of someone’s carefully placing the ball between my hands (Pacherie, ms.). That’s simply not catching, for the  notion  of  catching  implies,  for  instance,  that  the  object  to  be  caught  is  not under  my  (or  anyone  else’s)  control  before  I  catch  it.  The  final  state  by  itself doesn’t  suffice  to  characterize  what  counts  as  the  realization  of  this  kind  of intention:  hence  the  need  of  the  aforementioned  notion  of  a  sequence  of  bodily configurations. That sequence is apt to characterize the relevant kind of outcome, which  is  not  simply  a  state  of  affairs,  but  rather  an  action.  Intentions  whose content  crucially  involves  a  sequence  of  bodily  configurations  will  be  what  we term  motor  intentions.  Examples  are  the  intention  to  grasp  a  peanut  and  the intention to catch a ball.  To clarify, compare these  intentions with, e.g.,  the  intention to be good, or the intention to improve my grades. In both these cases, no specific bodily part is involved  in  the  accomplishment  of  my  intention,  nor  any  sequence  of  bodily movements. Clearly, neither of them is a motor intention. Not even the intention to go to the cinema counts as a motor intention. Although the accomplishment of this intention does involve a displacement of some sort (if I am already in the cinema, I can  at  best  intend  to  remain  there,  not  to  go  to  the  cinema,  unless  it’s  about  a different one),  it doesn’t  imply any specific sequence of bodily movements. I may get to the cinema in any of the following ways: on foot, by car, by bus, or even, in a sufficiently  fanciful  scenario,  by  teletransportation,  a  case  that  allows  one  not perform  any  bodily  movement  at  all.  So  motor  intentions  are  intentions  of  a specific kind, such that their content essentially refers to bodily configurations. In 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this  sense,  what  they  represent  is  sufficiently  close  to  motor  instructions.  But, given  the  level  of  abstraction  that  at  least  some  motor  intentions  enjoy  with respect  to motor  instructions,  the  former are also significantly different  from the latter,  insofar as  the  former, but not  the  latter,  represent action outcomes (those which, in chapter 1, section 5, I’ve termed motor outcomes) with a certain degree of abstraction. At  this point, one might raise  the doubt  that motor  intentions are still  too unlike  standardly  conceived  intentions  in  that motor  intentions  are more  apt  to account  for  spontaneous,  unreflected  actions,  as  opposed  to  actions  planned  in advance.  In  short,  one might  raise  that  doubt  that motor  intentions  provide  the best  interpretation  for  Searle’s  intentions  in  action, while  retaining  the  idea  that intentions  standardly  conceived  are  much  closer  to  what  Searle  calls  prior intentions,  and  that  the  two  are  significantly  different.  The  following  chapter  is going to show that Searle’s prior intentions and intentions lie on a continuum, so that they’re best accounted for in terms of just one kind of intention. I’m going to use  the  notion  of motor  intention  as  the  best  and most  plausible  way  in  which Searle’s  intentions  in  action  be  interpreted  (see  Pacherie,  2000,  for  a  similar strategy).  
Conclusion In  the  present  chapter,  I’ve  highlighted  the  existence  of  a  variety  of  motor intentions,  corresponding  to  different  levels  of  an  action  hierarchy.  While  the motor  intentions  corresponding  to  the  lower  levels  of  the  hierarchy  bear  a significant resemblance to motor images in terms of content, the content of motor intentions higher up in the hierarchy is not so straightforwardly identifiable with 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Introduction “Intention  is  Janus‐faced,  tied both  to  intentional  action and  coordinating plans”, writes Michael Bratman (1984, p. 404).  It  is part of our ordinary conception that intentions and  intentional actions are not unrelated,  and yet  it  is hard  to  specify what  their  relation  is.  Searle  (1983) has put  forward  an  account,  featuring prior intentions and intentions in action, by means of which he proposes to reconcile the two  faces  of  intention.  This  and  analogous  attempts  have  been  criticized  by Bratman  (1984,  1987)  as  expressions  of  what  he  terms  a  Simple  View  on  the relation between intentions and intentional actions.  I  am  going  to  propose  a  unitary  view  of  intention  that  evens  out  the differences  between  intentions  in  action  and  prior  intentions.  My  view  will incorporate Searle’s suggestion that all  intentional actions should be explained in terms  of  intentions.  This  claim  is  by  no means  obvious,  and  has  been  variously opposed (e.g., by Bach, 1978, as well as by Bratman, 1987). To reach this unitary standpoint, I shall first of all expound Searle’s distinction between prior intentions and  intentions  in  action,  and  I  will  subsequently  suggest  that we  should  see  no distinction at all between the two.  
1. The alleged differences between prior intentions and intentions in action: 
temporal characteristics and content The assumption that Searle works on is that intentions, just like beliefs, are Intentional  states,  namely  mental  states  characterized  by  a  directedness  upon 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objects  and  states of  affairs  in  the world  (1983, p. 1) – whenever  I  intend,  there must always be something that I  intend to do.  Intentions have a representational (or Intentional) content and a world‐to‐mind direction of fit. For an intention to be fulfilled,  the  world  has  to  conform  to  it.  On  these  premises,  Searle  proceeds  to draw the distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action. Searle (ibid., p. 84) points out that, while some actions are preceded by the formation of  the  intention  to perform  them –  e.g.,  the  intention  to  kill my uncle, formed (say) one day before the deed – there are some rather spontaneous actions, such as hitting someone all of a sudden, that are not preceded by any intention to so  act.  On  these  assumptions,  Searle  introduces  the  distinction  between  prior 
intentions and intentions in action, the first characterization of which is in temporal terms.  Prior  intentions  are  those  formed  prior  to  the  initiation  of  an  action,  as opposed to intentions in action, which are present as an intentional action unfolds. An  intention  in  action  is  the  component  that  makes  an  action  intentional, regardless of whether the latter has been preceded by an intention to so act.  The following worry might at this point arise: by introducing intentions in action, Searle acknowledges all intentional actions, including spontaneous actions, as accountable for in terms of intentions. As we will see by looking at the content characteristic of intentions in action, Searle defines these intentions in such a way that  they  do  indeed  turn  out  to  be  present  in  all  intentional  actions.  Still,  it  is  a moot  point whether  all  intentional  actions,  and  specifically  spontaneous  actions, can  be  explained  in  terms  of  intentions  (Bratman,  1987,  p.  126,  for  instance, explicitly denies this). So why does Searle allow that intentional actions should be explained in terms of intentions? On the basis of his views about Intentionality, he notes that the conditions of satisfaction of intentions are intentional actions. Then 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he suggests as a provisional  (but, according  to him, on  the right  track) view that “an  intentional  action  is  simply  the  conditions  of  satisfaction  of  an  intention” (1983,  p.  80),  and  thus  makes  room  for  intentions  underlying  all  sorts  of intentional actions by introducing seemingly ad hoc intentions.  So,  one might  be  tempted  to  get  off  the  bus  already  at  this  point  and  to reject  his  account,  or  any  accounts  based  on  his,  on  the  grounds  of  this move.  I believe  that  most  intentional  actions,  including  spontaneous  actions,  can  be accounted  for  in  terms of  intentions,  but  the  reasons why  this  is  so will  have  to wait until  the following sections. Until  that point,  in spite of  the worries that one might  have  already  at  this  stage,  let  us  assume  for  the  sake  of  argument  that Searle’s introduction of intentions in action is justified. Let us now turn to the differences between prior intentions and intentions in  action  in  terms of  content.  For  the  time being,  following  Searle,  I will  keep  to very  simple  intentions  such  as  the  intention  to  raise my  arm.  As  highlighted  by Pacherie  (2000,  p.  405),  there  are  three  related  aspects  concerning  content  in which the two kinds of intention differ, and they are summarized in the following passage:  […] the contents of the prior intention and the intention in action look quite different,  because  […]  the  prior  intention  represents  the whole  action  as the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, but the intention in action presents, but does not represent, the physical movement and not the whole action as the  rest  of  its  conditions  of  satisfaction.  […]  Another  difference  is  that  in any real‐life situation the intention in action will be much more determined than  the prior  intention,  it will  include not only  that my arm goes up but that it goes up in a certain way and at a certain speed, etc. 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(Searle, 1983, p. 93)  A first difference is in terms of Intentional content: while prior intentions have the whole action (I perform the action of raising my arm, in the adopted example) in their  conditions  of  satisfaction,  intentions  in  action  have  the  physical movement (that my arm goes up) in their conditions of satisfaction. A second difference has to do  with  the  contrast  between  presentations  and  representations,  introduced  by Searle  (1983,  p.  46)  within  the  context  of  the  Intentionality  of  perceptual experiences.  The  idea  he  puts  forward  is  that  the  perceptual  experience  of  an object  has  a  kind  of  directedness,  immediacy  and  involuntariness  that  the  belief about the object in its absence lacks. The perception, so to speak, imposes itself on the  perceiver  both  vividly  and  unavoidably.  The  same  difference  between presentation and representation is said by Searle to apply to the contrast between the  perception  of  an  object  and  the memory  of  such  perception.  This  analogy  is exploited to characterize the contrast between the prior intention to raise my arm and my intention in action to raise my arm, the formal relations among which are the  same as  those holding between  (respectively)  the visual memory of a  flower and  the visual perception of a  flower. The  third difference concerns  the  fact  that the content of an  intention  in action  is much more determined, or, we might say, much  more  fine‐grained,  than  that  of  a  prior  intention.  In  the  case  of  the  arm raising example, the prior  intention might  leave unspecified a series of kinematic and  dynamical  details  that  the  intention  in  action  does  specify,  e.g.  the  path followed by the arm rising, the speed at which it rises, etc.   As Searle himself notes (ibid., p. 94), since the contents of the two kinds of intentions have been characterized as very different, the question arises as to how 
  151 
prior  intentions  and  intentions  in  action  are  related  to  each  other.  Searle  puts forward the idea that, whenever both a prior intention and the intention in action to perform a specific action are present, the prior intention causes the intention in action, which  in  turn causes  the physical movement. The action  is constituted by the  intention  in  action  together with  the  physical movement.  By  transitivity,  the prior intention causes the physical movement.   At  this  point,  the  distinction  between  prior  intentions  and  intentions  in action  has  been  presented  both  in  its  temporal  aspects  and  in  those  concerning content. One may still wonder, though, what should lead us to accept that, for such simple intentions as that to raise one’s arm, there should be two distinct kinds of intentions at work. There is at  least a way to understand the distinction between prior  intentions  and  intentions  in  action, which  I’m now going  to  expound,  such that all the highlighted differences fall into place in an at least prima facie natural way.   Suppose one is about to perform an intentional action, e.g., one is about to raise  one’s  arm,  and  has  the  intention  to  do  so  prior  to  the  performance  of  this action. Before action onset, one has a so‐called prior intention to raise one’s arm at a certain point  in  the  future. The content of  the prior  intention  features a deeply unspecified  template  of  the  action  that  one  intends  to  perform:  one may  simply intend to raise one’s arm, following no matter what trajectory, no matter at what speed – hence the representational (vs. presentational) character, and the lack of specification (e.g., the failure to specify kinematic and dynamical details).  By contrast, once the time for acting comes, an unspecified template of the action one wants to perform no longer suffices to fill the content of an intention in action.  On  the  contrary,  the  sequence  of  physical  movements  that  realize  this 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action has to be specified in detail. It follows that the intention in action will have a presentational character, since at the time of action one is actually executing, and no  longer  just  planning,  a  series  of  movements,  and  is  in  touch  with  those movements  in an  immediate and vivid way  that  is  supposedly unavailable at  the time  of  in  advance  planning.  Furthermore,  no  detail  of  the  physical  movements that  realize  the  action,  be  it  kinematic,  dynamical  or  whatever,  can  be  left unspecified.  One’s  arm  will  be  made  to  rise  following  a  specific  trajectory,  at  a determined  speed.  Now  that  I’ve  drawn  this  seemingly  plausible  picture,  I’ll proceed to show in the following section why we shouldn’t accept it.  
2. Annihilating the differences, exploding the myth 
2.1 Temporal differences So  far,  I’ve  described  Searle’s  distinction  between  prior  intentions  and intentions  in  action  as  based  on  temporal  characteristics  as well  as  on  content‐related features.  In what  follows,  I will show that such alleged differences can be annihilated,  starting with  the  temporal  characteristics.  The  question  is:  at which point  in  time,  if  any,  do  prior  intentions  expire?  I.e.,  should  the  fact  that  a  prior intention causes an intention in action, which is part of the action, be interpreted as meaning that prior intentions expire at action onset?  This is precisely what O’Shaughnessy (1991, pp. 273‐274) asks in his quest for a role for intentions in action. He provides the following example: suppose that on Monday I reach a decision to swim the English Channel on Tuesday at 6 a.m.; I thus  form a prior  intention  that  lasts at  least until Tuesday at 6 a.m. What  then? Does the intention suddenly expire as I start swimming? That seems implausible. Surely the intention is still there, for otherwise I’d be irrational if I was swimming 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the Channel without  either  (a)  intending  to,  or  (b) being  forced by  someone.  So, not only the intention is still  there as I begin to swim, but, O’Shaughnessy rightly points  out,  half‐way  across  the  Channel  I  still  have  the  intention  to  swim  from Dover  to  Calais.  For,  “[d]elete  the  intention  at  any  point  [in  the  course  of  the action] and the act fizzles out […]” (O’Shaughnessy, 1991, pp. 273‐274). That is, at whatever point I ceased to have that intention, I would thereby put an end to my action (e.g., O’Shaughnessy says, “I join my friends in the boat”, p. 274). So my prior intention must still be there while the action unfolds.  Now,  the  example  provided  by O’Shaughnessy  concerns  an  action,  that  of swimming  the Channel, which  is much more complex and extended  in  time  than that of raising one’s arm – for one thing, the intention to raise one’s arm could be seen  as  a  proper  part  of  that  to  swim  the  Channel  (depending  on  the  technique employed in swimming). Searle (1991, p. 298) acknowledges that prior intentions can  exist  and  continue  to  function  after  the  onset  of  the  action,  but  he  adds  the proviso “at least in the case of complex extended actions”. But why should the case of simple actions such as raising one’s arm be different? Supposedly, at any point during my arm raising, I still intend to raise my arm. Thus, after action onset, there is an overlap between prior intentions and intentions in action that puts pressure on  the  distinction  drawn  in  temporal  terms:  after  action  onset,  prior  intentions seem  to  become  redundant.  Wouldn’t  it  be  better  to  posit  just  one  kind  of intention,  formed  prior  to  the  initiation  of  the  action  and  persisting  after  action onset?  The  question  now  is  whether  differences  in  content  can  preserve  the distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action. 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2.2 Differences in content Searle  presents  the  differences  in  content  between  the  two  kinds  of intentions  in  a  way  that  is  neutral  between  the  two  following  very  different readings.  On  the  one  hand,  we  may  think  that  the  content  of  a  prior  intention 
needn’t be as detailed as that of an intention in action, and so it normally isn’t. On the other hand, a stronger reading of Searle’s characterization may be given to the effect  that  the  content  of  a  prior  intention  can’t  be  as  detailed  as  that  of  an intention in action. It  is only the latter reading that provides reasons for thinking that we really have two distinct kinds of  intentions there, and I don’t  think there are grounds for granting such stronger reading.  While Searle does not motivate either reading, Pacherie (2000, 2003) seems to suggest the stronger reading, on the basis of two considerations. First of all, she invokes the cognitive cost that having prior intentions with such a detailed content as  the  relative  intentions  in  action  –  a  cognitive  cost  that would,  in most  cases, ultimately be unnecessary. This point is somehow between the two readings that I proposed: it seems to support the idea that the content of the prior intention both 
needn’t be and in general had better not be as detailed as that of a prior intention, which by itself doesn’t necessarily suggest that it can’t be. A second motivation pulls more clearly in the direction of the impossibility for the two contents to be the same, and it has to do with what Pacherie calls the 
anchoring to the situation of the intention, which consists in putting one’s intention in  touch  with  the  information  that  becomes  available  once  the  corresponding action  has  started.  This  process  is  further  divisible  into  two  aspects.  First, supposing  one has  formed  the prior  intention  to  get  on  a  bus  to  go  somewhere, when the time comes one must not only get on a certain bus (say, bus n. 12), but on 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this bus (this is a kind of indexical content), which will be one of the many passing by  the  stop where one  is waiting.  Secondly, more often  than not,  prior  to  action onset  one  is  simply  not  in  the  position  to  predict  all  the  possible  obstacles  that might force one to modify his course of action accordingly (Pacherie, 2003). Now the question is: are these points compelling? In particular, do they suffice to make the content of prior intentions impossible to reconcile with those of intentions in action? To return to the arm raising example, suppose now that the one who forms the  prior  intention  to  raise  his  arm  is  Peter  Sellers,  during  the  filming  of  “Dr Strangelove”.  Here  the  actor  interprets  the  role  of  a  man  (Dr  Strangelove)  who appears to be affected by the anarchic hand syndrome, a neurological disorder in which  the  affected  person’s  hand  seems  to  have  acquired  a  mind  of  its  own. Accordingly, in the film we see Peter Sellers’s hand every now and then suddenly going up as if it was no longer under his control. Presumably, then, at least the first times he was making this movement during the filming, it is plausible that he could have thought out how to move his hand in such a way as to make it look like that of an anarchic hand syndrome patient. That is, we can imagine that, prior to moving his hand, he must have formed an intention not only to raise his hand, but to do so in a way that could look out of his control – in particular, with a specific dynamics (his  hand  goes  up  very  quickly).  Furthermore,  part  of  the  characterization  of Dr Strangelove includes that his arm does not just generally move out of his control, but, specifically, moves in such a way as to reproduce the Nazi Party salute. Peter Sellers must have therefore taken care to orient and move his arm accordingly.  In a nutshell, if we reflect on all the kinematic and dynamical characteristics of  Peter  Sellers’s  arm  moving  up,  it  becomes  plausible  that,  even  prior  to  the 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initiation of such movement, he must have been able to form the intention to raise his arm  in  such a way  that  the content of his  intention was probably as detailed and fine grained as that of his alleged intention in action. In that situation, for the sake of the success of the performance it would be appropriate to work out all the details  of  the  action prior  to  action performance.  Therefore, we wouldn’t  have  a case of useless cognitive cost. Furthermore, between before and after action onset, nothing  changes  either  in  terms  of  indexical  content  or,  presumably,  of  possible obstacles  available –  everything  is  very predictable. This  reflection goes  to  show that  there needn’t be any difference  in  content between  intentions  in  action and prior intentions, insofar as the content of the latter, depending on the need, can in principle be as detailed as that of the relative intentions in action. If we do accept this picture of how the story goes,  then,  the differences  in content between prior intentions  and  intentions  in  action  turn  out  to  be  annihilated.  But  differences  in content,  together with  those  in  terms  of  temporal  characteristics, were  the  only distinguishing features of intentions in action as opposed to prior intentions.   
Conclusion Searle  (1983)  has  put  forward  a  distinction  between  prior  intentions  and intentions in action to account for both faces of intention, namely future‐directed intentions  and  intentional  actions.  While  I  embrace  the  idea  that  intentional actions should be explained  in terms of  intentions,  I object  to Searle’s distinction by proposing that just one kind of intention suffices to do the explanatory job that prior  intentions  and  intentions  in  action  are meant  to  do.  I’ve  argued  that  these two kinds of  intentions are distinguished by Searle on the basis of both temporal and content characteristics. The O’Shaughnessy example showed that, when there 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Introduction In the course of the previous chapters, motor intentions have been introduced as standing in a specific relation to motor representations—either referring to action outcomes  by  deferring  to  action  outcomes,  or  as  having  the  same  content  as  a motor  representation—as  well  as  providing  the  grounds  for  arguing  for  the continuity between prior intentions and intentions in action. In this chapter, motor intentions  will  be  seen  to  occupy  the  lowest  levels  of  a  hierarchical  structure underlying  intentions.  This  will  give  me  the  chance  to  explore  the  notion  of 
intention­with­which, and to review a series of experimental results in the light of the introduced hierarchical structure.  
1. Three notions of intention­with­which As a matter of fact, one of the early versions of the leading theory in philosophy of action, the causal theory of action (Davidson, 1963), had it precisely that intentions with which are simply ways of redescribing what someone is doing  in terms of a 
primary reason, conceived as a pro‐attitude towards actions having some feature F, together with the belief that the action in question has that feature. It is by virtue of  a  relation  to  a  primary  reason  that  actions  count  as  intentional.  Hence,  a reductive theory was given of intentions‐with‐which and of intentional actions to a theory of action featuring primary reasons (see chapter 2, section 2). 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It  is  possible  to  distinguish  among  different  senses  of  intention‐with‐which, following Bratman (1987, pp. 128–ff.) on the notion of acting with an intention45. Bratman  first  traces a distinction between what he  calls acting with an  intention and acting with  a  further  intention.  An  example  for  the  first  case  is  opening  the curtains with  the  intention of  getting more  light  (Bratman, 1987, p. 128).  In  this first  example,  the  act  of  opening  the  curtains  just  is  an  act  of  getting more  light, given  the  circumstances.  Note  that,  therefore,  opening  the  curtains  and  getting more light roughly occupy the same time interval. Also, opening the curtains is one of the possible means to getting more light, and is one of the potentially many ways in which this end could be achieved (for instance, one may have switched the lights on instead). Turning now to acting with a  further  intention, an example of  this  is given  by  opening  the  curtains  with  the  intention  of  washing  the  windows (Bratman,  1987,  p.  128).  In  this  second  example,  the  two  acts—opening  the curtains and washing  the windows—occupy distinct  time  intervals,  such that  the time  interval  occupied  by  washing  the  windows  follows  (while  presumably  not overlapping with)  that  of  opening  the  curtains.  Note  that  washing  the windows could in principle be characterized as an overarching action made of many steps, one of which is opening the curtains, in which case it wouldn’t be true that the two acts  occupy  subsequent  time  intervals,  but  rather  nested  time  intervals  (that corresponding  to  opening  the  curtains  included  into  that  corresponding  to washing  the windows).   For my earlier description of  the  time  intervals  to work, the act of washing  the windows  in  this specific example has  to be  interpreted as less  inclusive,  and  specifically  as  beginning  strictly  after  the  time  interval corresponding to opening the curtains.                                                         45 These distinctions were  sketched  in  chapter 2,  and are now going  to be developed  in greater detail. 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 Once  the  distinction  between  acting  with  an  intention  and  acting  with  a further  intention  is  in place, Bratman proceeds  to distinguish a  strong and weak reading of the former (pp. 129‐ff.). According to the strong sense of acting with an intention,  in the example given beforehand one has the  intention of getting more light.  Acting  with  an  intention  in  the  weak  sense,  by  contrast,  implies  that  one strictly speaking does not intend to get more light, but rather merely endeavours to  get  more  light.  As  Bratman  (1987,  p.  130)  rightly  highlights,  the  contrast between  the  strong  and  weak  sense  of  acting  with  an  intention  is  not  merely verbal, but rather points  to a difference  in  the webs of norms and regularities  to which  intending  and  endeavouring  are  subjected.  I’ve  talked  about  these differences  in  chapter  2,  so  I’m  not  going  to  dwell  on  them  again.  Following Bratman  (1987,  p.  133)  I’m  simply  going  to  stress  that  in  typical  cases  one endeavours to A and intends to A, and, for this reason, in what follows I’m mainly going to be concerned with the strong sense of acting with an intention.   Let  me  now  notice  that,  by  distinguishing  among  acting  with  a  further intention and acting with an  intention  in  the strong sense,  it  is possible  to order actions on the basis of two corresponding principles. As far as acting with a further intention  is  concerned,  as  mentioned  beforehand  if  one  As  with  the  further intention  to  B,  then  A  and  B  will  occupy  subsequent  time  intervals,  with  A preceding B. So we have a binary relation  further­intending­to(x,y) where x and y are  actions  such  that x  and y  occupy distinct  time  intervals  Ix  and  Iy  such  that  Ix precedes Iy. Pairs of actions satisfying further­intending­to(x,y) can thus be ordered along  a  horizontal  axis where  the  variable  is  time. What  about  the  principle  for ordering  actions  based  on  acting  with  an  intention  in  the  strong  sense?  This  is more complicated and will occupy the following sections. 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2. Hierarchically structured actions The notion of action hierarchy is widespread in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience  (Shallice,  1988;  Csibra,  2007;  Hamilton  &  Grafton,  2007),  and  is based on  the  idea  that  actions  can be  structured hierarchically  in  terms of  goals and  sub‐goals. This notion has been  referred  to on  several occasions  throughout the thesis, so I’m not going to give further examples of it at this stage. It is now time to make the notion of action hierarchy more precise. In what follows, I’m going to rely  on Goldman  (1970)  insofar  as  he’s  provided  an  especially  clear  and precise way to render the notion of action hierarchy under the philosophical viewpoint.   
2.1 “A fine­grained procedure for individuating acts” Let me start by a methodological caveat: Goldman’s theory relies on a fine‐grained individuation of actions. I’m going to describe this  interpretation and adopt it  for the sake of argument without actually embracing it: as I’m ultimately interested in arriving  at  a  hierarchical  structure  for  intentions,  nothing  of  what  I’m  going  to propose actually hinges on whether the fine‐grained individuation of action holds.    Goldman  (1970,  p.  1)  proposes  the  following  example.  John  at  the  same time (i) moves his hand, (ii) scares a passing by fly, (iii) moves his hand, (iv) moves his  queen  to  a  certain  slot,  (v)  checkmates  his  opponent,  (vi)  gives  the  said opponent a heart attack, (vii) wins his first game of chess. As Goldman points out, theorists  such as Davidson and Anscombe have  claimed  that  in  this  example  (i)‐(vii) do not point to different act performed by John, but rather to only one act of his, of which (i)‐(vii) constitute different descriptions. This is what Goldman terms the identity thesis, according to which whenever someone could in principle be said 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to be doing many different things at the same time, as in the above example, as a matter  of  fact  she’s  doing  just  one  thing,  of which  different  descriptions may  be given (Davidson, 1963, p. 686, quoted in Goldman, 1970, p. 2).  Goldman  argues  that  the  identity  thesis  faces  a  series  of  insurmountable difficulties. The first is due to the fact that two identical acts, by the principle of the indiscernibility  of  identicals,  should  exemplify  the  same  properties,  and  it  is possible  to  find acts  that  should be  identical  according  to  the  identity  thesis and which at the same time fail to exemplify the same properties. I’m not going to dwell on the examples taken to establish this point (see Goldman, 1970, pp. 3‐4), as the latter is not crucial for my purposes. Instead, I’m going to dwell on another reason why  the  identity  thesis  is  thought not  to hold by Goldman. He reasonably claims that,  if  two  acts  A  and  A’  are  identical,  it  cannot  be  the  case  that  one  bears  an asymmetric and irreflexive relation to the other. For suppose there exists a binary relation R(x,y) such that it is the case that R(A,A’), and at the same time it is not the case  that R(A’,A),  or  that R(A,A),  or  that R(A’,A’).  If  it  is  true  that A  = A’,  then,  by substituting A with A’  and A’ with A  in R(A,A’)  one obtains precisely R(A’,A)  (and similarly  for  R(A,A)  and  R(A’,A’)).  But  an  asymmetric  and  irreflexive  relation holding  between  allegedly  identical  (if  we  rely  on  the  identity  thesis)  acts  can indeed be found according to Goldman, and it is of special interest to us. According  to  the  identity  thesis,  in  the  example  given  at  the  beginning  of this  section  checkmating  one’s  opponent  and  moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  are  identical  acts. We may well  say  that  in  the  situation  described  by  the example one checkmates his opponent by moving the queen to king‐knight‐seven. So,  the  relation by(x,y),  defined  as x  by y,  holds  of  (checkmating one’s  opponent, moving the queen to king‐knight‐seven). Note that this relation is asymmetric, as it 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is  not  the  case  that  one  moves  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  by  checkmating one’s opponent. This relation is also irreflexive insofar as it is not the case that one checkmates  one’s  opponent  by  checkmating  one’s  opponent  (and  similarly  for moving the queen to king‐knight‐seven). Since an asymmetric, irreflexive relation is  found  to  hold  of  supposedly  identical  acts,  and  since  asymmetric,  irreflexive relations cannot hold of identical acts, according to Goldman we should deny that acts  such  as  checkmating  one’s  opponent  and moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven in the above given example are identical acts. This piece of reasoning leads Goldman to adopting what he calls a fine­grained procedure for individuating acts, such that, for instance, checkmating one’s opponent and moving the queen to king‐knight‐seven  are  different  acts.  As  mentioned  at  the  outset,  I’m  not  going  to  be concerned with defending the fine‐grained procedure for individuating acts, but I’ll limit myself to assuming it  for the sake of argument. This will allow me to follow Goldman in the deepening of the relation that can be said to hold between pairs of acts  such  as  checkmating  one’s  opponent  and moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven—namely what Goldman calls  level­generation, which, as I’m going to show, with appropriate modifications can help us elucidate the notion of acting with an intention.  
2.2 What  is  level­generation?  Is  there  a more  useful  notion  for  structuring 
actions?   Level‐generation  (Goldman,  1970,  pp.  20‐ff.)  is  an  asymmetric,  irreflexive and  transitive  relation.  A  definition  of  this  notion  is  going  to  take  most  of  this section,  and  the  subdivision  of  such  notion  into  four  categories.  After  that,  I’ll propose my own revision to that notion. Let us start by noting the following. We’ve 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already  seen  that  checkmating  one’s  opponent  and  moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  in  the  previous  example  are  related  in  such  a  way  that  it  is appropriate  to  say  that  one  checkmates  one’s  opponent by moving  the  queen  to king‐knight‐seven.  In general,  according  to Goldman  (1970, p. 21), whenever  the 
by relation holds between two actions, level‐generation between those can be said to obtain. This is reasonable insofar as, as we’ve seen, the by relation is asymmetric and  irreflexive.  It can also be said that  the by  relation  is  transitive: e.g., once one checkmates  his  opponent  by moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  and moves the queen to king‐knight‐seven by moving one’s hand, it can also be said that one checkmates  his  opponent  by  moving  one’s  hand46.  But  cases  in  which  the  by relation  hold  do  not  exhaust  the  totality  of  the  cases  in  which  level‐generation obtains. So let us see what further characterizes this relation.    Goldman  (1970,  pp.  21‐22)  specifies  two  temporal  properties  of  acts  that are related by level‐generation. First of all, whenever two acts are related by level‐generation,  they  are  always  done  at  the  same  time:  none  is  subsequent  to  the other.  This  is  the  case  for  the  aforementioned  example  of  checkmating  one’s opponent  by moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven.  It  is  not  the  case  that  one moves  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  and  then  checkmates  one’s  opponent  (or conversely).  The  same  goes  for  Bratman’s  example  concerning  acting  with  an intention:  it  is not  the case  that one opens  the curtains and then gets more  light. 
                                                        46 I’d like to point out that the transitivity of the by relation is not wholly unproblematic. For  instance, while  it  is  strictly  speaking  true  that  in  the given example one checkmates one’s opponent by moving one’s hand, it is also the case that checkmating one’s opponent by  moving  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  seems  to  be  much  more  informative  than checkmating one’s opponent by moving one’s hand, and it seems that one may not accept: “By  moving  his  hand”  as  an  answer  to  the  question:  “How  did  he  checkmate  his opponent?”, on the grounds that the former is not sufficiently  informative to count as an appropriate answer (any chess move, and not just checkmating, is going to involve moving one’s hand). 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Rather, the two things are done simultaneously by the same individual. Secondly, working  on  the  assumption  that  the  two  actions  related  by  level‐generation  are done  at  the  same  time,  it  is  not  the  case  that  the  two  actions  in  question  are independent. That is, it shouldn’t be possible to say of two level‐generational acts that one  is performed while also  carrying out  the other.  In Goldman’s words,  the two  actions  related  by  level‐generation  shouldn’t  be  co­temporal.  Indeed,  it  is incorrect  to  say  that  one  moves  the  queen  to  king‐knight‐seven  while  also checkmating  one’s  opponent,  or  that  one  opens  the  curtains while  also  getting more  light.  This  is  because,  as mentioned  at  the  outset,  given  the  circumstances opening the curtains (e.g.) just is getting more light.   So  far,  these  two  temporal  characterizations  ensure  that  any  two  level‐generational acts are going to occupy the same interval of time. But now we need to be told more about the nature of level‐generation. In order to do so, we need to separately look at four categories of level‐generation that Goldman considers to be exhaustive of all cases of level‐generation. As I proceed to illustrate the differences among  them,  the  nature  of  level‐generation  is  going  to  become  clearer.  I’ll  also mention  my  reservations  about  certain  aspects  of  the  taxonomy  proposed  by Goldman,  and  this will  give me  the  opportunity  to  introduce  the details  that  are still missing in Goldman’s framework to obtain the hierarchical structure that, I’m going to propose, underlies intentions.   Goldman  (1970,  pp.  22‐ff.)  distinguishes  among  four  kinds  of  level‐generation:  (1)  causal  generation,  (2)  conventional  generation,  (3)  simple generation,  (4)  augmentation  generation.  In  the  case  of  causal  generation,  the generated  action  is  always  one  that  can  be  described  in  terms  of  causing  E  or 
bringing about E, where E is an event or state of affairs (Goldman, 1970, p. 23). For 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instance,  in  a  given  situation  in which  I  flip  the  switch  and  thereby  turn  on  the light, my flipping the switch causally generates my turning on the light, where the latter  act  can  be  rendered  as  causing  the  light  to  go  on.  Causation  is  involved insofar as one’s causally generating act A causes a certain event E (my flipping the switch  causes  the  lights  to  go  on),  and  causally  generates  a  certain  act  A’  (my flipping the switch causally generates my turning on the light), and one’s causally generated act A’ consists in one’s causing the event E (Goldman, 1970, p. 23). Still, as  Goldman  warns,  one’s  causally  generating  act  does  not  cause  one’s  causally generated act (my flipping the switch doesn’t cause my turning on the light—in the given  circumstances,  it  is my  turning  on  the  light).  More  will  be  said  about  the contrast between causation and causal generation in due course.   Conventional  generation  (Goldman,  1970,  p.  25)  relies  on  social conventions or practices making  it  the case  that,  in appropriate circumstances C, act A counts as act A’. For instance, extending one’s arm out of the window while driving  counts  as  signalling  for  a  turn.  According  to  Goldman  (1970,  p.  26),  this relies on the presence of appropriate circumstances C—driving a car as opposed to standing  in one’s  garage with one’s  car  engine  switched off  and one’s  car  sitting still—such that,  in those circumstances, a rule R makes it the case that extending one’s arm out of the window while driving counts as signalling for a turn. As for the rules underlying cases of conventional generation, Goldman subdivides them into normative  and  non‐normative.  Normative  rules  have  to  do  with  specifying  acts that are obligatory or forbidden, and give rise to examples such as one in which S’s trying  to  save  his  friend’s  life  conventionally  generates  S’s  doing  his  duty.  Non‐normative  rules  rest  on  institutional  frameworks  or  games  dictating  the significance of certain acts in certain circumstances, and are at the basis of the turn 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signalling  example,  or  of  the  example  involving  checkmating  one’s  opponent  by moving one’s queen  to king‐knight‐seven. As we’ll  see,  cases of  the  latter sort,  in comparison with  those  involving  normative  rules,  are  easier  to  accommodate  in the framework that I’m going to propose.   Simple  generation  (Goldman,  1970,  p.  26),  by  contrast  with  causal generation,  doesn’t  involve  causation  at  all:  it  relies  solely  on  the  presence  of circumstances that make the performance of an act A also the performance of an act A’. For instance, in circumstances in which George has jumped six feet, my act of  jumping 6  feet 3  inches  counts  as outjumping George  (Goldman, 1970, p.  26). Goldman  contrasts  simple  generation  not  only  with  causal  generation,  but  also with  conventional  generation,  since  simple  generation  doesn’t  appeal  to  the existence of rules. Still, to the extent that simple generation relies on the presence of the appropriate circumstance, I would say that there is some degree of similarity between simple and conventional generation. Let  us  now  turn  to  agumentation  generation  (Goldman,  1970,  pp.  28‐ff.), which  is where my main disagreement with Goldman  lies. Here  are  a  few of  the examples of  augmentation generation  that he provides. S’s  running at 8 m.p.h.  is level‐generated  by  augmentation  by  S’s  running.  S’s  jump‐shooting  is  level‐generated  by  augmentation  by  S’s  shooting  (in  a  basketball  context).  Now, Goldman claims that the generated act is obtained by, so to speak, augmenting the generating act with a certain manner or with certain circumstances in which it  is performed.  Goldman  claims  that  this  form  of  level  generation  is  significantly different  from  the  other  three,  insofar  as,  for  instance,  the  by  relation  doesn’t capture  it—by  his  lights,  we  would  not  normally  say  that  S  ran  at  8  m.p.h.  by running, or that S jump‐shot by shooting. And herein lies the mistake, I claim. For, 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instead,  I  think  we  can  agree  that  it  would  be  admissible  to  say  that  S  ran  by running at 8 m.p.h., or, even more clearly,  that one shot by  jump‐shooting,  in  the following sense. Running at 8 m.p.h.  is one of  the possible ways to run. Likewise, jump‐shooting  is  one  of  the  possible  ways  in  which  one  may  shoot.  Goldman’s characterization  of  augmentation  generation  is  not  sensitive  to  this  feature, whereas one thing that seems to be implicit in his notion of level‐generation more generally is that to which I’ve made reference ever since the first chapters, namely a means‐end relation. To be precise, cases of augmentation generation are going to be more appropriately described in terms of determinate‐determinable relation, in the following sense. Cases of what Goldman terms of augmentation generation are such that, e.g., one cannot run at 8 m.p.h. without running. Running at 8 m.p.h.  is thus best described as a  further determination of running, as opposed to a means towards  running.  The  relevant  similarity  between  means‐end  relations  and determinate‐determinable relations is that for every couple of acts (x,y) satisfying either kind of relation, x  is always going to be more determinate and constrained than y.  In what follows, I’m going to use the term means­end­generation, with the understanding  that,  whenever  what  Goldman  terms  augmentation‐generation  is involved,  means‐end‐generation  has  to  be  interpreted  as  determinate‐determinable‐generation. With these ideas in place, if we look back at all the other cases of level‐generation, it seems that we can analyse all of them in terms of what I’m going to term means‐end‐generation.  Take causal generation. Opening the curtains is one of the possible means to getting  more  light  (alternatively,  one  could  have  switched  on  the  light).  As  for conventional  generation,  cases  of  non‐normative  generation  are  easier  to accommodate in terms of means‐end relations. In the car example, extending one’s 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arm out of the window is one of the possible ways of signalling for a turn—another could  be  resorting  to  the  indicators.  It  is  not  so  straightforward  to  establish  the idea that, for instance, saving a life is one of the many ways of doing one’s duty. It seems  that  in  the given example one  is not  simply seeking  for a way  to do one’s duty, which may likewise be fulfilled by throwing an envelope in the appropriate bin as opposed to throwing it on the ground, but rather one wants to do one’s duty with respect  to  the  threatened  life. But, as  it’ll become clear  in  the course of  this chapter,  it’s  much  more  concrete  cases,  which  happen  to  be  captured  in  non‐normative vs. normative rules, that I’m interested in, so I think we can live with the difficulty  that  normative  rules  seem  to  pose.  As  I  said  earlier  on,  augmentation generation,  by  contrast,  had  better  be  characterized  in  terms  of  determinate‐determinable‐generation,  with  the  outcome  that  the  order  of  generation  among acts linked by augmentation gets reversed with respect to Goldman’s framework. Curiously enough, Goldman considers the option that I’m proposing, namely that  augmentation  generation  should  be  conceived  as  operating  in  the  opposite direction, but rejects it on the following grounds.   In  all  of  the  other  species  of  generation,  a  generated  act  is  formed  by making use of some additional  fact not  implicit  in the generating act. This feature of generation is preserved by saying that S’s running generates S’s running  at  8 m.p.h.;  it  would  run  contrary  to  this  feature  to  say  that  S’s running at 8 m.p.h. generates S’s running. (Goldman, 1970, p. 29)  Still,  there  are  important  reasons  in  favour  of my  interpretation.  First  of  all,  all other  three  forms  of  level‐generation  can  be  re‐read  in  terms  of  a means‐end  / 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In  this  structure,  each  action  (n)  means‐end‐generates  action  (n‐1).  One  may wonder  whether  this  sort  of  structure  constructed  by  means  of  means‐end‐generation  ever  bottoms  out,  and,  if  so, where.  That  is,  could we  once more  ask how  (v)  is performed and  thus obtain  a  sixth  action  in  reply? Could we  then  re‐apply  this  strategy  over  and  over?  Until  when  can  we  do  so  and  obtain  as  an answer  an  event  that  a  subject  can  voluntarily  initiate  (thus  excluding  answers along the lines of producing neuron firings in one’s brain47)? 
In  order  to  answer  these  questions,  it  is  now  time  to  tackle  the notion  of 
basic action. We’ve already explored at length the idea that there are actions that we  perform  by  performing  other  actions—e.g.,  checkmating  one’s  opponent  by moving one’s queen to king‐knight‐seven. The notion of basic action, roughly, has to do with the idea that there are actions that are not performed by means of other actions  (see  Goldman,  1970,  p.  6).  A  methodological  caveat:  the  following discussion will rely on the idea that we have at least an intuition, along the above mentioned lines, as to what a basic action may be. This intuition is going to guide our quest for a definition of basic action, a definition that will enable us to include what we think should count as a basic action and to rule out what should not count as  a  basic  action,  either  because  it’s  too  complex  and/or  abstract  for  being generated without performing a more basic action (e.g., becoming a good person is not  a  basic  action),  or  because we  cannot  consciously  initiate  it  (e.g.,  producing                                                         47 This example is due to Searle (1983, p. 99). 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neuron  firings  in  one’s  brain  is  not  a  basic  action—it’s  not  an  action  at  all—and contracting certain muscles in one’s arm and hand48 for most people are not basic actions49).  
The notion of basic action was introduced by Danto (Danto & Morgenbesser, 1963; Danto, 1965, reported in Goldman, 1970, p. 24), and defined in the following way: 
A is a basic action if and only if  (1) A is an action, and (2) whenever S performs A, there is no other action A’ performed by S such that A is caused by A’. 
 Goldman rightly notes that if the notion of basic action is meant to do justice to the idea that there are actions that are not performed by means of other actions, then Danto’s  formulation, as  it  stands,  is  inadequate. Goldman claims  that  the mistake lies  in  appealing  to  causation  instead  of  causal  generation.  Now,  as  pointed  out beforehand, the notions of causation and causal generation are indeed related, but they’re  also  importantly  different.  Essentially,  whenever  causation  between  two events  is  involved,  this  normally  implies  that  the  causing  event  precedes  the caused event. On the basis of the temporal characteristics of level‐generation, this means that two events related by causation cannot be related by causal generation.   Goldman  (1970,  p.  24)  points  out  that  appealing  to  causation  instead  of causal generation results in failing to classify as basic actions acts that we’d like to 
                                                        48 Another example due to Searle (1983, p. 99). 49 But see Pacherie (2008, p. 199). 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x,”  “being  pro  x,”  “finding  x  an  attractive  possibility,”  “finding  x  to  be  a ‘fitting’ or ‘appropriate’ possibility,” etc.52 (Goldman, 1970, p. 49)   Accordingly, Goldman’s reference to a want as the origin of a given action ensures that  the agent has a positive attitude  towards  the action  in question:  it  is not an involuntary action, but rather one that the subject wishes to carry out. As for level‐generational knowledge and cause‐and‐effect knowledge, Goldman observes that, whenever we mean to carry out an action A’ that is not basic, we need to want to perform  an  act  A  that  is  either  going  to  cause  A’  or  level‐generate  A’.  So,  for instance,  if our goal  is  to pull  faces we’ll need  to contract our  facial muscles  in a 
                                                        51  Here  is  Goldman’s  definition  (see  Goldman,  1970,  pp.  10‐ff.  on  act‐types  and  act‐tokens):  
Property A is a basic act­type for S at t if and only if: (a) If S were in standard conditions with respect to A at t, then if S wanted to 
exemplify A at t, S’s exemplifying A at t would result from this want; and (b) the  fact  expressed  by  (a)  does  not  depend  on  S’s  level­generational 
knowledge  nor  on  S’s  cause­and­effect  knowledge,  except  possibly  the 
knowledge that his exemplifying A would be caused by his want. (Goldman, 1970, p. 67) 52  Goldman  subsequently  (1970,  pp.  86‐ff.)  gives  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  notion  of 
wanting, but I leave it aside as, for reasons to be explained shortly, it is best to substitute this notion with that of intending, in line with the theory developed throughout my thesis. 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certain way, stick our tongue out, and so on, and all  these  level‐generational acts will  need  to  be  voluntarily  initiated.  Wanting  to  pull  faces,  in  short,  results  in initiating  a  series  of  acts  that  are  level‐generationally more  basic,  and which  in turn require voluntary initiation.  By contrast, Goldman claims (1970, pp. 65‐66), if we want to move our hand, as far as our voluntary initiation goes there’s nothing level‐generationally more  basic  that we may want  to  do.  Analogously,  there  are acts  such  as  vomiting  (Goldman,  1970,  p.  66)  that  cannot  be  induced  at  will without  voluntarily  initiating  acts  that  are  causally  more  basic,  such  as  putting one’s  fingers  down  the  throat.  Acts  such  as  vomiting  do  not  therefore  count  as basic actions. Now,  I  acknowledge  the  improvement of Goldman’s notion of basic action over Danto’s as for capturing the idea of an action that is not performed by means of any other action, but I think that further modifications to Goldman’s formulation are possible, which will make the notion suited to my purposes. First of all, when it comes to the want requirement, we’re now equipped with a sufficiently powerful notion of intention to make that requirement even more efficient in capturing the notion  of  basic  action.  So we’re  going  to  have  as  a  first  requirement  that  for  an action A to be a basic action for a subject S, S has to be able to intend to perform A, and performing A is going to follow from one’s intention to A. For all that has been said  throughout  the  present  work,  appeal  to  intentions  has  a  number  of implications.  First  of  all,  an  intention  is  much  more  than  a  favourable  attitude towards  an  action,  insofar  as,  for  instance,  intention  defies  reconsideration, whereas a mere favourable attitude not necessarily does (and most  likely won’t). Also, we have a much better grasp on how performing an action A follows from the corresponding intention. 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Most  importantly  for present purposes, we know that having an  intention implies being able to introspect the content of that intention, so we can only have intentions whose content we can introspect. This feature of intentions leads us to put a lower boundary on actions that qualify as candidates for being basic,  in the following way. Suppose I execute a certain hand movement—say, while playing the piano.  That  hand  movement  can  be  characterized  at  one  level  (e.g.)  as  an alternating  contracting  of  my  index  and  middle  finger.  At  a  means‐end‐generational  level below,  it  can be  characterized as  an  alternating  contracting of my  index and middle  finger at a certain angle and at a certain speed. Should our expressive  capacities  come  to  an  end,  we  may  still  in  principle  resort  to demonstrative  concepts.  Characterizations  at  means‐end‐generational  levels further below are going  to be possible depending on our degree of awareness of our actions,  on our  introspective abilities, which are going  to be different  across individuals.  The  introspectability  requirement  on  intentions  is  going  to  ensure that,  in  accordance  with  individual  variability  in  introspective  abilities  and awareness, it’ll be possible to characterize as basic actions only events that a given subject  is  capable  of  voluntarily  initiating.  Some  events  will  be  beyond  the capability of voluntary initiation for most individuals, whereas other events might present  an  interesting  variation  across  individuals.  On  the  latter  point,  Pacherie (2008, p. 199) notes that contracting certain muscles cannot be a basic action if not (perhaps)  for  some  yogi.  Interestingly,  she  notes,  for most  people  it  won’t  be  a basic action insofar as one may need to voluntarily  initiate other actions, such as raising  one’s  arm,  in  order  to  obtain  the  contraction  of  the muscles  in  question (either by means‐end‐generation or by causation, I’d like to add). 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As  for  Goldman’s  second  requirement  concerning  the  independence  of  an action  from  level‐generational  or  causal  knowledge,  in  the  light  of  my  earlier considerations  about  level‐generation  I’m  going  to  substitute  the  latter  with means‐end‐generation.  So  I’m  going  to  suggest  as  a  second  requirement  for  an action  A  to  be  a  basic  action  for  subject  S  that  there  mustn’t  be  any  action  A’ means‐end‐generationally more basic than A that the agent may intend to perform. Prima  facie,  my  proposal  looks  remarkably  similar  to  Searle’s  (1983) characterization of basic actions according to which:  
A is a basic action type for an agent S iff S is able to perform acts of type A and S can  intend to do an act of  type A without  intending to do any other actions by means of which he intends to do A. (Searle, 1983, p. 100)  Still,  there  are  a  few  relevant  differences.  As  for  Searle’s  second  requirement, which would seem to be  identical with mine,  it’s worth  recalling  that  the way  in which I’ve developed the notion of intention significantly diverges from Searle’s53.   One  thing  that,  according  to  Searle  (1983,  p.  100),  follows  from  his definition is that it makes the notion of basic action dependent on the agent and on her skills, in such a way that an action which is basic for a given agent may not be likewise basic for another agent. Searle provides the following example: for a good skier, making  a  left  turn  can  be  a  basic  action,  insofar  as  he  no  longer  needs  to worry  about  (I  take  it,  in  the  sense  of  voluntarily  initiate  while  consciously attending to) the relevant means‐end‐generational actions, such as shifting weight                                                         53 See chapter 5  for my rejection of Searle’s  (1983) distinction between prior  intentions and intentions in action. 
  178 
from one ski to another, and so forth. The beginner, by contrast, in order to make a left  turn  will  need  to  consciously  attend  to  all  these  features,  being  unable  to bypass them and exclusively focus on the means‐end‐generational  levels above54. Does the same result follow from my definition? Not quite, and I’ll explain why.    Recall  the discussion  that  I made  in  chapter 3  about  the  accessibility  of  a mental  state  to  introspection.  There  I  insisted  on  the  idea  that  accessibility  to introspection of the content of a mental state at a given point—say, during action execution—does not have any bearing on the question as to whether that mental state  is  an  intention.  A  certain  mental  state  may  well  be  in  intention,  while  its availability  to  introspection  is  limited  on  certain  occasions  due  to  the  demands related to a successful performance (see the notion of flow introduced in chapter 3, section 3.3). The take‐home message relevant to the present circumstances is that accessibility  of  a  mental  state  to  introspection  may  vary  from  time  to  time depending on the circumstances. Skill, however, is a different variable with respect to capability for introspection. While it is true that one often ends up introspecting at a less deep level once she’s become more skilled, becoming more skilled doesn’t straightforwardly  imply a  change  in  the basic  action  that one  is  able  to perform, unless acquiring a  skill  is  accompanied by a  flat‐out  and  irredeemable  change  in capabilities for introspection. That’s why Searle’s point about basic actions varying with the subject’s skill needs to be handled with more care.   Let  us  now  take  stock.  On  the  basis  of  Goldman  (1970),  with  a  series  of modifications, I’ve introduced the idea that, for any action that one may be said to perform at a given time, one is simultaneously performing a series of other actions that are ordered in a hierarchy on the basis of the means‐end‐generation principle.                                                         54  Pacherie  (2008,  p.  199)  provides  an  example  in  the  same  vein,  according  to  which executing a trill may be a basic action for a skilled pianist, but not for the novice. 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By means of the notion of basic action, I’ve suggested that each hierarchy bottoms out. Now recall  some examples of action hierarchies  that  I gave earlier on  in  the chapter, and recall the lowest action that I described in each of them—which is not necessarily where they ended, as they may in principle have ended further down. The hierarchy corresponding to the chess example was specified down to moving one’s  hand.  In  the  gun  firing  example,  the  lowest  specified  level  involved contracting my  fingers. These  levels all  seem to  involve actions which,  insofar as they  essentially  involve  a  movement  of  one’s  body,  are  apt  to  fulfil  motor intentions—let’s call them motor acts. Even leaving it open whether the described actions  are  basic  or  not,  actions  that  are  even  more  means‐end‐generationally basic  are most  likely  going  to  involve motor  acts.  Should we  then  conclude  that basic actions just are motor acts?    Things  are  far  from  being  so  straightforward,  but  there  certainly  is  an interesting intersection between basic actions and motor acts. Even supposing for the sake of argument that whenever an action is basic it is a motor act, taking into account the variability across individuals discussed at length has the consequence that, with respect to a given action type, for different people, different actions, that are both motor actions, may be basic. For what I’ve said so far, it could at best be the case that basic actions are a non‐trivial subset of motor acts.   
4. Structuring intentions on the basis of actions Let us now take stock. We started with the observation that there are at least two senses of acting with an intention, namely acting with an intention (which in turn can  be  interpreted  in  a  strong  and  in  a  weak  sense)  and  acting  with  a  further 
intention. We have seen that it is possible to order actions along two axes following 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these  two  principles.  Acting  with  a  further  intention  provides  an  ordering  of actions  along  a horizontal  axis,  such  that Aing with  the  further  intention of Bing implies that action A precedes action B—if one opens the curtains with the further intention  of  washing  the  windows,  opening  the  curtains  precedes  washing  the windows. By contrast, acting with an intention tout‐court provides an ordering of actions along a vertical axis, which I’ve been calling an action hierarchy structured on the basis of means‐end‐generation. Whenever an action A  is a means towards accomplishing action B, A can be located below B, and this vertical ordering comes to an end with a basic action.   Now, so far I’ve followed Goldman’s idea that actions related by means‐end‐generation occupy  the  same  interval of  time. Things may not necessarily be  that simple, however, if we consider that a single action may be means‐end‐generated by a series of more than one action. Recall that, at the beginning of this chapter, I suggested  an  alternative  interpretation  of  Bratman’s  example  involving  opening the  curtains  in  order  to  wash  the  windows.  According  to  that  interpretation, washing the windows could in principle be characterized as an overarching action made  of  many  steps,  one  of  which  is  opening  the  curtains,  the  latter  therefore occupying  an  interval  of  time  which  is  strictly  less  extended  than  that corresponding to washing the windows. Working on these assumptions, the action of washing the windows can be thought to be means‐end‐generated by a series of actions  less  extended  in  time,  such  as  opening  the  curtains,  dipping  a  cloth  in  a bucket of water, and so on.  Now,  there  are  deep  and  difficult  questions  as  to  how  actions  should  be segmented along a given  level  (e.g.,  should  there be an action of reaching  for  the cloth  between  opening  the  curtains  and  dipping  the  cloth  in  water?  Or  does 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reaching  for  the  cloth  belong  to  a  level means‐end‐generationally  below dipping the cloth in water?) Experimental evidence shows that the subdivision of an event such as an action into meaningful steps is routinely performed by human beings, as witnessed  by  research  on  behaviour  parsing  (introduced  by  Newtson,  1973). Research  on  how  individuals  segment  the  actions  they  observe  into more  basic chunks has yielded controversial results (see Kurby & Zacks, 2008). The question as  to how actions  are  to be  segmented both  as  far  as  their production  and  their observation  are  concerned  still  needs  a  lot  of  work.  For  the  time  being,  it  is plausible  to  suppose  that  (i)  the question as  to which action units one  is  able  to produce has a bearing on that as to which action units one is able to perceive, and conversely  (many  results  concerning  mirror  neurons  and  mechanisms  can  be interpreted  along  these  lines—see  Cattaneo  et  al.,  2007),  and  (ii)  partly  as  a consequence of (i), it could be the case that action segmentations are going to vary across individuals, or even across a single individual’s lifetime.  In spite of all  the difficulties that there might  in practice be  in pinpointing the  correct  segmentation  for  a  given action performed by a  given  individual,  the proposal of a hierarchical structure for action that extends both along a horizontal and  a  vertical  dimension  should  by  now  have  proved  coherent.  I  now  wish  to propose a hierarchical structure underlying intentions that  is going to mirror the hierarchical  structure  underlying  the  corresponding  actions.  First  of  all,  it  is possible to provide different descriptions for an action along a vertical dimension, where any two adjacent  levels are related by level generation. Basic actions have been  defined  as  the  foundations  of  this  hierarchy,  and  motor  acts  have  been characterised as candidates either for basic actions or for actions level generated by basic  actions, where  the  latter  are voluntary movements.  Secondly,  an action, 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such as reaching to grasp a cup of coffee for drinking, may be segmented along a horizontal  dimension,  for  example  into  reaching  towards  a  cup,  grasping  it, bringing  it  to  the mouth,  and drinking  from  it. This has provided  the  context  for introducing motor actions as series of motor acts organised  in a chain. Now  let’s see  what  may  be  gained  under  the  explanatory  viewpoint  by  adopting  the distinctions introduced. 
 
5.  Re­interpreting  experimental  results  in  the  light  of  a  hierarchical 
structure for intentions 
5.1 Re­interpreting results by resorting to the vertical dimension only I’m  going  to  start  by  reviewing  some  experimental  results  as  well  as  some hypothetical  scenarios  that  can  be  interpreted  by means  of  what  I’ve  called  the vertical dimension. I’m going to show that the experimental results as well as the hypothetical  scenarios  in  question  can  be  read  as  involving  a  layering  of intentions—sometimes just motor, sometimes both motor and non‐motor.  Mirror neurons have been recorded (Gallese et al., 1996) that represent not only  grasping  tout‐court,  that  is,  with  whatever  effector,  but  also  some  that respond only to grasping with a specific effector, such as one’s hand (regardless of which hand is being employed), and some that fire only in the case of grasping with 
a  precision  grip  or  grasping  with  a  whole­hand  prehension.  Those  that  fire  in correlation with  grasping with  the hand,  independently  of  the kind of  grip,  have been called broadly  congruent mirror neurons,  by  contrast with  those  that  fire  in correlation with a specific kind of grip, which have been termed strictly congruent 
mirror  neurons.  Notice  that  the  names  that  have  been  chosen  for  these  kinds  of mirror neurons reflect an implicit understanding that grasping with the hand is the 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outcome, whereas precision grip and whole­hand prehension are possible means to achieve  that  outcome.  Likewise, grasping may  be  seen  as  an  outcome  for which 
grasping with the hand and grasping with the mouth are possible means to achieve that  outcome. Thus,  the  above  reported  actions  can be  ordered hierarchically  as follows:  (A1) grasping; (A2) grasping with the hand (or grasping with the mouth);  (A3)  grasping  with  the  hand  using  a  precision  grip  (or  grasping  with  the  hand using a whole‐hand prehension).  A grasping with the hand using a precision grip, therefore, can be described at least at  the  following  three different  levels. These are ordered hierarchically  in such a way  that grasping, at  level  (A1),  is means‐end generated by either grasping with the hand or grasping with the mouth, at level (A2), and grasping with the hand at (A2)  is means‐end generated by  either  grasping with  the hand using  a precision grip or by  grasping with  the hand using  a whole‐hand prehension,  at  level  (A3). Notice  that  the  labels  I’ve  employed,  (A1)‐(A3),  are  not meant  to  imply  that  the corresponding levels are adjacent. I.e., I’m leaving it open that there could be one or  more  action  descriptions  that  are  means‐end‐generationally  intermediate between,  say,  grasping  with  the  hand  (level  (A1))  and  grasping  with  the  hand either with a precision grip or with a whole‐hand prehension (level (A2)). Means‐end  generation  applies  insofar  as  (A1),  (A2)  and  (A3)  occupy  the  same  time interval, and since means‐end‐generation is a transitive relation, even if there were further intermediate level between (A1) and (A2) or between (A2) and (A3), this 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wouldn’t  lead  to  the  denial  of  (A1),  (A2)  and  (A3)  being  related  by means‐end‐generation.  It  is  important  to  note  that  (A1),  (A2)  and  (A3)  are  related  by  that species  of  means‐end‐generation  that  involves  determination  as  opposed  to  a proper  means‐end  relation:  it  is  not  possible,  e.g.,  to  grasp  with  one’s  hand  by using  a  precision  grip  without  grasping  with  one’s  hand.  The  former  action description  is  more  determinate  than  the  latter,  rather  than,  strictly  speaking, constituting a means towards its realization. In  the  light  of  the  earlier  considerations,  the  following  intentions may  be specified as underlying (A1), (A2) and (A3), respectively:  (I1) the intention to grasp; (I2) the intention to grasp with the hand, or the intention to grasp with the mouth; (I3) the intention to grasp with the hand using a precision grip, or the intention to grasp with the hand using a whole‐hand prehension. 
 
  Recall the questions that were posed in the first chapter (section 4): for any given action, how many intentions are being fulfilled? And what kind of intentions? Take an instance of an action of grasping with the hand using a precision grip. This action  fulfils  at  least  three  intentions, namely:  the  intention  to grasp  (level  (I1)), the  intention  to grasp with  the hand (level  (I2)), and  the  intention  to grasp with the  hand  using  a  precision  grip  (level  (I3)).  Given  their  content,  which  involves sequences  of  bodily  configurations,  these  are  all  motor  intentions.  The  same proviso that I made for action levels (A1)‐(A3) holds for (I1)‐(I3): no assumption is being made about the existence of intentions at intermediate levels, so, at least in principle, there may well be more (motor) intentions than an act of grasping with 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A grasping with the hand using a precision grip, therefore, can be described at least at the above highlighted three different levels. These are ordered hierarchically in such  a  way  that  turning  on  the  light  at  level  (A1’)  is  means‐end  generated  by pressing the switch at level (A2’), and pressing the switch at level (A2’) is means‐end generated by pressing  the switch with one’s right  index  finger at  level  (A3’). Once more, I’m leaving it open that there could be one or more action descriptions that are means‐end‐generationally intermediate between, say, pressing the switch and pressing the switch with one’s right index finger—such as pressing the switch with one’s hand. Again, means‐end generation applies  insofar as  (A1’),  (A2’)  and 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(A3’) occupy the same time interval55. It is important to note that different kinds of means‐end‐generation are involved between (A1’) and (A2’) on the one hand and between (A2’) and (A3’) on the other hand. Pressing the switch (at level (A2’)) is a means to turning on the light (at  level (A3’))—an outcome that could likewise be achieved by opening the curtains, if there’s light outside. By contrast, pressing the switch  (at  level  (A2’))  and  pressing  the  switch with  one’s  right  index  finger  (at level  (A3’))  are  related  by  that  species  of  means‐end‐generation  that  involves determination. The  following  intentions  may  be  specified  as  underlying  (A1’),  (A2’)  and (A3’), respectively:  (I1’) the intention to turn on the light; (I2’) the intention to press the switch; (I3’) the intention to press the switch with one’s right index finger. 
 
This  time, only  the  intention  to press  the switch (at  level  (I2’)) and  that  to press the switch with one’s right index finger (at level (I3’)) are motor intentions, given that  their  content  involves  a  series  of  bodily  configurations,  and  it  imposes constraints on which bodily configurations are going to count as the fulfillment of the intention to press the switch. Suppose that one managed to turn on the light by performing  some  sort  of  grasping  action  on  the  switch:  that  wouldn’t  count  as pressing  the  switch,  insofar  as  the  two  actions,  grasping  and  pressing,  are characterized in terms of different bodily configurations. By contrast, the intention                                                         55 At  least, under an understanding of  turning on  the  light  that  is means‐end‐generated, rather than caused by, pressing the switch. 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to turn on the light  is one whose fulfillment doesn’t require any specific series of bodily configurations: anything that is going to bring that result about will do, and the  attainment  of  this  outcome  doesn’t  impose  any  constraints  on  the  bodily movements involved. If there were a device that enabled you to turn on the lights by blinking, you’d be able  to  turn on  the  lights by blinking,  instead of pressing a switch, or instead of opening the curtains. All these bodily realizations of the action of  turning  on  the  lights  are  too  diverse  to  be  grouped  under  an  outcome  that’s defined solely  in motor  terms. To sum up,  the action of pressing  the switch with one’s right index finger involves at least three intentions (the intention to turn on the light; the intention to press the switch; the intention to press the switch with one’s  right  index  finger)  and,  since  no  assumption  is  being  made  about  the existence of intermediate levels of intention with respect to (I1’)‐(I3’), there could in  principle  be  even more—such  as  the  intention  to  press  the  switch with  one’s hand.  Once  again,  (I1’)‐(I3’)  have  been  ordered  by  resorting  solely  to  what  I’ve called the vertical dimension. The last result that I’m going to review exclusively in the light of the vertical dimension  is  the  one  by Gazzola  and  colleagues  (2007),  introduced  in  chapter  1 (section 3.2.5). In that study, two aplasic individuals born without hands or arms underwent an fMRI scan while they watched hand actions, and their brain activity was  studied  in  comparison  with  that  of  sixteen  typically  developed  individuals. Both aplasics, while observing hand actions, activated those areas in their brain—part of the mirror neuron system—that had previously been shown to be involved in  the  execution  of  foot  or  mouth  actions.  Aplasics  are  exposed  to  an  action—grasping—that  can  be  executed  by  different  means—hands,  mouth  or  feet.  The following has to be borne in mind. 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The intentions listed at  levels (I1’’TD)‐(I2’’TD) as those listed at  levels (I1’’A)‐(I2’’A) are  motor  intentions,  and  it  can  be  said  that  the  TD  agent  has  at  least  two intentions  ((I1’’TD)‐(I2’’TD)),  and  is  recognized  to  have  at  least  two  intentions ((I1’’A)‐(I2’’A)) by the aplasic observer. Note, however, that from the point of view of  the aplasic observer  the  intention  to  grasp with  the hand has been  remapped onto the corresponding one in the aplasic’s motor repertoire, namely the intention to  grasp  with  the  hand  or  foot.  The  interpretation  of  the  study  by  Ferrari  and colleagues (2005) is entirely analogous to that of Gazzola et al. (2007), so I’m going to leave it aside. 
 
5.2 Re­interpreting results by resorting to the horizontal dimension only   Now  recall  the  study  by  Fogassi  and  colleagues  (2005),  a  single‐cell recording study on the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) of the macaque monkey brain in which it is shown that grasping‐for‐eating is encoded differently from grasping‐for‐placing  by  mirror  neurons.  The  authors  suggest  an  interpretation  of  their findings according to which some of  the recorded mirror neurons “not only code the  observed  motor  act  but  also  allow  the  observer  to  understand  the  agent’s intentions”  (Fogassi  et  al.,  2005,  p.  662),  from  which  it  would  seem  that  they 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conceive  of  eating  and  placing  as  the  intentions  of  the  acting  individual,  and,  by contrast, it is not clear that the act of grasping has an intention associated to it.   The first thing to note is that, unlike the actions considered in the previous paragraph,  the  two actions  involved  in  the experiment by Fogassi and colleagues can be segmented  into  temporally distinct  components  such as grasp  on  the one hand and eat on the other hand, or grasp on the one hand and place on the other hand.  Due  to  this  temporal  segmentation,  in  order  to  analyze  this  action  we’re going  to  resort  to  what  I’ve  been  calling  a  horizontal  dimension  for  action description. The  first  thing  to point out  is  that,  out of  the  recorded neurons  that coded  for  grasping,  some  responded  differentially  depending  on  the  subsequent act,  whereas  others  discharged  in  the  same  way  regardless  of  the  following segment of action (Fogassi et al., 2005, p. 662). In the light of this, it is possible to say that, while acting in the grasping in order to place condition, the agent has: (i) the intention to grasp, and  (ii) (subsequently) the intention to place. This  is not  the whole  story, however,  insofar as, on  the basis of  the  fact  that  the firing of some grasping neurons is indeed modulated by the subsequent segment of action  (eating or placing)  (Fogassi  et  al.,  2005, p. 662),  it  is possible  to maintain that, in addition, to (i) and (ii), the agent also has: (iii) the intention to grasp‐in‐order‐to‐place. Note that (i), (ii) and (iii) all lie on the same level of a hierarchy. At  this  point,  you might want  to  challenge  the  addition  of  (iii)  as  redundant. However,  I’m  going  to  show  that,  far  from  being  redundant,  an  interpretation featuring  intentions  that  take  into account  the  subsequent  segment of  the action rather  provides  the  best  explanation  for  the  following  result.  An  experiment  on 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typically  developing  vs.  autistic  children  (Cattaneo  et  al.,  2007)  shows  that  a similar sequence of action segments may be executed and perceived as seamless or as detached. In this EMG recording, the activation of the mylohyoid muscle, which is employed  in mouth opening and therefore while eating, was recorded both on TD  children  and  on  autistic  children.  The  recording  was  carried  out  both  while subjects executed and while they observed two kinds of actions—the same actions involved in the experiment by Fogassi and colleagues (2005): grasping to bring to the mouth and grasping to place. For TD children, it was found that: (a) in  execution  phase,  there  was  an  increase  of  the  EMG  activity  of  the mylohyoid muscle  as  soon  as  an  act  of  grasping  in  order  to  bring  to  the mouth  began.  By  contrast,  this  activation  was  absent  when  the  subject grasped an object in order to place it into a container.  (b) In  observation  phase,  an  immediate  activation  of  the  subject’s mylohyoid muscle took place as soon as the experimenter grasped food to bring  it  to the mouth. No such activation was observed in relation to grasping in order to place into a container. The  authors  interpret  these  findings  as  showing  that  the  action  of  grasping  in order to bring to the mouth is treated by the observer as a chain, a unified whole, that makes it possible for the mylohyoid muscle, which controls the last segment of the action, to be activated from the outset of the either executed or observed action (Cattaneo et al., 2007, p. 17829). What about children with autism? Cattaneo and colleagues write:    A  behavior  radically  different  from  that  of  TD  children  was  found  in children  with  autism  both  during  the  execution  and  the  observation  of actions  done  by  others.  The  most  striking  result  was  that  during  the 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execution  of  grasping  to  eat  there  was  no  activation  of  the  MH  muscle during  the  reaching  and  grasping  phase.  Its  activation  was  found  only during bringing to the mouth. (Cattaneo et al., 2007, p. 17829)     In  a  nutshell,  while  typically  developing  children  seem  to  recognise  the motor intention that lies further along in the sequence, autistic children are unable to do so, and only recognise the motor intention to bring an object to one’s mouth towards  the  end  of  the  sequence.  This  may  be  taken  as  showing  that,  while normally action segments can be performed and recognised as chains, sometimes recognition of this chain‐like structure may break down, so that an individual can only perform (or understand) an action segment at a time. For our purposes, this may  be  taken  to mean  that,  while  grasping  to  bring  to  the mouth,  the  typically developing child is going to have all the three following intentions:  (i) the intention to grasp, and  (ii) (subsequently) the intention to bring to the mouth. (iii) the intention to grasp‐in‐order‐to‐bring‐to‐the‐mouth.  By contrast, the autistic child is likely to have only the former two.  
5.3  Re­interpreting  results  by  combining  the  vertical  dimension  with  the 
horizontal dimension Up to this point, we’ve discussed motor intentions related to different segments of an  action,  by  considering  segments  displayed  along  just  one  level  of  the  vertical 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hierarchy.  Now  I’m  going  to  discuss  a  way  to  use  both  dimensions  in  the interpretation  of  an  experiment.  There  is  an  fMRI  study  (Iacoboni  et  al.,  2005) which  is  often  taken  as  parallel  to  Fogassi  and  colleagues’  (2005)  result.  In  this study, subjects were exposed to the following three kinds of stimuli: 
a. Actions: clips showing grasping hand actions (grasping a mug either with  a  precision  grip  or with  a whole‐hand  prehension) without  a context; b. Contexts: clips showing context alone (scenes in which objects were displayed, suggesting a before tea or after tea kind of situation); c. Intentions:  clips  showing  grasping  hand  actions  (grasping  a  mug either  with  a  precision  grip  or  with  a  whole‐hand  prehension), embedded  in  a  specific  context,  before  tea  or  after  tea,  which, respectively, suggested the intentions drinking or cleaning.  
The third kind of conditions—intentions—produced a significantly higher increase of  the signal, compared with actions and contexts,  in areas—the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex—thought  to  contain  mirror  neurons  (Iacoboni  et  al.,  2005,  p.  529).  Iacoboni  and colleagues’ interpretation is that:   premotor mirror neuron areas—areas active during the execution and the observation of an action—previously thought to be involved only in action recognition  are  actually  also  involved  in  understanding  the  intentions  of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal […]. (Iacoboni et al., 2005, p. 529) 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These  statements  are based on  the understanding  that mirror neuron activity  in Iacoboni and colleagues’ study is sensitive to the intentions of drinking vs. cleaning up rather  than  to  the actions of grasping  in different ways. But,  if one  takes  into account  both  dimensions  of  explanation  that  I’ve  proposed,  this  scenario  can  be complicated in at least two ways.  
First  of  all,  Iacoboni  and  colleagues’  interpretation  is  based  on  a  contrast between actions and intentions, or between what is being done and why it is being done, which my notion of motor intention has shown to be inadequate. Grasping is underlain by an intention as much as drinking or cleaning—rather, there might be an issue in assigning a level in the vertical hierarchy to the respective intentions. In particular,  I  claim  that  cleaning  belongs  to  levels  higher  up  in  the  vertical dimension  with  respect  to  grasping,  insofar  as  the  latter,  but  not  the  former, involve a kind of motor content—no constraint on the relevant sequence of bodily movements  holds  for  cleaning.  If  there  really  was  to  be  a  parallel  between  this result  and  Fogassi  and  colleagues’  one,  this  would  mean  that  mirror  neuron activity  is  sensitive  to  something moving  the  cup  somewhere  (say,  to  the  sink), rather  than to cleaning.  I don’t  think that  Iacoboni’s result by  itself enables us  to disentangle between these two available characterizations, and its moral should be determined on  independent grounds—e.g.,  on  the grounds  that motor outcomes, and not intentions underlying actions higher up in the vertical dimension, are the sort of things that mirror neuron activity correlates with. 
Secondly, there is a potential issue with the time interval corresponding to the fulfilment of the intentions of drinking and cleaning. The action of cleaning is subject  to  two  potential  interpretations.  In  the  previous  paragraph,  I’ve  been assuming  that  the  action  of  cleaning  follows  the  action  of  grasping.  But  an 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alternative  interpretation  might  have  it  that  the  action  of  cleaning  encompasses that of grasping: in addition to being located higher up in the hierarchy, it can also be  seen  as  more  extended  along  the  horizontal  dimension.  Call  the  action  of cleaning that’s less extended in time cleaning1 and that which is more extended in time  cleaning2.  Since,  according  to  Iacoboni  and  colleagues  (2005,  p.  529),  “[to] ascribe  an  intention  is  to  infer  a  forthcoming  new  goal”,  they  interpret  the intentions  of  cleaning  as  being  fulfilled  after  the  cup  has  been  grasped—and therefore they interpret cleaning as cleaning1. Still, the results as they stand do not enable us to adjudicate between these two interpretations. There is, then, a variety of intentions with which mirror neuron activity could in principle correlate in the cleaning scenario: 
 
(i) The intention to grasp; (ii) The intention to grasp in order to move away (say, to the sink); (iii) The intention to grasp in order to clean1; (iv) The intention to clean2. 




Conclusion: motor intentions—not so high, not so low  The central question of this thesis was: how are actions connected with intentions? In order to answer this question, first I needed to make it clear what an intention is.  In  the  course  of  chapter  2,  I’ve  established  that  intentions  are  mental  states representing  action  outcomes  with  a  world‐to‐mind  direction  of  fit,  that  they enable  effective  planning,  and  are  inserted  in  a  specific  web  of  norms  that differentiates them from other propositional attitudes—specifically desires, which have  the  same direction of  fit,  and  that  they  are  endowed with  a  content  that  is accessible  to  introspection.  In  chapter  3,  I’ve  highlighted  the  existence  of motor 
representations, namely of representations of an action outcome that depict the self in action as a generator of  forces,  and  thus determine  the pattern of movements that  are  going  to  be  executed,  thereby  driving  action  execution.  Given  the proximity of motor representations to action execution, an answer to the question as  to how actions are  connected with  intentions was bound  to  lie  somewhere at the intersection between the notion of intention and that of motor representation. Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted a commonality between intentions and motor representations, namely the representation of an outcome. Chapter 3 provided the foundations  for  the  notion  of motor  intention,  a  kind  of  intention whose  content has relevant commonalities with that of a motor representation. Chapter 4 made it more precise what  this  commonality  in  terms  of  content  consists  in. On  the  one hand, it emphasized that the content of a motor intention, as well as that of a motor intention,  involves  a  sequence  of  bodily  configuration.  On  the  other  hand,  it 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suggested  the  possibility  to  divide  motor  representations  at  least  into  two categories:  (i) a category of representations whose content is  likely to consist  in a motor image, and (ii) a  category  of  representations  whose  content  is  likely  to  be  captured  in propositional terms.  The motor intentions corresponding to (i) refer to action outcomes by deferring to the  former  kind  of  motor  representation,  whereas  the  motor  intentions corresponding  to  (ii)  are  likely  to  have  the  same  content  as  that  of  the corresponding motor  intentions. Thus we  can  see how motor  intentions  connect intentions  with  actions  by,  in  some  cases,  deferring  to  a  motor  representation, which then drives action execution, and in other cases by having the same content as that of the corresponding motor representation.   Chapter  5  showed  the  independence  of  the  characterization  of  motor intentions,  and  of  intentions  more  generally,  of  temporal  considerations,  thus showing the inadequacy of the notions of prior intention and of intention in action. Thus  I’ve  shown  the  shortcomings  of  a  previous  attempt  to  account  for  the connection  between  intentions  and  actions,  namely  the  notion  of  intention  in 
action.  Chapter  6  completed  the  picture  by  showing  how  motor  intentions  and non‐motor  intentions  can be ordered  in  a hierarchy  that  features both a vertical and  a  horizontal  dimension. Motor  intentions  can  be  located  at  the  lower  levels along the vertical dimension.  The  results  about  mirror  neurons  presented  in  chapter  1  gave  us  the opportunity  to  explore  the  notion  of  a motor  outcome  (chapter  1,  section  5),  an outcome whose content at the same time involves reference to bodily movements 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while enjoying a relative degree of  independence and abstraction with respect to fine movement  details.  In  the  light  of  the  notion  of motor  intention,  it  becomes plausible  to  suggest  that,  since  mirror  neuron  activation  correlates  with  motor outcomes, and motor outcomes are represented by motor intentions, then mirror neuron activation correlates with motor  intentions. On the basis of  this  idea, and taking into account also the framework for intentions worked out in chapter 6, I’ve concluded my thesis by re‐interpreting a series of experimental results concerning mirror neurons in the light of the notion of motor intention. Now,  where  do  we  go  from  here?  Consider  the  problem,  sketched  at  the outset,  of  understanding  other’s  actions.  Suppose  I’m  in  the  presence  of  other people  who  are  carrying  out  some  familiar  activities—say,  someone’s  bringing food to her mouth, while someone else is moving objects away from table. While I observe these individuals, I understand what they are doing—that is, I understand that  the goals of  their actions are,  respectively, eating and  tidying up. What does this understanding consist in? Is it the case that I explicitly reason on the details of the action  that  I observe  to  then conclude  that  it’s an  instance of, e.g.,  eating? Or does my action understanding consist in a process akin to perception?  
Note  that we now have  the  theoretical  tools  for  framing  the  fact  that  that any  token  action  may  simultaneously  fulfil  many  intentions.  For  instance,  my action of picking up objects  from a  table and storing  them away  in  the cupboard may fulfil my intention to move an object, that to store an object away, as well as, simultaneously, the intention to obey my personal love of neatness—and these are hierarchically  ordered.  An  observer may well  be  able  to  tell  that  I’m  picking  up objects and storing them away, and also that I’m tidying up the kitchen, while not necessarily understanding my action as fulfilling a more abstract kind of intention 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such as that of obeying my personal love of neatness (see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Jacob,  2008).  On  the  basis  of  this  example,  we  could  think  that  action understanding can take place at many levels, from more concrete ones—e.g., being able  to  tell an act of grasping  from an act of sweeping—to more abstract ones—e.g.,  being able  to distinguish a  tidying up  just  for one’s own sake as opposed  to tidying  up  in  order  to  obey  one’s  love  of  neatness.  Could  it  be  the  case  that, depending  on  what  level  of  action  understanding  we  are  considering,  the processes  in  which  action  understanding  consists  may  significantly  vary?  If  so, could  it  be  the  case  that  whether  mirror  neuron  activity  plays  a  role  in  action understanding depends on the level of action understanding we are considering? 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